

T H E
KASHMIR
SAGA

SARDAR M. IBRAHIM KHAN

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THE KASHMIR SAGA

BY

SARDAR M. IBRAHIM-KHAN

The Founder-President of Azad Jammu and Kashmir

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PREFACE

This little book is an account of Kashmir's struggle for freedom at a very crucial time in the history of Indo-Pakistan sub-continent. It lays no claim to perfection. Nor could it possibly contain all the details for obvious reasons. In places, I may have given more emphasis to my personal part in this account. For this I may be forgiven.

This book was originally written in 1951-52. It could not then be published for various reasons. One of the reasons was my financial difficulties. Even at the present time, I have faced serious difficulties in bringing this out.

There are things I have deliberately omitted in this account. Those things are in my personal knowledge. If they are published today, they will start a storm of controversy, serving no cause. In fact it is more likely to do positive disservice to our cause of Kashmir's freedom. But it is very logical that history should, one day, know some of those facts. I propose to write them down and have them published, when Kashmir issue will have been settled for all time, if, of course, I lived till that time. Even if I did not live that long, I will see that those facts get published after my death.

M. IBRAHIM KHAN

82-D (1), Gulberg 3, Lahore.

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The Author

Chapter I

Historical Background

The State of Jammu and Kashmir is bounded in the north by the Russian and Chinese Republics. The independent kingdom of Afghanistan lies to the north-west. On its south-west is the Province of West Pakistan. A very small area in the south-east of the State has common boundaries with the Republic of India.

The State has an area of 84,471 sq. miles. There are only two plains in all this vast area. One is the valley of Kashmir, 84 miles long and about 25 miles wide with the summer capital, Srinagar, in the centre, and the Jhelum river running from east to west down the centre. The other is the Jammu plain, which is a continuation of the Punjab plains, divided to the east by the Chenab, and separated on the west from the hills of the Rawalpindi and Hazara districts of West Pakistan by the Jhelum river. The Panjal range of mountains, averaging 14,000 ft. high, encloses the valley of Kashmir on its southern and western sides. The slopes of the Jammu plain are a continuation of the plains of West Pakistan.

The main Himalayan chain, with summits from 15,000 to 23,600 ft., runs north-west from the southern boundary of the Indian Hill State of Chamba, in an almost straight line to near the Indus. A quarter of the State's area lying to the south-west of this main Himalayan chain, is comparatively well-watered and supports as large a population in its two plains. Beyond the main Himalayan chain, the upper reaches of the Indus drain

a drier and more barren broad belt of mountains culminating in the north in the high peaks of Karakorum, separating Ladakh and Baltistan from Sinkiang—a Province of Communist China, and cut right through by the Hunza river near their western end, where they are continued in the Hindukush running along the northern boundary of the State of Chitral, now acceded to Pakistan. The valleys of eastern Ladakh support a sparse population, but in the much lower valleys of Baltistan and the Gilgit Agency to the north-west, a considerable part of the population lives on agriculture. South-west and west of Gilgit, the mountains do not attain such heights and are more broken. The climatic conditions of the country vary from the arctic cold of Ladakh district to the extreme heat of the West Pakistan plains. Tropical heat is experienced in Jammu Province. The Kashmir valley enjoys a temperate climate during summer but is very cold in winter. In early November, the Banihal Pass on the road to Srinagar from Jammu becomes snow-bound, and throughout the winter months is not open to any traffic. In the Frontier Districts, extreme cold prevails throughout the year. The deep narrow valleys in Kashmir and Gilgit are, however, hot and damp.

Rainfall is scanty in the frontier regions, but in the rest of the State it varies from 30 inches to 65 inches a year.

From the point of view of area, the State of Jammu and Kashmir is the largest in India and Pakistan. Its area is slightly smaller than that of Great Britain. The area of the former Indian States of Mysore, Travancore, Jaisalmeer and Bikaner, all put together, is equal to the area of Jammu and Kashmir State. The area of Jammu and Kashmir State is again equal to the area of Belgium, Denmark, Holland, Austria and Albania, all put together.

The population of the State, according to the Census Report of 1941, was 40,21,616. The following figures,

based on the Census Report of 1941, give the composition of the main communities in different Provinces of the State—

Name of Province	Total Population	Muslims	Non-Muslims
Jammu Province	.. 19,81,433	12,15,676	7,65,757
Kashmir Province	.. 17,28,705	16,15,478	1,13,227
Frontier Districts	.. 3,11,478	2,70,093	41,385

It thus appears that the population of the State of Jammu and Kashmir is larger than that of Iraq and almost equal to that of Switzerland. The main religions of the people of the State are Islam, Hinduism, Sikhism and Buddhism. It will be observed from the statistics given above, that, in 1941, the Muslims formed a Majority in all the provinces of the State. They constituted 77.11 per cent of the total population of the State, the Hindus being 21.12 per cent and the Sikhs 1.64 per cent. There are some 40,000 Buddhists in Eastern Ladakh, but the population of Ladakh as a whole, including Baltistan, is predominantly Muslim. The annual increase in population has been estimated at a little over one per cent.

In race and culture, the people of Jammu and Kashmir State vary according to the region in which they live. The people of Ladakh and Baltistan have typically Mongolian features. Their culture and language are different from those who live in Gilgit or in the valley of Srinagar itself. The people of Gilgit, though akin in their features to the people of Ladakh and Baltistan, have markedly different characteristics. Their language is different from those who live in Gilgit and in the valley of Srinagar or those who live in the Province of Jammu.

The people of the valley of Kashmir speak a different

language to the rest of the State, called "Kashmiri". They have a different dress and follow slightly different customs. The people in the rest of the State, namely, the whole of Jammu Province, including Poonch, are closely akin to the Muslims of West Pakistan.

The Hindus of ancient times were never good historians. There is, therefore, no reliable historical material relating to the Hindu period in all parts of India. With the ancient land of Kashmir this is not the case. An available record of our past has been preserved in a famous book called "Raj Tarangini" by the prominent historian Kalhana who lived in the first half of the twelfth century A.D.

The Hindu kings ruled over Kashmir for over four thousand years. During this long period of history, twenty-one dynasties came to power one after the other. An account is given about the kings of this period, but most of this appears to be of a conjectural nature.

It is not possible to describe precisely the social or economical conditions of the people of the Kashmir during the earlier parts of the Hindu period except that the governments in those days were based on absolute patriarchy. The quality of every regime depended on the personal traits of the particular Raja. It does not fall within the scope of this small book to go into all that.

The most famous king of Kashmir was one Raja Lalitaditya (715-752 A.D.). It is related that when he ascended the throne, the State of Kashmir was in a disorderly condition. He restored peace and normal conditions and established a strong Government. After doing this, he started on a wide conquest of other countries. It is told that he went as far as Central Asia and returned to his country *via* Tibet after remaining absent for twelve years from his seat of Government.

It is obvious that the lives of the Hindu kings,

generally speaking, were very simple. Most of them were the absolute monarchs peculiar to mediaeval times, but this did not prevent some of them from looking after their subjects very well. These realised that their lives were closely associated with the people of their country, and many of them were not infrequently drawn from amongst their people. Huan Tsiang, the great Chinese traveller, who visited Kashmir in 617-53 A.D., found the people in the State prosperous and happy. He narrates that some of the adjacent territories of the State were subject to the rule of kings of Kashmir.

In spite of the simple times of those days, the people were advanced in their culture, and in many other walks of life. Their progress was striking enough even for this modern age. We, of the present generation, can and should take legitimate pride in the fact that our earlier ancestors evolved a philosophy of their own which was profound and popular. This philosophy was characterized by absolute monism, a depth of fine originality which has been universally acknowledged.

Between the years 1310 A.D. and 1553 A.D., Kashmir was ruled by local Muslim kings. Between 1515 A.D. and 1718 A.D., the State was ruled by Mughal kings, and between 1718 A.D. and 1819 A.D., by Afghan Governors. This would show that Kashmir was under independent Muslim rule for more than five hundred years. In the beginning of the fourteenth century political changes of great importance came over Kashmir. In 1324 A.D. a Tibetan Prince fled from his country and took shelter under the king of Kashmir. Living in Kashmir for several years he took advantage of the unsettled conditions and came into power himself, while the king of Kashmir was absent in Kishtwar. Subsequently, this Tibetan Prince embraced Islam. After that the Government of Kashmir passed into the hands of those who were alien in birth and in culture. These Muslim Sultans ruled Kashmir for more than a century and a half. The most famous, and still very well known even to the average

Kashmiri today, was Sultan Zain-ul-Abidin, otherwise known as Budshah (the Great Monarch). During the reign of his predecessor Sultan Sikandar, a large number of Kashmiri Pandits left Kashmir and settled in the Punjab and elsewhere in India. During the reign of Zain-ul-Abidin Budshah, many industries were introduced; for instance, paper-making, sericulture and shawl-manufacture. He became extremely popular among all sections of the people, including Hindus, because of his tolerance.

Akbar the Great conquered Kashmir in 1586 A.D. During the whole Mughal occupation of Kashmir, it was governed by Governors appointed by the Mughal Emperors from time to time. The Mughal occupation of the country is marked by the prevalence of peace and happiness. But as soon as the Mughal Empire started crumbling after the death of Aurangzeb, times became very unsettled again.

In 1750 A.D. Ahmad Shah Durrani invaded and conquered Kashmir. The country thus passed into the hands of the Afghans. Their rule in Kashmir is known as very harsh and far from satisfactory. Tales of religious persecution, devastation and rapine are still told in every household throughout the valley of Kashmir. It is, no doubt, during this period, that people in general, and Hindus in particular, must have suffered because of this misrule.

The Sikhs succeeded in wresting the valley of Kashmir from both the rulers in 1819 A.D. The Afghan Governor was defeated and Kashmir passed into the hands of new masters from the Punjab. From 1819 A.D. to 1846 A.D. Kashmir remained under the rule of Sikhs. The change of this rule made no difference at all to the lot of the people. Maharaja Ranjit Singh and other Sikh rulers after him had neither time nor the inclination to look into the administration of this new Province of the Sikh kingdom. They always sent their

Governors to rule for them in Kashmir. William Moorcraft, who visited Kashmir in 1824 A.D., wrote—

“The Sikhs looked upon the Kashmiris as little better than cattle. The murder of a native by a Sikh was punished with a fine by the Government from sixteen to twenty rupees of which four were paid to the family of the deceased, if a Hindu, and two if he was a Mohammadan.”

According to Moorcraft, the people were everywhere in a miserable condition, and they were subjected to every kind of extortion and oppression.

Some of the Muslim rulers of Kashmir, like Ahmad Shah, Akbar and Jehangir, did great things for this unfortunate land. The Mughals brought back as much peace and prosperity to the country as they could. Akbar built the wall round Hari Parbat. Jehangir and Shah Jehan were very fond of the valley and paid frequent visits to it. Some of the gardens round the Dal Lake are a standing monument of the good work of the Mughals. In our times, and probably in all times, visitors from all over the world will see these Monuments as great marks of a great age in the history of the Kashmir valley.

Bernier, who visited Kashmir during the reign of Aurangzeb, was pleased to see the conditions then prevailing everywhere. He was particularly impressed by the industrious habits of the people and he appreciated the shawl of Kashmir which was manufactured in those days.

In 1819 A.D. Kashmir came under the Punjab Government. Sheikh Imam-ud-Din was appointed as Governor. This rule continued up to 1846 A.D., when the British took over the State. It was not until November, 1846 A.D. that Maharaja Gulab Singh was brought into Kashmir with the aid of British troops. During the five centuries of Muslim rule, Islam won the greatest part of the people to its fold. The piety and learning of Syed


Ali Hamdani made such a great impression on the people, that a large number embraced Islam.

Jammu Province has a different history

From the twelfth up to the fifteenth century, the Rajas of Jammu, who held sway over Dogra country (round about Mansar and Sarvansar Lake), remained under the suzerainty of the Ghauri dynasty of Afghanistan, and they got Jagirs from the Afghans. After 1554 A.D. they accepted the suzerainty of the Mughal Kings. During this reign Rajauri was under Raja Ikram Ullah Khan of Rajauri. Bhimber was under Raja Azimullah Khan of Bhimber. Mirpur was under Dewan Ghulam Ali and Haider Ali Khan Ghakhar of Mirpur. In 1770 A.D. the Sikhs attacked Jammu, and it had, perforce, to accept the suzerainty of the Lahore Government. Gulab Singh's father got the Jagir of 'Andwara' from the British Government in the Jammu Tehsil. Later on Gulab Singh's father entered the service of the Punjab Government. In 1809 A.D. Gulab Singh entered the service of the Sikh Army as a trooper. In lieu of his good military services, he got a Jagir in the districts of Jhelum and Sialkot. In 1820 A.D. Gulab Singh was made the Raja of Jammu, and his two brothers were given the principalities of Poonch in the north-west and Ramnagar, north-east of Jammu.

Poonch has a typical historical background

From the end of seventeenth century up to 1837 A.D. Poonch was ruled by the Muslim Rajas of Loran in Tehsil Haveli. It then fell into the hands of Raja Faiztalab Khan of Rajauri to whom it was handed over by the Punjab Government. Poonch was included in the transfer of the hilly country to Maharaja Gulab Singh in 1846. Before this transfer, Poonch was considered a district of Lahore. Maharaja Gulab Singh granted Chibal, Poonch and other ilaqas to Jawahar Singh and Moti Singh, sons of his brother Dhian Singh. The Raja



SOVIET TURKISTAN

SINKIANG

BHARAT	
PAKISTAN	
CHINA	
SOVIET UNION	
Red Army H-Q	
Soviet Airports	

PERSIA

AFGHANISTAN

PAKISTAN

KASHMIR

TIBET

CHINA

NEPAL

BHUTAN

ASSAM

PAKISTAN

BHARAT

BENGAL

BURMA

SIAM

BAY OF BENGAL

0 25 30 Miles

0 100 200 300 Miles

Bip Pares

of Poonch had to present to the Maharaja of, what is now known as, Jammu and Kashmir, one horse with gold trappings. The Raja of Poonch was not to effect any administrative changes in the territory of Poonch without previous consultation with the Maharaja of Kashmir. Poonch was converted into a Jagir by Maharaja Hari Singh in 1935-36 by bullying the Raja of Poonch into submission.

The Dogra Maharajas found it extremely difficult to establish their Government in Poonch. It refused to accept, *ipso facto*, the *de jure* sovereignty of the Dogras. Poonch had, therefore, to be conquered by them. During this regular conquest the Dogras met with stiff armed resistance. When ultimately, by sheer strength of arms, Dogra sovereignty was firmly established, they picked a number of leaders from the people and had them flayed alive in public. For the people of Jammu and Kashmir, the places where these horrible crimes were committed against humanity, will always remain as unique memorials to the cause of freedom.

In a repetition of history, it was these self-same people who first rose in arms against the Dogras in 1947.

The history of the beginning of the Dogra rule would be considered incomplete without a mention of the infamous treaty of Amritsar which was concluded between Maharaja Gulab Singh and the British authorities in 1846 A.D. By the terms of this treaty the Valley of Kashmir was sold by the British to Gulab Singh for a paltry sum of seventy-five hundred thousand rupees. Relevant portions of the treaty of Amritsar read as follows:

ARTICLE I

The British Government transfers and makes over for ever in independent possession to Maharaja Gulab Singh and the heirs male of his body all the hilly or

mountainous country with its dependencies situated to the eastward of the River Indus and the westward of the River Ravi including Chamba and excluding Lahul, being part of the territories ceded to the provisions of the article IV of the Treaty of Lahore, dated 9th March, 1846.

ARTICLE 3

In consideration of the transfer made to him and his heirs by the provisions of the foregoing article, Maharaja Gulab Singh will pay to the British Government the sum of seventy-five lakhs of rupees (Nanakshahi), fifty lakhs to be paid on ratification of this Treaty and twenty-five lakhs on or before the 1st October of the current year, A.D. 1846.

ARTICLE 9

The British Government will give its aid to Maharaja Gulab Singh in protecting his territories from external enemies.

ARTICLE 10

Maharaja Gulab Singh will acknowledge the supremacy of the British Government and will in token of such supremacy present annually to the British Government one horse, twelve shawl goats of approved breed (six male and six female) and three pairs of Cashmere shawls.

According to the treaty of Amritsar, the district of Hazara went to Gulab Singh, but this was, later on, exchanged for Mandir, Dadhi, Kathua and Suchetgarh in the Punjab.

It will appear that the treaty of Amritsar does not mention anything pertaining to the internal administration of the State. Gulab Singh, it seems, was given a free hand to deal with matters as he chose. In later days

the British Authorities themselves regretted the handing over of Kashmir to an Indian Prince. It seems that when the treaty of Amritsar was concluded, the Englishmen who were dealing with the matter, had not the slightest notion as to the strategic and other values of the valley of Kashmir. They found the Amritsar arrangement inevitable, because during that time Punjab politics were in a fluid state and the North-West Frontier and Afghanistan were unsettled. To them it was an advantageous disposal of Kashmir. In any case they thought Gulab Singh was a good ally in the North. Drew wrote—

“One great objection which the Governor-General had in view when he made this arrangement for the Jammu and Kashmir territories, was to lessen the force of Sikhs by establishing on their flank a power independent of them and inclined to the British. This objection may be said to have so far succeeded that, on the next and final trial of strength between the Sikhs and the British, Gulab Singh’s aid was withheld from the nation to which formerly belong his allegiance”.

It will, of course, appear that the treaty does not contain even the mention of a British Resident in Kashmir, and when the matter of appointment of a Resident was taken up by the British, the Maharaja resisted. Ultimately, in 1851 A.D. the Maharaja had to agree to the appointment of a British officer. Finally, after a lot of controversy over the matter, the Resident was appointed.

Of the rule of the Dogras in Jammu and Kashmir State a great deal has been said by different authorities at different times. It is not in the scope of this book to go into the story of maladministration during the Dogra dynasty. Even K. M. Paniker, who certainly was not hostile to Maharaja Gulab Singh, had to admit that—

“The Maharaja did not achieve his ends by methods

which were always beyond criticism. He did not hesitate to resort to the tricks and stratagems which would, in ordinary life, be considered dishonourable. He was trained in a hard school, where for ages inhumanity and treachery were all considered part and parcel of politics”.

During the early period of the Dogras, the people of Kashmir suffered much misery. Though the Amritsar treaty arrangement gave outward peace to the people and they were rid of the Pathan and the Sikh misrule, this peace, probably, only particularly helped the upper class of people. The Hindus consolidated their position and started growing rich at the expense of the general Musalman masses. So far as the general masses were concerned, no economical or social progress was possible. The land was in a sorry condition during the period of Gulab Singh and Ranbir Singh. The taxes were arbitrary and exorbitant. Revenue was collected in kind and sepoy were deputed to collect it, in advance, at the time of harvesting. Since these sepoy were themselves not regularly paid, one can hardly imagine the misery and havoc they worked on the villagers. There were strange taxes. To quote one instance, there was a tax on the sale of horses which amounted to fifty per cent of the purchase money.

Every Department was full of corruption and the burden of it all fell on the poor peasant. All officials, particularly the revenue officials, were corrupt to the core. Since the revenue official could collect money in this inhuman manner was respected in upper society because money gave him position. Therefore, the question of checking him was never contemplated.

What, perhaps, is the biggest disgrace that will be associated with the Dogra rule was the obnoxious system of forced labour termed ‘begaar’. The State officials, by law, could force anyone among the villagers into forced labour, namely, ‘begaar’. Poor and helpless people were

miserably dragged, like so many slaves, out of their homes and against their will, to carry loads over long distances. They were never paid nor were they given any rations during this labour. They had to carry their own dry bread with them to sustain them. This system continued right up to very recent times. Dr. Arthur Neve described this in the following language—

“I was at Islamabad striving to fight an epidemic of cholera by sanitation, and noticed that coolies were being collected from the surrounding region, each with his blanket, spare grass shoe, his carrying crutch, and light frame of sticks and rope in which to carry the load upon his back. And I was present at the great concourse on a green meadow in front of mosque when a sort of farewell service was held for those starting on this perilous journey. Loud was the sobbing of many, and fervid the demeanour of all, as led by the Mulla, they intoned their prayers and chanted some of their special Ramzan penitential psalms. Even braver men than the Kashmiris might well have been agitated at such a time, when taking farewell of their loved ones! Who would till their fields? What would happen during their long absence to their wives and children? To what perils would they themselves be exposed to in the snowy Pass of hilly Gilgit district?”

Knight has given a graphic account of this system in pathetic language. He says:

“An enormous transport service is needed to supply the garrisons on the North Frontier with grain; and the Kashmir authorities have been utterly careless of the comfort, and even of the lives of the unfortunate wretches, who are dragged from their homes and families, to trudge for months over the wearisome marches on that arid country. They fall on the road to perish of hunger and thirst, and, thinly clad as they are, are destroyed hundreds at a time by the

cold on the snowy Pass. When a man is seized for this form of 'begaar', his wife and children hang by him, weeping, taking it almost for granted that they will never see him again. A gang of these poor creatures, heavily laden with grain, toiling along the desolate range between Astore and Gilgit, on a burning summer day, urged on by a Sepoy guard, is perhaps as pitiable a spectacle as anything to be seen on the roads of Siberia. But these are not convicts and criminals, they are Musalman farmers, harmless subjects of the Maharaja".

The 'begaar' system worked great hardships, which have been described in the very forthright and beautiful language above. But one of the hardships was that people were forced to this 'begaar' at a time when the villagers were mostly needed in their fields, the crops suffering from their absence. When a revenue official would sweep down on a district to collect men for 'begaar', he would collect money by granting immunity to those who paid him. Whenever it was known that an official was to visit a particular village for this purpose, all male members of the village would run away and hide themselves in order to save themselves from this tragedy. One could go on quoting instances which would move even the hardest mind as to how the subjects of the Maharaja of the State of Jammu and Kashmir suffered under this most uncivilised and barbarous system of forced labour.

During the great famine of 1877 A.D. thousands of people died of starvation, and the whole country-side was totally ruined. Whatever may be said about the causes of the famine, the responsibility for the loss of lives that ensued, lies on the shoulders of the Dogra administration. Unfortunately, the famine was followed by a terrible earthquake in 1885, as a result of which a large number of people died. Nobody could or would look after these miserable creatures, who died under the debris of collapsing houses, nor was there any money to

finance any relief that could be given to these people.

The Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir ruled in a most autocratic manner. His word was law. More often, the Maharaja got incompetent officers. The Maharaja himself scarcely came into contact with the people or their problems. The impact of the outside world made no impression on the social, economic and educational problems of the people. At one time they were not even allowed to read newspapers. To submit the legitimate demands of the people to the Maharaja was sedition and entailed exile from the State. For small sins of this nature, a number of people were actually exiled.

This would have continued for some time but for an extremely conservative Hindu administration that came into power after the War of 1914-18. The Musalman, who now got some education from the University of Aligarh, was considered an alien intruder into the State and a potential trouble-maker.

During the War of 1914-18 a large number of State people went abroad to serve the cause of the Allies in Iraq, Iran and in France. When these soldiers came home from abroad and after seeing things for themselves, they realized the great difference in their lives at home.

After the last War, which concluded in 1945, things completely changed in the State. The soldier, who came back this time, was no longer so docile as to submit easily to 'begaar'. He was defiant and almost in a mood to revolt. When he realized, during 1947-48, that his kith and kin would be butchered by the Dogra rulers as a last act of treachery, the soldier revolted against the Dogra regime throughout the State. What shape the revolt took will be described in the following pages.

Chapter II

Political Consciousness

When, at the beginning of the present century, to the people in the Valley of Kashmir came political consciousness, the first thing that the Mussalmans in Kashmir realized so keenly was the fact that, in the State Services, they were not represented at all. Since there was a dearth of educated State subjects available for the civil services, the State had to recruit people from outside. And the outsiders so entrenched themselves in the services of the State, that they practically monopolised all positions of any consequence. At one time, the Kashmiri Pandits, who were the only educated community in the State, agitated against this foreign usurpation of almost all important services in the State. During this particular period of political development, the Muslims of the State naturally welcomed their brethren from outside, because no State Muslim of any qualification was available to hold any important appointment in the State. Pandit Prem Nath Bazaz in his book 'INSIDE KASHMIR', describes the position thus—

“At the beginning of the present century a new problem confronted the people; that of facing the outsider who had occupied every position of vantage in the administration of the country. From those early times the struggle for the rights of the people living in the State against outsiders took a definite shape. While the masses were groaning under the unbearable load of taxes and crushing economic poverty, the upper classes felt displeased and resentful

because of this foreign domination in every branch of administration. The feeling of resentment which was running underground for centuries, found an outward expression, though it was not yet directed against the Ruler or his administration as such. Representations were made to the Government of India, who, in a letter to the Kashmir Durbar at the close of the last century, sent instructions that in the matter of State employment, natives of Kashmir should be given preference over the outsiders and that this principle should be strictly adhered to."

The agitation by Kashmiri people against the outsiders continued till 1912 A.D., when the definition of 'State Subject' was formulated for the first time.

During this period what was taking shape was another factor. The Muslims of the State were getting equally aware that, because they also lacked education, they could not possibly secure representation in the State services. They, therefore, began clamouring for the making up of their deficiency in the matter of education. This demand they persistently pursued till 1916, when Mr. SHARP, the Educational Commissioner of the Government of India, visited the State and examined the Muslims' demands and grievances. He made certain recommendations to the State but they remained unimplemented, and no serious notice was taken of them.

In 1924 Lord Reading, who was then Viceroy of India, visited Kashmir. Muslims of the State submitted memorandum to him demanding due representation in the State services, and the abolition of the system of 'Begaar'. Surprisingly enough, this memorandum, which also contained a number of other grievances, was signed by some Jagirdars and two Mir Waizes. The committee, which was appointed to examine these grievances, however, reported that there was no substance whatever in the demands. And some of those who had signed the paper were promptly exiled from the State. The position

remained unchanged till 1929 when the State again began seething with discontent. Sir Albion Banerji, one of the Maharaja's cabinet ministers, seriously deplored the existing state of affairs and resigned his membership of the Council of Ministers, a post he had held for over two years. Before leaving the State, Sir Albion made the following statement to the Associated Press, which was later on to become historical. It ran thus:

“Jammu and Kashmir State is labouring under many disadvantages, with a large Mohammedan population absolutely illiterate labouring under poverty and very low economic conditions of living in the villages and practically governed like dumb, driven cattle. There is no touch between the Government and the people, no suitable opportunity for representing grievances and the administrative machinery itself requires overhauling from top to bottom to bring it up to the modern conditions of efficiency. It has at present little or no sympathy with the people's wants and grievances.”

In the subject of public opinion at that time he said—

“There is hardly any public opinion in the State. As regards the press it is practically non-existent with the result that the Government is not benefited to the extent that it should be by the impact of healthy criticism.”

The people of Jammu Province were comparatively better off, as they enjoyed greater political freedom. They organized a Party known as the Dogra Sabha, membership of which included practically all the pre-Government retired Government servants. About the Dogra Sabha, Pandit Prem Nath Bazaz, in ‘INSIDE KASHMIR’, on page 92 says—

“In the name of the people the Sabha protected the interests and safeguarded the rights of the upperclass

Dogras. It was a most loyal body so that even the Government servants were allowed to join it. Having found out that Dogra aristocracy wanted more voice in the administration of the State the rulers had allowed the existence of this organization to act as a safety-valve to evaporate and discharge any dangerous agitation that might otherwise go underground. When during the twenties of this century, the signs of discontent became visible in the upper classes of the people of Kashmir, the organization was extended to that province as well."

In the province of Kashmir all political activity was banned. Nevertheless, despite this ban, a number of young men, graduates of the Muslim University of Aligarh, formed a reading room known as the 'Fateh Kadal' Reading Room. In this room, people collected and discussed the state of affairs existing at that time, particularly the question of the representation of Muslims in the State services. This is of some interest, because it was these Reading-Room men, with education from the Aligarh University, who started political consciousness in the real sense.

It is said that on the 11th September, 1930, the young men of the Fateh Kadal Reading Room sent their representatives to meet the Council of Ministers. Included in this deputation was Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah, who had returned from Aligarh University with an M.Sc. degree. It is said that all the members of the Council of Ministers of the Maharaja's Government were present, including the Prime Minister, Mr. WAKEFIELD. He explained to this body, the principles governing the constitution of the Recruitment Board, and also tried to convince them, that the Recruitment Board was there for the purpose of safeguarding the interests of educated people. These arguments did not, however, convince this body of representatives. And the grievances took firmer root in the minds of the educated and hastened formation of political parties, both in

Kashmir and in Jammu.

In the Province of Jammu, a similar body, known as the Young Men's Muslim Association, had come into existence, with almost the same objects in view. Towards the end of 1930, the Jammu and Kashmir groups became aware of the each other's activities from reports in the Punjab press. They started approaching each other with a view to organising themselves into an All-Jammu and Kashmir Political Organization. Prem Nath Bazaz, while tracing this political development, says—

“We have seen that educated Muslim young men were dissatisfied and were making preparations to get their grievances redressed. They were now trying to organise themselves on an all-State basis, or at any rate, the young men living in the two capital cities of the provinces were joining hands to make a move. It is doubtful whether any of them was at this stage thinking in terms of a revolution or even a drastic change. Most of them were anxious to get a big slice in the Government services and some of them might have been anxious to ameliorate the lot of the poorer classes, such as peasants. A few intelligent men desired small constitutional reforms. But all of them were hazy about their future programme. Little did they know that a spontaneous mass-rising unknown in the annals of the State would take place very soon in spite of them. Little did they know that historical forces had already prepared a field and they were tools in the hands of time to work a change in the political conditions of Kashmir which they could not imagine or dream about.”

It was inevitable that this co-operation between the two parties in Srinagar and Jammu would culminate in the formation of a regular political party. Throughout this period popular feeling in Kashmir had found expression in many upheavals and finally in 1932 the first Muslim Conference was held in Kashmir. One of its

foremost aims was to demand the enforcement of agrarian reforms in the State. The ensuing agitation was put down by the Maharaja with the help of the British Army. It is worth noting that, although it did not bring about the reforms, it set out to achieve the 1931 agitation, it strengthened the Kashmir Muslims' movement for a constitutional Government for the people of the State, and the setting up of a Legislative Body.

In this movement the two bodies that showed great interest in the Punjab, were the Ahrars and the Ahmadis. Thus when, in 1931, an All-Jammu and Kashmir State agitation started against the repressive policy of the Government, the Majlis-i-Ahrar took up the cause of the Muslims of Kashmir and sent a large number of volunteers to support this agitation, but they were imprisoned in the Punjab. A Kashmir Committee was formed, under the chairmanship of the head of the Ahmadia Community to help and support this agitation for political rights by the people in Kashmir. I may quote Bazaz—

“Evidently Ahrars and Ahmadis could not and did not join hands. Both worked mostly independently of each other. This produced an inevitable rift and a constant setback in the progress of the movement. We shall discuss that at its proper place. For the present we must only say that the outlook and the activities of both the parties produced a highly communal atmosphere inside the State. Even the Punjab politics were gravely affected by it subsequently, when the movement assumed enormous proportions.

Besides, there were Muslim politicians belonging to the All-India Muslim League and the All-India Muslim Conference (which was still functioning then) as also certain eminent statesmen, owing no party affiliations, who interested themselves in the affairs of the State. At the first beat of drum all of them became active and alert. Their communal and religious

sentiments were roused and, though they did not take as prominent a part as did the Ahrars and Ahmadis, yet their contribution was by no means negligible.”

The Hindus generally, and the Dogras particularly, had always been against this movement. The Hindus thought that, if the Muslim political movement succeeded, and, as a result, a popular Government came into existence, they would be deprived of their vested interests. They were mainly jagirdars, an upper Hindu class, who were extremely reactionary, and opposed to this movement. They were against any such agitation as would ultimately result in the Government passing into the hands of the majority—the Muslims. Similarly, in the Valley of Kashmir, all the Hindus, with the exception of a few Kashmiri Pandits, were opposed to this movement. Since Kashmiri Pandits formed the bulk in the State services, they reckoned that a Muslim Government, if it came into power, would deprive them of their positions. For these reasons they also opposed the Muslim demands for a representative Government.

The Muslims of the State wanted to act, but they could not have their activities publicised because there were no Press facilities available. Even if there were, it could not have published anything against the Government. Ultimately therefore they had to arrange for the necessary publicity outside the State and, in due course, articles started appearing in the Lahore newspapers, like ‘INQILAB’ and ‘ZAMINDAR’.

The Reading Room Party had, in the meantime, enlisted the sympathies of two Mir Waizes of the State. One of them was Maulana Ahmad Ullah Mir Waiz of the Jamia Masjid, who died in 1931 and was succeeded by Maulana Yusuf Shah, the present Mir Waiz of Jamia Masjid, now virtually an exile in Pakistan.

In 1931, certain happenings took place, which gave

opportunity to this Reading Room Party to organize themselves. Incidents that took place, interfered with the religious freedom of the Muslims of the State. An agitation started for the redress of grievances. Mr. WAKEFIELD, the State Prime Minister, advised the Muslims to depute a few representatives to Srinagar, where, along with other representatives of the Kashmir Muslims, they would be afforded an opportunity to present themselves before His Highness to submit their demands. How this movement got an electric momentum is related as under:

“At the end of the function, when the meeting had already been adjourned and the leaders had left the premises, an ugly-looking, short-statured Pathan, Abdul Qadir by name, obviously excited by the environments, delivered an inflammatory speech vehemently denouncing and abusing the Hindus and the Hindu Raj, before the gathering which was dispersing. This Pathan belonged to the North-West Frontier Province and had come to Srinagar with a European visitor as his cook. Abdul Qadir was arrested on 25th of June for his speech, which was considered seditious.”

On 13th July, 1931, while Abdul Qadir was being tried in the Central Jail, a large crowd gathered and demanded entry into the jail to hear the evidence against him. When the State authorities refused this request the crowd forced an entry into the building, with the result that the police had to open fire, killing and wounding many people. The 13th of July is, therefore, observed by the people of Kashmir as ‘MARTYRS DAY’. Following this incident a Commission, headed by Mr. B. J. Glancy, was appointed to report on the actual state of affairs leading to the agitation. The Glancy Commission, while submitting their recommendations to the Government, made a number of suggestions for introducing reforms, only a few of which were implemented. Nevertheless a State Legislative Assembly was then convened,

and the first political organization, as has already been mentioned, thus came into being. This account has been summed up by Bazaz as follows—

“During the summer of 1932, soon after the Glancy Report was published, the Muslim leaders felt that to safeguard the interests of the Mussalmans—which by now were no more than the interests of the upper and middle classes—the establishment of some organization was necessary. The All-Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference was, therefore, founded. Its first session was held at Srinagar on the 15th, 16th and 17th October, 1932, when thousands of Muslims attended it. Obviously, both Yusuf Shahis and Abdullahites had by this time reconciled themselves with the upper class ideology. Although the Conference was primarily a function of the Abdullah Party, Mir Waiz Yusuf Shah willingly participated in its deliberations. The Mir Waiz did not, however, take any share in the subsequent sessions of the Conference as the personal differences had become more acute with the passage of time.

The All-Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference remained in existence till June, 1938. It held six annual sessions in all. The first, second, fifth and sixth sessions which were held at Srinagar, Mirpur, Poonch and Jammu respectively, were presided over by Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah. The third session was held at Sopore under the presidency of Mian Ahmad Yar, while the fourth session was held at Srinagar with Choudhri Ghulam Abbas in the chair.”

In 1938 Sheikh Abdullah and Ch. Ghulam Abbas agreed to alter the political structure of the Muslim Conference by calling it a National Conference, the ideology of which was identified with the ideology of the Indian Congress. The resolution of the Working Committee, which met in Srinagar in June, 1938, was as follows—

“Whereas in the opinion of the Working Committee the time has now come when all the progressive forces in the country should be rallied under one banner to fight for the achievement of responsible Government, the Working Committee recommends to the General Council that, in the forthcoming annual session of the Conference, the name and constitution of the organization be so altered and amended that all such people who desire to participate in this political struggle may easily become members of the Conference irrespective of their caste, creed or religion.”

There were a number of people, however, who dissented from this decision in 1940, primarily in Jammu Province. The old Muslim Conference, with its ideal of working for the amelioration and betterment of the Muslims of the State, was revived. This became necessary, because Hindus were not liberal enough to see the liquidation of the autocratic rule of a Hindu Maharaja. Though Sheikh Abdullah continued to be the head of the National Conference Party right up to 1953-54, till he was dismissed and arrested, he has always experienced difficulty in working with Hindus, especially on any ideology which could go against the Dogra Raj. Therefore, even the National Conference continued to be considered as a virtual Muslim Organization. It was given to Sardar Gohar Rehman and others to revive the Muslim Conference. This revived Muslim Conference was ultimately joined by Choudhry Ghulam Abbas who had, in the meantime, left the National Conference. This body then identified itself, in ideology, with the Muslim League programme in the Indo-Pakistan Sub-Continent.

The first general elections to the State Legislative Assembly were held in 1933-34, and the Muslim Conference Party captured 16 out of the 21 elective Muslim seats. It repeated this success in the elections held in 1937. In 1938 the Party resigned *en bloc* from the Assembly, and fresh elections were ordered to break the deadlock. In these elections, the Muslim Conference

again captured all of the 21 elective Muslim seats in the State Assembly.

In 1946 Sheikh Abdullah's Party started a 'Quit Kashmir' movement, on the pattern of the 'Quit India' movement launched by the Indian Congress. It was aimed against the ruling family of the State, which was given an ultimatum to quit the country, and leave it to be governed by its own people. The 'Quit Kashmir' movement, however, petered out fairly soon. Sheikh Abdullah was tried for treason, found guilty and sent to jail.

Meanwhile, the Muslim Conference continued its political activity, and speedily gained strength and popularity. It went on agitating for responsible Government in the State. In June 1946, the Muslim Conference passed a resolution, directing Muslims to prepare themselves for action if they wished to gain their objectives. The annual session of the Muslim Conference which was to be held in October, 1946, was banned by Government and all prominent members of the Conference, including its President, Choudhry Ghulam Abbas, were imprisoned. Though deprived of many of its prominent leaders, the Conference fought the elections in the State Assembly in 1947 and captured 15 out of the 21 elective Muslim seats in the Legislative Assembly. For the remaining six seats, the nomination papers of the Muslim Conference candidates were rejected, with the result that those seats were not contested. The National Conference, however, boycotted the elections.

In 1947, the British Government announced its plan for the future of the Indo-Pakistan Sub-Continent. Paramountcy over the States was to cease on the appointed day, the 15th August 1947, and the States were to be left free to decide to which dominion they should accede. But the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir was not able to decide on the issue of State's accession. On Pakistan Day, the Muslim Conference demonstrated, unequivocally, in

favour of accession to Pakistan. On the 19th of July, 1947, it formally decided to accede to Pakistan by a resolution in the following words:

- (1) "This meeting of the All-Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference Convention expresses its satisfaction and congratulates the Quaid-i-Azam for his achievement.
- (2) "The people of the Indian States expected that they would walk shoulder to shoulder with the people of British India in the attainment of freedom. On the partition of India the people of British India have obtained independence but the announcement of June 3, 1947, has strengthened the hands of the Indian Princes and unless the Princes respond to the call of the times, the future of the people of Indian States is very dark. There are only three ways open to the people of Jammu and Kashmir State—
 1. To accede to India, or
 2. To accede to Pakistan, or
 3. To remain independent.

"The Convention of the Muslim Conference has arrived at the conclusion that keeping in view the geographical conditions, 80 per cent Muslim majority out of total population, the passage of important rivers of the Punjab through the State, the language, cultural and racial, economic connection of the people and the proximity of the borders of the State with Pakistan, are all facts which make it necessary that the Jammu and Kashmir State should accede to Pakistan."

This resolution further emphatically demanded of the Maharaja that he should declare internal indepen-

dence, accept the position of a Constitutional head of the State and form a Constituent Assembly. It also demanded that the departments of Defence, Communications and Foreign Affairs should be acceded to the Pakistan Constituent Assembly. This Convention, the resolution continued, makes it clear that, if the Kashmir Government ignores this demand and advice of the Muslim Conference, under some internal or external influence, and decides in favour of accession to the Indian Constituent Assembly, the Muslims of Jammu and Kashmir shall oppose this move tooth and nail.

There were other political parties in Jammu and Kashmir State which may be mentioned. Besides the Muslim Conference and the National Conference, the principal political parties in the State were the Kashmir Socialist Party, the Parja Parishad Party, the Kashmir State Pandits' Conference, the Communist Party, the Kashmir Democratic Union, and the Kisan/Mazdoor Conference.

The Kisan/Mazdoor Conference, based on the Kisan/Mazdoor population, was particularly well organized in the Valley of Kashmir, and was in favour of accession of the State to Pakistan. Its President was later imprisoned by the Abdullah Government for his pro-Pakistan activities. The Kashmir Democratic Union was formed with, more or less, the same objects in view. Its leader, Prem Nath Bazaz, has always believed that the accession of the State should be decided by the free will of the people, the majority of whom wished to accede to Pakistan. Pandit Prem Nath Bazaz was imprisoned in 1947 and served his sentence under Sheikh Abdullah's Government for 3/4 years, and when ultimately released, he was exiled from the State. Pandit Prem Nath Bazaz, one of the foremost leaders of the State, thinks progressively and really wishes to work for the betterment of the masses of the State. Though he is himself a Kashmiri Pandit and comes of a reactionary class, he is probably the most advanced of all Kashmiri

leaders in his political views.

The Praja Parishad is a party which believes in the ideology of the RSSS. It favours the separation of Jammu, or at least the Hindu areas of Jammu and Ladakh, from the State and accession to the Indian Union. No other political party wishes the division of the State of Jammu and Kashmir.

Only very recently Sheikh Abdullah, then Prime Minister of India-held Kashmir, had admitted that units of Jammu province will get local autonomy on cultural basis, when a constitution is framed by his 'Constituent Assembly'.

Chapter III

Kashmir State—1947

August 1947 ushered in an extraordinary event unparalleled in history for the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent—an event, which probably and in more ways than one, will affect the future course of history throughout Asia. This was the granting of independence to India and its partition into two countries—BHARAT AND PAKISTAN.

The movement for Pakistan has a brief but unique and glorious history. I have no intention of going into that history, nor am I qualified to do so. In this movement for the creation of Pakistan, the personality of Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah is, at least to the writer's mind, very nearly as miraculous as the achievement of Pakistan itself. Seldom, in our times, has one man fought against so many, with such meagre resources, and with so much courage and determination. In pre-partition India there was perhaps not a single Muslim whose life had not been affected, one way or another, by the actions of one man—JINNAH—during the years 1937-1947.

The desire for a free and independent Muslim State had deeply influenced Muslims, wherever they were, whether in small or large numbers. There were very few people outside the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent, who seriously believed that Jinnah would be able to accomplish the partition of India into two separate dominions. It was indeed a great surprise for other Muslim countries

to have been confronted with the *fait accompli* of Pakistan on the 14th of August, 1947. No doubt it must have been a pleasant surprise to them, as was to us, the birth of Indonesia. In fact, Indian propaganda, particularly in Egypt, always showed Jinnah in the light of an agent of the British and, also, made out that he was never serious about his demand for Pakistan. The creation of a very large consolidated Muslim State, all along the border of Jammu and Kashmir, gave the Muslims in this State a completely new hope and an entirely different outlook on life. Thirty-two lac Muslims in the State of Jammu and Kashmir had, for very nearly one hundred years, lived a life of slavery and bondage. They had patiently suffered insult, injury and intolerance. They had borne the worst forms of coercion and tyranny. They had, at the point of the bayonet, been subjected to indignities, religious intolerance and Hindu fanaticism. The people of Kashmir had, in short, lived a miserable life under the autocratic rule of Hindu Maharajas of a reactionary and bigoted Dogra dynasty. Under this Dogra rule, Muslims had been subjected to political segregation, economical inequalities, educational disadvantages and step-motherly treatment in every walk of life. It is quite likely that, but for the impetus given by the establishment of Pakistan, the Azad Kashmir Movement in October, 1947, though inevitable, would have been impeded and delayed, it was bound to come one day. It is not quite inconceivable that, by the force of arms, about four million human beings could have been kept under an autocratic and inhuman rule. Just across the borders of the State, the entire sub-continent of India was undergoing a huge political and psychological revolution, which was, steadily and surely, shaking the mighty British Empire. The people of Jammu and Kashmir State, who were themselves by no means a politically backward people, could not have remained unaffected by these happenings in India. In India, the struggle between the Congress and the Muslim League became so pronounced, that Muslims, perhaps for the first time since the advent of British rule, became really

politically alive, very much united and systematically organized. These objectives, incidentally, were not so much the result of the efforts of the Muslim League, with due deference to that body, as of policies so foolishly pursued by the Congress Party and the Congress Ministries, particularly in the minority Provinces of India. For this reason, the Muslim League gained its following and strength more in the minority Provinces than in any other. The demand for the State of Pakistan thus, slowly and surely, came to be accepted as an article of faith by Muslims in the minority Provinces. By a stranger irony of fate, the Muslims in these Provinces later had to pay the supreme sacrifice for their loyalty to a political ideal. Similarly, in Kashmir State, though the Muslims were in a majority, they lived under a thoroughly hostile rule of the Dogra dynasty. The Muslims of Jammu and Kashmir very soon realized that their emancipation lay well within sight, especially after the achievement of Pakistan. Naturally, therefore, the Pakistan Movement gathered terrific momentum, so much so, in fact, that the use of the Pakistan slogan, within the State, was treated as seditious act by the Maharaja's Government.

As the establishment of Pakistan became more and more a reality, the Maharaja's Government became increasingly aggressive. The State authorities resorted to more oppressive and coercive methods, developing into sheer bullying in Poonch, Mirpur and Muzaffarabad Districts of the State, which now form a part of Azad Kashmir. Following a change in the State Government's policy, the RSSS—a militant Hindu organization, began to make its influence felt in all parts of the State, and it was proved to the Maharaja that the RSSS had established its headquarters in Jammu city and had organised branches everywhere. In the city of Jammu, secret and regular training in the use of arms had started on a very large scale. The State authorities were also in possession of information that arms were being smuggled in from two directions—Kathua and Muzaffarabad. The carrying and the use of arms was regularly taught to these men.

Members of the RSSS were encouraged to carry arms and regularly trained in their use in properly established training schools supervised by the Hindu Mahasabha body in Jammu. News of all this activity and preparation spread panic and fear among the Muslims, particularly in the districts of Kathua, Jammu, Udhampur and parts of Riasi, where Muslims were in minority.

What really alarmed the Muslims most was the movement of Dogra troops, who were being spread out in the districts of Poonch, Mirpur and Muzaffarabad—all along the Jhelum River. In Poonch troops were posted all over the district. The writer will refer to this subject in a little more detail elsewhere. Then a cunningly devised posting of all Muslim officers in the Dogra Army betrayed the authorities. State troops' movement definitely indicated the real intentions of the Government. Brigadier Scott, Chief of Staff of the Dogra Army, not unnaturally, expressed his apprehension on this score. He later refused to be associated with these dispositions and with the wholesale transfer of Muslim officers. These actions were, in themselves, ominous and forebode serious trouble—possibly a general massacre of all State Muslims. I am told that Brigadier Scott did not agree with other similar policies of the Maharaja. Under these circumstances, Brig. Scott had no option but to quit the State in a not very agreeable manner. Similarly, another British Officer, the Inspector-General of Police, was forced to resign his post and leave the State. They were soon replaced by Dogra Officers, who belonged to Maharaja's family. These new officers were known to be lacking in administrative ability. Their views about the Mussalmans were very well known. Their appointments to these key posts very clearly indicated what was going to be the future policy of the State Government, vis-a-vis its Muslim subjects. It was thus, in a very tense atmosphere, surcharged with all manner of rumours, that an historical convention of the All-Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference took place in the house of the writer at Srinagar. No less than two hundred leaders and

workers of the All-Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference, drawn from all parts of the State, participated in this Convention. Almost all the members of the Muslim Conference group in the Jammu and Kashmir State Assembly were present to take part in these discussions. Finally, after long and very serious deliberations, the convention decided in favour of an unqualified accession of the State to Pakistan. There was, however, a large group of workers, headed by Choudhry Hamidullah Khan, the Acting President of the All-Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference, in favour of the State remaining independent of both India and Pakistan. It should be said on behalf of the 'Independence' group that they adopted this course on the strength of the best advice available from the All-India Muslim League. The truth of this fact, the writer has never been able to ascertain, not even from the Quaid-e-Azam himself. That the decision of accession to Pakistan was, however, to become historic and was later proved so. In 1948, when the Kashmir case came up before the Security Council, this decision of the All-Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference was cited as proof, that the Muslims of the State, who formed an overwhelming majority of the population, wanted accession to Pakistan. In fact, the decision to accede to Pakistan was welcomed by the mass of the Muslim population in the State, no matter to what political party they belonged. Even the members of the Abdullah National Conference were in full agreement with the Muslim Conference members that ultimate decision that the accession of the State must be left to the people of the State themselves. The National Conference leaders, however, qualified this with the proviso that only a State Constituent Assembly, properly convened, could decide the issue. The Muslim Conference view was that, since Muslims formed a majority in the State, and were, one and all, in favour of Pakistan a fact which could, if necessary, be ascertained by a Plebiscite, therefore, the State should *ipso facto* accede to Pakistan.

This decision was formally conveyed to the State

Government of the Maharaja, as well as to the All-India Muslim League Authorities in India. This Convention was held in July 1947.

Before the leaders and workers dispersed to their respective places, top leaders, including the Acting President of the Muslim Conference, secretly met again at the house of the writer, to consider especially the serious situation existing in Poonch, which caused the Dogra regime much anxiety for a number of reasons. First, the communal situation in the Punjab was disturbing, and since Poonch was adjacent to the Punjab, it was bound to be affected by what was happening there. Secondly, it was agreed to by all who were conversant with the State affairs, that it was only from Poonch that a serious and effective challenge to the Dogra Government could originate and flourish. The situation was equally disturbing to us. The Kashmir Muslims knew that if the people of Poonch were once effectively suppressed, any anti-Dogra political movement would not become easily possible.

Having carefully considered this most ticklish problem, we assured the workers from Poonch that, in case of any of them was arrested anywhere, we would immediately counter by launching a movement, from the Centre, on the Pakistan issue. To mark this solemn occasion, the Holy Quran was brought in, and everyone present touched the Holy Book, to make sure that nothing would deter us from implementing the promise we had made. The writer remembers the solemn and secret nature of the ceremony. The event that followed this meeting were both swift and dramatic. None of us could comprehensively assess the situation. Poonch was soon after placed under Martial Law and all kinds of outrages came to be perpetrated on the people in the name of law and order. None of us could think clearly enough to provide an answer to these happenings in Poonch. The writer knew that on his shoulders rested great responsibility. He was prepared to do his best so long as he knew what was

in the best interests of the people.

Soon after we started to organize Muslim Conference in Srinagar. Our chief difficulty was funds, collection of which is always an unpleasant job. Some of our Pakistani friends came forward to help us, but they were very few. The result was not very encouraging. The writer was a practising lawyer, he could not afford much of his spare time. Even the Muslim Conference was divided into two groups. Everything was possible, but who could bring the leaders into one place? Some of our Pakistani friends did make sincere efforts to bring about this unity, which was the most desirable thing. Since differences were not ideological but personal, everybody was jockeying for position.

Suddenly the Government of Kashmir decided to lift the ban they had hitherto imposed on Sheikh Abdullah's National Conference. Some of the Nationalist leaders came out of their hide-outs and started their activities in public. Tentative negotiations were already started with Sheikh Abdullah who was still in prison in Jammu. Arrangements were undertaken to bring Sheikh Abdullah from Jammu to Srinagar. It was still doubtful whether Sheikh Abdullah would whole-heartedly support India, because his party followers would not have backed any decision on the accession issue made in a hurry. After meeting some of the Nationalist leaders in Srinagar, the writer was of the view that the best of the Nationalists were not necessarily anti-Pakistanis.

The political atmosphere in Srinagar was changing every hour since that fateful August 1947. The then Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir State, Pandit Ram Chand Kak, had gone to Delhi to meet the Viceroy as well as the Congress leaders. He also had an interview with Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah. After coming back from Delhi, Pandit Kak advised the Maharaja, the writer was told, to remain neutral for the moment and sign a standstill agreement both with India and Pakistan.

Pandit Kak also advised him to let Pakistan operate the Postal and Telegraph services. He then went on to advise the Maharaja to ultimately find out the wishes of his Muslim population on the issue of accession. If the Muslim population, being the majority in the State, wishes to accede to Pakistan, he should then accede to Pakistan. To this advice the Maharaja did not agree. He asked his Prime Minister to resign, which he did. The Premiership of the State was handed over to General Janak Singh, a close friend of the Maharaja and also a near member of his family. Since then the Maharaja received top leaders from the All-India Congress, including Mahatma Gandhi, and the President of All-India Congress. By the visit of these Hindu leaders to the State it became quite evident that an intrigue was going on with regard to the accession of the State to India against the will of the people.

These intrigues perturbed the Muslims of the State. In Poonch the methods of repression and coercion became more pronounced. Political arrests started and the Dogra Army started a persecution campaign which is mentioned in detail elsewhere.

Warrants of arrest were issued against the writer. It was made quite clear that in no case would the writer be allowed to enter Poonch.

On 14th of August, 1947, when Pakistan was declared, a huge Pakistan dinner was arranged to celebrate the occasion by all the friends of Pakistan. A large number of Pakistanis and other guests attended this dinner. At this function the writer made a speech in which the issue of accession was dealt with in all its aspects. The Maharaja himself was requested to let the issue be decided by the people of State, or, at least, that no decision of such paramount importance be taken without consultation with his Muslim subjects. These proceedings were duly conveyed to the Maharaja. After this speech it became quite clear that for me to stay in Srinagar any longer,

without being arrested, was not possible. It was known among all Muslim Conference leaders, as well as other Pakistani friends, that the writer's arrest in Srinagar would be useless and would serve no purpose, in that the writer would have only to rot like so many others in the jails of the Maharaja. The Poonch people would be persecuted and an otherwise good movement, which had already started in Poonch, would fizzle out. It was, therefore, considered most essential that the writer should reach the people of Poonch and start whatever he could against the impending unwise step of the Maharaja.

When the writer eventually reached Lahore Railway Station, after his escape from Srinagar, what he witnessed there was a small 'Qayamat', doomsday. A mass of humanity, in which were wounded women and children, was streaming into Lahore. These women told horrible tales of cruelty, butchery and inhuman treatment meted out to the helpless Mussalmans across the border in India. If one could have waited and heard all this with patience! Five to seven million of human beings were ruthlessly pushed into Pakistan. In fact, one could hardly imagine that any Government could exist against this unexpected deluge of humanity. When I went to see the refugees' camp at Walton, the largest camp in Lahore, the smell of congested humanity reached me at a distance of half a mile. All the train services having gone topsy-turvy, the Pakistan Army dispersed all over South-East Asia, the Baluch regiment fighting a huge battle single-handed, one could not seriously contemplate the survival of Pakistan. Perhaps, only once in his life, that great man, Quaid-e-Azam, was broken in spirits. This was something that had come to pass against his anticipation. The Prime Minister of Pakistan, Liaquat Ali Khan, who had specially come up to Lahore in connection with the influx of refugees, unfortunately, lay in his bed because of heart trouble. None seemed to be there to proclaim the existence of Pakistan.

To add to all this, one could witness, to his shame and

horror, in the streets of Lahore, shameless and fearless loot of shops and houses going on. The Hindu and Sikh population left in Lahore, and probably in all parts of the Punjab and the Frontier Province was, no doubt, subjected to great hardship though not quite similar to those experienced by the Mussalmans in the East Punjab. Only a future historian will be able to present both sides of the picture in a dispassionate manner, when all these issues will have died down. This certainly was a very sad picture of Pakistan about the end of August, 1947.

Against this background, I could scarcely conceive that this great country of Mussalmans across the Jhelum river could be of any assistance to the helpless and thoroughly trapped people of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Though prospects seemed so bleak, the writer was convinced that, if any assistance could be available, it was only from the people of Pakistan. It is easy to convince one man of a particular situation, but to convince all the men who walked up and down 'Anarkali' in Lahore was a very hard job. No two people seemed to agree on one thing. There was hardly any organization of the people with which one could discuss such a subject.

Chapter IV

Atrocities in Kashmir—1947

As events in India moved fast, and Pakistan seemed a much nearer possibility, the State administration became more and more nervous. In this sheer nervousness, they resorted to aggressive actions against Mussalmans. In Jammu Province a militant Hindu organization, the Hindu Mahasabha, was given positive encouragement by the State Hindu officialdom. As this attitude of the State authorities became manifest, tension and mistrust among the public increased in equal measure. Despite this atmosphere, Mussalmans, who had lived a life of misery for long enough time, started talking differently and more defiantly. The 'Pakistan' slogan, which was once seditious in the State, came to be openly discussed in private and in public, even by the employees of the State. Reading the League paper 'Dawn' was accepted by the Government as no offence. The Muslim officers of the State, however, who subscribed to this paper, were put on a secret black list. Some of the prominent Government servants, nevertheless, expressed their candid views on Pakistan without much censure from the Government. But later on, as things completely changed, all pro-Pakistan officers were either imprisoned or persecuted. It so appears that regular lists were scrupulously kept by a secret staff of those Muslim officers whose tendencies were pro-Pakistan. Some of these officers, who were trapped on the occupied Kashmir side, had to pay a very heavy penalty for their views at the hands of the Maharaja's Government.

On the 3rd June, 1947, the British Government announced its plan for the future of the Indo-Pakistan

Sub-Continent. Paramountcy over the States ceased on the appointed day, namely the 15th August 1947, and the States were to be left free to decide to which Dominion they should accede. At the same time, the Crown Representative advised the rulers of the States to take into consideration economical factors, geographical contiguity, the wishes of their people and other factors, in arriving at a decision vis-a-vis accession. As this position crystallized, a regular wooing of Jammu and Kashmir State started under a well thought-out plan. A series of visits were arranged by the Hindu leaders of India to the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Mahatma Gandhi visited the State on 1st of August, 1947 and had a long interview with the Maharaja. His visit was closely preceded by that of Kriplani, the Congress President. It is a fantastic undertaking to try and make us believe that these visits were without any purpose. Hindu leaders, in all probability, told the Maharaja of the consequences and 'dangers' of State's accession to Pakistan. They may have given him a warning that, on his accession to Pakistan, the Dogra regime would suffer liquidation. What, perhaps, really convinced the Maharaja, was the argument, then so strongly put forward by the Hindu leaders, that Pakistan itself would not be able to survive economically, and otherwise, for more than six months.

Simultaneously, the Maharaja's policy of accession to India by means of achieving complete elimination of the Muslims of the State, began to be put into operation. Repression and massacre of the Muslims by the Sikh and RSSS armed gangs, assisted by the Dogra police and Army, started in early September 1947. Muslim refugees, mainly from Jammu, began to cross over to Pakistan in their hundreds and thousands in search of asylum. Repression of Muslims in the State increased in intensity from day to day.

Realizing the consequences of a hasty step, the Maharaja approached both India and Pakistan for conclusion of a standstill agreement with two Dominions,

as they then were. India demurred, while Pakistan accepted the offer, and the standstill agreement with Pakistan came into force on the 15th of August 1947. Pakistan thus stepped into the shoes of the pre-partition Government of India, and acquired lawful control over the Defence, Foreign Affairs and Communications of the State. In pursuance of this agreement, the Pakistan railways continued to operate the small railway in the State, while Pakistan personnel took over its Postal and Telegraph services. Pakistan was entitled to, and, in due course, would also have assumed control over, defence services and foreign relations of the State. Usually, standstill agreements are a prelude to a full-scale accession, and almost everyone in Jammu and Kashmir expected that the conclusion of a standstill agreement with Pakistan would fructify into the final accession of the State to that Dominion.

But the Maharaja, in conjunction with his Hindu advisers, had hatched another plot. Recent experience had shown that even majorities could be liquidated successfully, if persistent and vigorous attempts were made on the 'right' lines. A number of instances could be quoted from the East Punjab States to corroborate this. If complete elimination of the Muslims could have been effected in the State, the way then would have been open to the Maharaja to accede to the Dominion of India, with which his sympathies certainly lay. In pursuance of this plot as adumbrated above, the Maharaja sent out invitations to and provided free entry into the State for the RSS and Sikh murder gangs. These began to pour into the State by the middle of August 1947. The standstill agreement, in the meantime, was signed with Pakistan in order to avoid the suspicion of the Muslim population of the State. Under the camouflage of this agreement, the Maharaja was playing for time, to create the necessary conditions which would furnish him with a plausible excuse to ask the Government of India to send their troops into the State, if the people of the State revolted against such a move.

Another very significant event that took place in July 1947, was a secret meeting of a number of Rajas and Maharajas of the Kangra Valley in Srinagar. There are good reasons to believe that, in this meeting, a conspiracy was hatched in collaboration with the Rashtrya Sevak Sang at Amritsar, to carry out a wholesale massacre of the Mussalmans in the State, beginning with Poonch where they expected stiff resistance. This had to be carried out systematically with the active assistance of the Dogra Army. With this end in view, the Dogra Army Units were posted in the most strategic places, for instance, all along the Jhelum river in Mirpur and Poonch Districts. To post Dogra Army contingents on all bridges and ferries on the Jhelum river was a part of the same plan.

The revolution, which started in October, 1947, in Western Kashmir, Gilgit and Ladakh, and eventually spread throughout, would not have been ignited so rapidly, except for the brutal treatment which Dogra soldiers meted out to the people. It needs a book by itself to give, in any detail, the tales of horror which reached the writer in Murree during the months of September, October and November of 1947. All local Sikhs and Hindus had played the unworthy role of spies to the Dogra troops, though the primary duty of this Army was supposed to be to protect the honour, life and property of the subjects of the State, who contributed with their lives and hard-earned income to the maintenance of this very Army. Dogra soldiers, having nothing in common with the local people, and also having the stupid idea that the Dogras were the ruling race, resorted to loot, rape, desecration of sacred places and burning of the Holy Qur'an without the least compunction. About all these happenings, the writer, from Murree, sent an urgent telegram to the Maharaja. The Maharaja was most earnestly requested to take steps to put an end to what was happening in Poonch and elsewhere. Of course, no reply was forthcoming.

In Jammu Province, as a whole, complete panic

prevailed all over the place. Though Muslims were a sixty per cent majority in Jammu Province, the districts of Jammu, Kathua and Udhampur have a Hindu majority. These districts are either inhabited by Rajput-Dogras or Brahmins. These are staunch Mahasabhites, and extremely conservative in their outlook. Under the State laws, these Hindus could keep arms of every kind without licence. Every Hindu in these parts was armed with some weapon or the other. The atmosphere across the border, in the Punjab, was rampant with communal frenzy. Murders were taking place on a vast scale, and law and order had completely broken down, and even the Boundary Forces could not do anything in the matter. It was learnt that during this period the Sikhs and the RSSS had been transferred from Amritsar to Jammu. The RSSS started their activities openly with a licence from authorities. A plan was evolved to completely wipe out the Muslim population in the city of Jammu, and also in the districts of Jammu Province. All branches of the RSSS were supplied with their quota of arms and ammunition, and the State Hindu officers were sent to give them proper instruction in the use of their arms.

The Sikhs, meanwhile, started their migration from the former Frontier Province *via* Muzaffarabad into the Valley of Kashmir. It was definitely reported to the State police, that huge quantities of arms and ammunition were secretly imported into the State by these Sikhs through Muzaffarabad. In fact, it was later on discovered that huge dumps of arms and ammunition were collected in Muzaffarabad in a Gurdwara by these Sikhs. A similar dump was also created round-about the city of Baramula. It may be mentioned here that the Sikhs had quite a good hold in these two districts. Since the refugees from the Frontier Province came, some with real and some with imaginary tales of attacks on them, a good amount of tension and fear was brought into being. Muslims in these two districts were an unarmed and helpless lot. There is no actual proof on this point,

but I had grave misgivings that the Sikh community was busy importing arms from the former Frontier Province into the State, with some sort of nefarious design in mind. In fact, they were very aggressive in Baramula. Some 'Kirpan' attacks had already taken place in that district during the months of July and August 1947.

In other parts of the State, particularly in Poonch and Mirpur and all the districts of Jammu Province, Muslims were in imminent danger of being rounded up by the Dogra Army and butchered. This was certainly no small apprehension, and this tragedy did take place in Udhampur, Kathua and Jammu in September, October and November 1947.

In Poonch people were already semi-armed and militarily very well trained, and were also ready to meet even a planned military attack on public life. By September, 1947, the Dogra Army started a regular campaign of terror with a view to frightening these people into submission or forcing them to fly to Pakistan. Loot, rape and general terrorism by the Dogra Army resulted in a regular revolt in Poonch on October 6, 1947. On the 22nd of October, 1947, Tribal brethren came to the aid of the people of Muzaffarabad. A regular fight with Dogra troops ensued, resulting in a complete rout of the Dogra Units. The Tribal people, assisted by locals, reached the outskirts of Srinagar on or about 24th/25th of October 1947.

Earlier in June, 1947, the people of Poonch started a 'no-tax' campaign. This arose from the fact that, as soon as the Maharaja secured direct control over Poonch, as a result of his successful suit against the Jagirdars of Poonch, the Maharaja imposed on this district all the numerous taxes enforced in the rest of the State. The people of Poonch resented whole-heartedly this heavy imposition of taxes, and started an agitation which the Maharaja tried to put down by force. A Press note issued by the Maharaja's Government on September

12, 1947, said—

“On August 24, 1947, a large and highly excited mob collected in the west of Bagh Tahsil, and on the 25th, disregarding all efforts to persuade them to disperse, carried on to Bagh town when they reached the number of some five thousand, which swelled considerably during the next two days. These mobs were armed with weapons of various patterns, such as axes and spears and a variety of others.”

On August 26, 1947, these mobs clashed with the State Forces. The Dogra armies started bren-gun firing on this huge crowd of 5,000 and more with the result that hundreds of people were either killed and/or wounded. The reports of these brutalities reached Pakistan and were extensively published in the Pakistan Press.

As on the 24th and 25th of October 1947, the tribal ‘Lashkar’, assisted by locals, reached the outskirts of Srinagar, the Maharaja, Hari Singh, fled from Srinagar, finding his safety impossible. How this evacuation was effected is another very interesting story. I am told that all the petrol supply was taken over during the hours of darkness by some army officers, who issued petrol only to those who were running away. The Maharaja himself collected all his luggage, money and jewellery, and loaded them on lorries to make his flight from Srinagar during the night when lorries and other vehicles were not available any more. A huge caravan of ‘tongas’ started for Jammu on a two hundred mile trek. All Hindu officers, and whatever was left of the Government machinery, were shifted to the other side of Banihal Pass, leaving Srinagar city in chaos and confusion.

We have it on good evidence that, on reaching Jammu and also on his way, Sir Hari Singh himself gave orders to his troops and police to kill every Muslim found to save the Dogra Raj from destruction. These instructions, for instance, he left at Batood and Kud on his way

to Jammu. In Jammu itself, arms were distributed to Rajputs and Brahmins, on some occasions under the supervision of the Maharaja himself. On his way back once from Kathua during this period, the Maharaja, when he himself saw the dead bodies on the road, felt completely gratified!

In Jammu city, Muslims collected from outer districts to save their lives. The large number of Muslims, who poured into this Hindu-dominated city, made the job easier for those who had already planned their butchery. The shooting of Muslims started in broad daylight in Jammu. Muslims' electric supply lines were cut. Their water supplies ceased, and, above all, their rations were stopped. These Muslims put up a stiff resistance, headed by Mian Nasir-ud-Din Ahmad, with whatever arms they could get hold of. If they had received a quota of arms that, on the receipt of their frantic cries for help, we managed to send them they might have saved their lives and given a good account of themselves.

In the midst of this fight, a proclamation was issued by the Dogra Government asking the Muslims to surrender, and guaranteeing that they would be given safe custody across the border into Pakistan. Accepting the *bona fides* of this proclamation, Muslims surrendered in a helpless lot. They then were asked to collect themselves on an open piece of land so that lorries would be able to convey them to Pakistan. As many as sixty lorries were loaded with women, children and old men. These sixty, and, a day after, more lorries were taken into the wilderness of Kathua Jungle. Sikh, Dogra and Brahmin armed gangs were let loose on these innocent women and children and an unparalleled butchery was perpetrated. Very few of these people escaped to tell their woeful tale in Sialkot—a city in Pakistan. All these happenings were taking place in full view of the Indian Army which had by then entered the State. The responsibility of these killings squarely lies on the shoulders of Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru, then Prime Minister of India, who

was duly informed about all this beforehand. It must be said, to the credit of Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru, that he candidly admitted his responsibility. Sheikh Abdullah himself had taken over the administration of the State. He, therefore, cannot be morally absolved of the responsibility of these heinous crimes committed on innocent women and children.

From the Province of Jammu, particularly from the districts of Jammu, Kathua and Udhampur, no less than three lakhs of refugees poured into Pakistan, while large gatherings in Miran Sahib and Ranbir Singhpora (a tehsil of Jammu District) camps were machine-gunned in cold blood. Three lakhs of Muslims in these areas were supposed to have been annihilated. The rest took refuge in Pakistan. The way Pakistan treated them is a very well known story. They are still the sacred trust of Pakistan. These helpless Jammu and Kashmir refugees still patiently wait for their return to their homeland. But is the day for their return any nearer now than it was when they entered the country of their refuge?

What had happened in Jammu had its natural repercussions in what is now Azad Kashmir, or those parts of Kashmir which, by that time, had been liberated. The atrocities committed by the Dogra troops in these parts of the State, and also the spy-role played by non-Muslims, had bred a feeling of hatred against the Sikhs and the Hindus in the minds of the Muslims. As soon as the news of the carnage of Muslims in Jammu reached these parts, the random killing of Hindus and Sikhs took place here too. In some places innocent women and children were subjected to maltreatment and the male population was murdered. There can be no justification for such actions. No retaliation on our part against innocent people here could make any difference to the lot of the Muslims who had been trapped in different parts of Kathua, Jammu and Udhampur districts. On the other hand, if we could treat the Hindu population differently, our fight for freedom would have

risen much higher in the eyes of future historians. As it was, it seemed humanly impossible for any agency to control these things.

What the tribal brethren did on their way to Srinagar has been exaggerated by the other side. The writer went half way with the tribal fighters up to Baramulla city. In war, of course, truth never survives. An exaggerated and untrue propaganda is put out by Indian Press and Radio. I leave it to the future historians to bring to light in a balanced form the true statement of facts. Nonetheless, I have no hesitation in saying that what happened in Muzaffarabad on or about the 22nd, 23rd and 24th of October, 1947, was bad enough, and I saw the whole thing with my own eyes. There could not have been any justification for a killing of that sort. The fault does not at all lie with the tribal fighters; and the whole blame must be borne by those who were leading them.

The Azad Kashmir Government had numerous difficulties, but it certainly did its best to organize camps for the non-Muslims. Some of the camps existed for 3 to 4 years. One camp at Muzaffarabad existed as late as 1950-1951. Those people who have since been evacuated to India, will bear testimony to the fact that, under all circumstances, we did our best for them. In the beginning what we could do was not, in any case, very effective. I quote only one instance to explain this. During the month of November, 1947, I went to Mirpur to see things there for myself. I visited, during the night, one Hindu refugee camp at Ali Baig—about 15 miles from Mirpur proper. Among the refugees I found some of my fellow lawyers in a pathetic condition. I saw them myself, sympathised with them and solemnly promised that they would be rescued and sent to Pakistan, from where they would eventually be sent out to India. In Azad Kashmir no big refugee camps could be maintained because of obvious difficulties. After a couple of days, when I visited the camp again to do my bit for them, I was

greatly shocked to learn that all those people whom I had seen on the last occasion had been 'disposed of'. I can only say that nothing in my life pained my conscience ever so much as did this incident. The shame and horror of it, what those friends would have thought of me, has never left my mind. Those who were in charge of those camps were duly dealt with but that certainly is no compensation to those whose near and dear ones were killed in this manner.

Chapter V

The Background of Azad Kashmir Movement

The Budget Session of Jammu and Kashmir State Assembly for the year 1947 was held in March-April. This was the first Session of the Assembly in which I participated, after being elected a member of the State Assembly in January, 1947. This being the Budget Session, it was, as usual, a very busy one.

Fortunately, or unfortunately, it fell upon me to bring together all Mussalman M.L.A.'s into one Muslim Conference group in the Assembly. There were persons who were elected on the Muslim Conference ticket from different parts of the State, but there were still others who, though not elected on the Muslim Conference ticket, did believe in the Muslim Conference ideology. They willingly joined the Muslim Conference group.

During this Session speeches were made in the Assembly, expressing the apprehension about the activities of the Praja Parishad Party and the RSSS in the State. It was clearly pointed out by the writer, that a semi-military organization was being built up in certain parts of the State, with the intention of killing the Mussalmans. This apprehension was converted into a reality in Udhampur, Jammu and Kathua. It was also very clearly pointed out, during these speeches, that the Dogra Army was resorting to high-handedness in the districts of Poonch and Mirpur. These speeches, of course, were noted down, but no action ever was taken on them.

During the month of April, 1947, Maharaja Hari Singh toured the State frontier areas of Manawar, Bhimber, Mirpur, Kotli, Poonch, Rawalakot and Nowshera. Like Pandit Nehru on his tour of the North-West Frontier Province the previous October, the Maharaja saw that almost all Mussalmans were in favour of Pakistan. He was specially impressed and alarmed by a great gathering of about forty thousand men, almost all ex-Servicemen of the British Army from Sudhnutti and Bagh Tehsils of Poonch, assembled to greet him on April 21, 1947 at Rawalakot.

During this tour the Maharaja gave clear instructions to his non-Muslim officers to aid the Hindu and Sikh population wherever it was possible to do so. Later on the Maharaja ordered more troops into these western districts of Jammu Province. A Mirpur-Poonch brigade had been formed with headquarters at Nowshera, and in the summer of 1947, another separate brigade composed of purely of non-Muslim troops, Dogra-Hindus, Gurkhas and Sikhs, was formed as Poonch brigade. Garrison which had hitherto been kept in the main centres, were to be in all small towns, central villages, and at bridges and ferries and other key-points.

After the March-April Assembly Session had ended at Jammu, the writer visited his own Constituency of Poonch and, particularly, Sudhnutti and Bagh Tehsils. These two Tehsils of Bagh and Sudhnutti bordered on Pakistan from end to end. I genuinely warned the people on way from Jammu to Poonch of the coming ominous events. I had thoroughly realized by this time that a conspiracy had already been hatched and the RSSS and Dogra troops, in cooperation with each other, were going to be a part of that conspiracy. I, therefore, urged the people to get organized politically. In my private meetings I disclosed to the people the dangers that lay ahead of them. I told them that they may be completely annihilated by the Dogra troops after being rounded up. I asked them to get prepared militarily to

meet effectively such a danger. In order to give people courage I made very strong speeches. These speeches produced the necessary effect, and people generally got courage, became defiant, and started organizing themselves exactly on military lines. These preparations remained secret throughout, though the Hindu population of this area got alarmed by my speeches, and sent irresponsible telegrams to the Maharaja's Government. In the meantime, while I was still at Rawalakot, one night some wandering people appeared in the villages of Rawalakot area from the Punjab. This alarmed the Dogra troops stationed there. The Commander of these troops, in desperation, attacked some of these villages in order to arrest those people. During this incident Dogra troops arrested and beat innocent Mussalmans, and molested naked women in a village very near to Rawalakot town. The next day I called a very big meeting of the whole area, and twenty thousand people collected to hear my speech which I delivered in most 'seditious' terms. I emphasized upon the people that Pakistan—a Muslim State—was going to be established along the border of the State of Jammu and Kashmir and in any case the Mussalmans of Jammu and Kashmir cannot remain unaffected by this great event. They, therefore, I urged, should take courage and meet all insults from the Dogra troops with courage and fortitude. From that day a strange atmosphere took the place of the usually peaceful life in these parts.

After this speech I had a long meeting with the Wazir of Poonch at his request. The Wazir of Poonch told me, during this meeting, that he had no power to deal with matters which affected the Army. He only promised to send the whole case of Rawalakot to the higher authorities. He, nevertheless, promised that he would obtain the dismissal of the Subedar who led the army contingent into the village to perpetrate this raid.

The writer then left for Srinagar with his family.

As soon as I reached Srinagar, I contacted all the Government agencies with regard to the situation obtaining in Poonch, but everybody seemed to think that whatever was happening in Poonch was my own creation. A restrictive order was served on me towards the end of June, 1947, and warrants of arrest were issued on August 20, 1947. Before those warrants could be executed I escaped to Pakistan.

Pakistan was declared to have come into being on 14th of August, 1947, since when the whole atmosphere changed in the State. On August 15, 1947, Srinagar, the centre of all activities, gave ample proof of its being pro-Pakistan. Processions and meetings were arranged in all parts of Srinagar. Pakistan flags were flying over at least fifty per cent of the buildings and houses. All house-boat owners were flying the Pakistan flags and the Jhelum river presented a fortifying sight. Though Sheikh Abdullah's party was yet indecisive on the issue of Pakistan, this pro-Pakistan demonstration incidentally made them extremely uncomfortable. Forced by events and suddenly changing circumstances, even Sheikh Abdullah's party men were forced to speak in favour of Pakistan, because the public in general leaned in that direction. As a matter of fact, some people were so sanguine as to believe that, as soon as Sheikh Abdullah came out of prison, he himself would declare in favour of accession of the State to Pakistan.

The majority of the Muslim Conference leaders were in jail. Those who were outside were not united internally, though they were all agreed on the issue of Pakistan. The masses were ready for a furious drive in favour of Pakistan but Muslim Conference leadership, somehow or other, was not at all equal to the task.

Agha Shaukat Ali, the then General Secretary of the Muslim Conference, was on parole for a fortnight from Srinagar Jail. He went round to meet some of the the Pakistani friends whose advice we needed ever so

much. The task was really very big and any good advice from the Muslim League leaders was not available. None of us was so ripe in experience as to clearly visualize the implications of Pakistan and then natural repercussions of it on State politics. We did not want to bungle the situation by taking risks or unnecessarily precipitating the matter. Some of the Muslim League leaders, who visited Srinagar in those days, contacted the Nationalist leaders instead of Muslim Conference leaders. Somehow or other Muslim League leaders were impressed by Sheikh Abdullah's organization in Srinagar itself. One must confess that the Muslim Conference organization was comparatively much weaker in Srinagar, and throughout the valley of Kashmir. As has been pointed out, there were a number of leaders in Sheikh Abdullah's party itself, who believed in accession of the State to Pakistan as a natural consequence of the partition of India, though they still strongly believed in nationalist ideas. Jammu Province and Poonch, however, were much better organized, so far as the Muslim Conference was concerned. These areas were absolutely decided on the Pakistan issue. In Poonch things moved very much quicker than one expected. Nothing could have possibly arrested the march of events there.

Assemblies of more than five persons were prohibited by an order of the District Magistrate at the end of July, 1947, but, in fact, the control of Poonch had already passed to the State troops, who now had posts and pickets at all key points. The arms deposited by the Mussalmans with the police, by the orders of the District Magistrate, were handed over to the Military. They distributed these arms to local non-Muslims and to Sikhs, originally from Hazara, who moved during the summer into the Bagh area and Poonch itself, after being trained and organized in Muzaffarabad.

This alarmed the Mussalmans. They started taking whatever measures they could to defend their hearths and homes. In the villages, in August, 1947, some

leading men, particularly ex-Servicemen, began to collect money to buy arms from tribesmen of the former Frontier Province, because it had now become absolutely clear, that only by force of arms could they remove the Maharaja's oppressive army occupation, and save their own lives. There were others who crossed to Pakistan to escape arrest or to leave their families in a place where they could live safely and honourably, while they themselves could take up the fight against the Dogra Maharaja.

During these days a very big meeting of Mussalmans was held in front of the mosque at Hajira, Poonch. It was addressed by Muslim preachers and also by a local Sikh, Khazan Singh of Arunka, who declared that, the State being overwhelmingly Muslim, should join Pakistan, and that the Muslim authorities should treat the Sikh and Hindu minorities fairly, as they wished to remain in their homes in harmony with their Muslim neighbours. In this meeting they passed resolutions asking for a responsible Government, right of free assembly, release of political prisoners, accession to Pakistan and abolition of all recently imposed taxes by the Central Government at Srinagar.

A column of troops was sent from Poonch *via* Hajira to march through Rawalakot to Bagh where stronger agitation was in progress. To protect their friends of the Bagh area, who sent messengers asking that the troops should be held up, the villagers of Khai Gala attempted to block the road and prevent their passage to Rawalakot. They had no arms, only woodman's axes, which every man carries in these hills, but the Dogra troops fired on them, and killed three and wounded many more before they cleared the trees and boulders blocking the road and marched through.

There were a number of clashes between the Muslim ex-Servicemen of Poonch and the Maharaja's Hindu troops. Captain Balwant Singh, in charge of the Dogra troops at Bagh, agreed that the Muslim demand for

accession to Pakistan was legitimate. He sent a Muslim official of the State to pacify the crowd, which eventually held a meeting and camped outside Bagh. Next day, however, there was more trouble, and fighting broke out when the Dogra pickets around Bagh opened up with rifles and bren-guns on the Muslim crowd encamped below, causing heavy casualties.

Dogra troops sent out their patrols to the neighbouring Muslim villages. One patrol was sent to surround a nearby village, the centre of agitation against the Dogras, and the Muslim villagers were threatened with extinction if they did not deliver up the local Muslim Conference leader, Khadim Hussain Shah. To save them he surrendered himself, and was taken to Bagh. Before they killed him, the Dogra officer asked him what he wanted. He replied: 'Freedom and Pakistan'. On this he was bayoneted through his chest!

Reinforcements continued to arrive from Poonch through Rawalakot. Pandit Ramchandra Raina, a decent Kashmiri Hindu, who was a revenue officer in Poonch, was sent to tour the troubled areas, to seize weapons and to pacify the people. But the civil officials were now powerless. Poonch had, since July, been given up to the unrestrained control of the non-Muslim occupying forces, who received secret orders from the Maharaja and his Dogra chiefs. There were, however, some Hindu civilian officers, who positively encouraged the Dogra troops to stamp out the popular movement, and clear the country of all the inhabitants, who demanded self-government and Pakistan.

Immediately after the Bagh firing, columns of troops, accompanied by bands of armed Sikhs and civilian Hindus aided by non-Muslim villagers, were sent out through the country-side, to search and plunder villages in a most merciless and random fashion. In most cases the unarmed Muslim male villagers abandoned their villages when the troops and armed bands approached,

remaining hidden in the nearby forest till they had passed. The civilian armed bands and local non-Muslim villagers assisted the police and army in their loot and arson. Women were raped mercilessly. The writer was told of an incident where a girl of thirteen was raped by ten soldiers, and she ultimately died of wounds her rapists had inflicted.

It was then so clear to all of us that the Maharaja was bent on joining India in total disregard of the wishes of eighty per cent of his people, and that resistance to his plan of accession to India would be ruthlessly crushed. This meant the expulsion from their homes or the slaughter of a million Muslims living in a broad belt of territory along the Pakistan borders, from Muzaffarabad to Kathua.

One of the best commentaries on the movement of Pakistan, which originated in Poonch, is that of Sheikh Abdullah himself. As reported by the Associated Press of India, under the date-line, New Delhi, October 21, 1947, Sheikh Abdullah said—

“That the present troubles in Poonch, a feudatory of Kashmir, were because of the policy adopted by the State. The people of Poonch who suffered under the local ruler, and again under the Kashmir Durbar, who was the overlord of the Poonch ruler, had started a people’s movement for the redress of their grievances. It was not communal.

“The Kashmir State sent their troops and there was panic in Poonch. But most of the adult population in Poonch were ex-Servicemen in the Indian Army, who had close connection with the people in Jhelum and Rawalpindi. They evacuated their women and children, crossed the frontier and returned with arms supplied to them by willing people. The Kashmir State Forces were thus forced to withdraw from certain areas”.

The story of this rising has been described by a Hindu leader of Kashmir, Pandit Prem Nath Bazaz, in the following words—

“The Poonch, where thousands of demobilised Muslim veterans of the Second World War live, an open armed rebellion broke out against the Maharaja and his new administration. The rebellion spread rapidly to the adjoining areas of Mirpur where, also, war veterans lived in large numbers. Instead of realising what he had done, Maharaja Hari Singh egged on by Congress leaders and the new Counsellors, despatched the whole of the Dogra army to quell the disturbances, or, as one Rajput Colonel puts it, ‘to reconquer the area’. The Army perpetrated unheard-of atrocities on the people of Poonch; whole villages were burnt down and innocent people massacred. Reports reaching Srinagar were not allowed to be published in the press, and no official reports were issued to allay the fears of the public. This happened in September and the tribesmen did not enter the State before the 23rd of October, 1947”.

In Srinagar itself the Dogra Government became more and more insecure because of the events in Poonch. Larger contingents of troops were sent from Srinagar. As the information of the movement of troops reached us we became decidedly more nervous, and, it was only too evident that the whole of the State appeared to be ready for a large-scale disaster. Somehow or the other, the State authorities came to be quite convinced, probably on the basis of good evidence, that this writer was wholly responsible for the events in Poonch. On one occasion Thakar Janak Singh, the then Prime Minister, during an interview, pointed this out very clearly to a deputation which met him to discuss the events in Poonch. I was a member of this deputation. Even at this stage I gave him the solemn guarantee of complete peace and order in Poonch, provided all troops were withdrawn and Poonch district was left functioning under normal civil

administration. This seemed to him very intriguing advice.

I was served with an order by the Government, through their Chief Secretary, not to leave Srinagar under any circumstances. If I remained in Srinagar the Government had no objection. My entry into Poonch, in any case, was considered undesirable. Warrants for my arrest were placed with the border authorities in Kohala, Banihal and Haji Pir Pass. In the meantime, information about the events in Poonch reached me daily. Every new day brought a more urgent and fervent appeal from the people of that district, to do something about the matters. Poonch being my constituency, my moral and other responsibilities were so great, that I eventually did collect the courage to do what I actually did, and came to the timely rescue of an otherwise lost but brave people.

On or about the 20th August, 1947, Agha Shaukat Ali, the General Secretary of the Muslim Conference and myself went to meet some of our Pakistani friends and advisers. We were looking for solid advice and reliable information on all matters that confronted us. These Pakistani gentlemen were holidaying in Gulmarg. They were in possession of solid facts and gave us good advice. The next meeting was held at the house of the late Dr. Mohammad Din Tasir in Srinagar.

We had a long meeting with these gentlemen, and discussed with them the existing state of affairs in Kashmir. We apprised them of the conditions existing in Poonch. These gentlemen were of the opinion that, unless there was some counter preparation, there was a genuine apprehension of Mussalmans being exposed to the danger of complete annihilation. They had come to this conclusion, in all probability, on the basis of some information that they themselves had in their possession and their views were confirmed by the facts that were placed before them. It was with these gentlemen that we had another meeting in Srinagar itself at the house of late Dr. M. D.

Tasir. It was suggested, in this Srinagar meeting, that if I had to get arrested at all, it must be done in Rawalakot, my home place, where easily twenty to thirty thousand people would have followed me into the jail, making the situation extremely difficult for the Government. The Wazir of Poonch had informed Srinagar authorities that my entry into Poonch would not be desirable, and my arrest anywhere in that area would entail a major crisis for the Government.

During this meeting it was also decided that, in the meantime, I should leave immediately for Pakistan, in order to re-enter Poonch to head the movement there. Chaudhri Hamidullah Khan, the Acting President of All-Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference, sent me a letter of authority in Pakistan, which I produce below—

SRINAGAR,

17TH SEPTEMBER, 1947.

“My dear Sardar Muhammad Ibrahim Khan,

We have started the civil disobedience movement here, and I have addressed a number of mass meetings. I may be arrested at any moment. Therefore, in consultation with the available members of the working committee, I am constrained to appoint you as my successor. As such, you will be perfectly competent to receive and deliver goods on behalf of the Muslim Conference. You can negotiate with any party or organization, and arrive at any understanding you deem fit and proper. The Muslim Conference will be bound by your acts and words. In my and my colleagues' opinion, you are utterly worthy of the trust reposed in you. I hope and trust you will, as usual, discharge your heavy responsibilities with zeal and enthusiasm, and our community will surely profit by your able guidance. You will please

appoint your successor whenever the prospect of your arrest arise.

May God bless you,

Yours sincerely,
(Sd) HAMIDULLAH KHAN,
Acting President,
All-J.&K. Muslim Conference.

N.B.—It may please be noted that, as long as I am not arrested, you are, even now, quite competent to act on my behalf outside the State.

Sd/- HAMIDULLAH KHAN.

I was to escape to Pakistan accompanied by Agha Shaukat Ali. A day for the escape was also fixed. This fact was to be kept a dead secret, but, somehow or other, the Government came to know all about it. The next day, early in the morning, before we could make the first move, Agha Shaukat Ali was re-arrested and taken back to jail. When I reached his house at 7 o'clock in the morning, it was closely watched by the police, and Agha Shaukat Ali had already been delivered to the jail authorities.

The moment I learnt about it, I decided to disappear. I did not attend the courts, and spread the story through my clerks, that I had gone to Islamabad for a day to attend a case. The police rushed to Islamabad as foolishly as they did so many other things. The whole day I kept away from my house, because there was a twenty-four hour watch on my movements. To-day it seems like a miracle that all arrangements for my escape from Srinagar were complete by the end of that day. Two persons were responsible for this arrangement. One was Sultan Hassan Ali Khan of Boi of District Hazara, and the other Raja Abdul Hamid Khan of Muzaffarabad, one of my colleagues.

One might mention a small incident which might be of interest to some people. Before my escape, in one of our meetings at Dr. M. D. Tasir's place, Dr. Tasir, who had a real sense of humour, suggested quite seriously that I should escape wearing a 'Burqa'. This suggestion I at once turned down. It would have been a disgrace to have been caught by the police in a 'burqa'. Owing to the fact that such suggestion was put forward, the rumour, somehow, got around that I actually escaped while wearing a 'burqa'. Dr. Tasir himself, in an article which he published in 1948, contradicted this.

The day I escaped from Srinagar, my little son, Javed, was running a high temperature. One of our friends, Dr. Noor Hussain, volunteered to look after him. I told my very credulous and simple wife that, after visiting Lahore, I would soon be back. The same friends who were responsible for my escape, also arranged for accommodation in a house-boat for my last night in Srinagar.

In the morning of August 25, 1947 while Srinagar Police looked for me in a dreary drizzle, I reached Domel (Muzaffarabad) without any incident. The journey from Srinagar to Abbottabad was without an incident of any kind. I learnt later on that a warrant of arrest was lying with the Customs officer at Domel. There was no search of my taxi. In my taxi there happened to be two vagabonds—friends of the taxi driver, who were running away from Srinagar courts. Though I had paid for the whole taxi, they made themselves comfortable in it by the courtesy of the taxi driver. On reaching the other side of the border, they told me that they were running away from the Police. I did not, however, tell them that I was myself running away in a somewhat similar fashion.

While in Abbottabad, I learned, to my grief and extreme sorrow, that in Tehsil headquarters of Bagh, the Dogra Army had opened fire on a crowd of ten

thousand people. This certainly was a declaration of war on the people, and left no doubt in my mind that people of Poonch were faced with a major catastrophe. Unless some outside help reached them in good time, their safety and security were an extremely doubtful proposition.

Sitting in my hotel in Abbottabad, I wrote not less than one hundred chits in my own hand to different people in Poonch area. In these chits I asked the people not to lose courage, and to prepare to defend their homes at every cost. In these chits I conveyed to them that I was busy trying to get them the necessary arms, though at that moment I did not have the slightest idea as to what I could do for them in concrete form. There was, however, a strong belief in my mind of solid help either coming from the Government or the people of Pakistan. These chits, it seems, did reach their destinations safely, though the Dogra security arrangements were fairly stiff. When, in the mad fury of a mob, in the chaos of thought and action, people paused and took stock of what they had, they found that they had very little.

In the meantime, the Dogra Government issued orders to the following effect—

- (a) Confiscation of all arms;
- (b) Clearing of Pakistan Border areas;
- (c) Empowering of the Dogra Army to shoot any person suspected of 'subversive' activities;
and
- (d) Poonch and Mirpur districts to be placed under Martial Law.

Against this background, I reached Lahore on 28th August, 1947. On the Lahore Railway Station, complete chaos prevailed. I paid Rs. 15 to get a tonga to reach my hotel in Anarkali. Normally, it should have cost me a rupee. I carried a letter for Mian

Amir-ud-Din, who was the Mayor of Lahore at that time. Through the good offices of this gentleman, I tried to arrange a meeting with Quaid-e-Azam, who was now the Governor-General of Pakistan, in order to place before him the Kashmir case. The Quaid-e-Azam himself did not wish to meet me because he did not desire, in any manner, whatever, to be associated with anything that was happening in the State of Jammu and Kashmir at that moment. Accompanied by another friend, Mr. B. A. Hashmi, a friend of the Srinagar meeting, I approached Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan, the Central Minister of Refugee and Rehabilitation, with the object of arranging a meeting with Quaid-e-Azam. Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan failed to contact the Quaid-e-Azam. As a matter of fact, the whole atmosphere was so uncertain, and everybody felt so awkward to approach the Quaid-e-Azam, that no one possessed enough courage to draw the attention of the Pakistan Governor-General to Kashmir affairs, and save so many Mussalmans from their impending tragic destiny. Pakistan herself was most tragically gripped by the problem of the influx of refugees. Complete chaos seemed to take possession of everything. Most well wishers of Pakistan doubted, and, most seriously, if Pakistan could exist another couple of months.

For a full period of one week, I went round seeing the people in Lahore. Every dawn brought me new disappointments. There was no ray or glimmer of hope. There was hardly any Newspaper editor whom I did not meet. The Press were quite prepared to do their best, and, in fact, they did their best as the movement actually started. But nothing disappointed me more than the streets of Lahore. The sun rose over Lahore and went down with the same mechanical precision. Every hour, every day for me in Lahore was the greatest agony a human being could possibly undergo.

I was completely disappointed, tired and exhausted. All avenues of hope had been explored, and I was

thoroughly dismayed with everything—people, streets, tongas, other noises and limitless thoughts. The noises of Lahore seemed such an unreal drudgery. People seemed selfish; could not they possibly realize that all business and trade was useless? Could not they visualize that a whole nation was faced with virtual annihilation? All these thoughts rose and fell like the waves of the sea in the mind of a small man, who had no second person to share the secrets of his mind.

I decided to pack and return to the scene of the tragedy. Keenly conscious of the great duty which nature so suddenly and prematurely called upon me to perform, equally conscious of my failings and limitations, something still worked within my mind like a volcano. With all the disappointments and failures lodged in my heart, I desired to see, for the last time, the Editor of the Pakistan Times—a daily of Lahore. I started for the office of that paper while my bedding was being packed in my hotel. As I was passing the 'Nila Gumbad' area, a car stopped near my tonga, and a gentleman asked me to come down from the tonga and get into the car. I accompanied him to Model Town, where he was going to see the bungalows of his Hindu friends just to make sure that they were safe. The journey from the city of Lahore right down to Model Town and back, could have hardly taken an hour or so. Within this I was able to convince my friend of the impending tragedy of the people of Kashmir. I did not really believe that he could do much. But I would have told this story to anyone who lent a sympathetic ear. This friend, strangely enough, promised to do his best, but he insisted that he should make sure about things for himself. He, therefore, proposed to proceed to Srinagar. To any proposal which could help the cause in any manner I could have had no objection. I told him that I was proceeding to Murree, where he could always contact me if he so desired.

It seemed that he did consult quite a number of people before arriving at a definite decision. From

Murree he collected his wife, and off he went to Srinagar with the pretext of his wife's diagnosis about some disease. After remaining in Srinagar for about a week or so he came back to Murree to have a conference with me. To my entire satisfaction and relief, he agreed with me on all points. He realized the urgency of the matter and also the risks Mussalmans were running, if no outside assistance was extended to them in good time. I really do not wish to go into details of what happened after that, but I must admit that this gentleman did his best with deep sincerity and honesty of purpose.

He did his utmost to advance the cause of the movement which, later on, came to be known as the Azad Kashmir Movement. This gentleman was no other person than Mian Iftikharuddin of Lahore, a great leader himself. He died in 1960 or so. The echo of this movement which rose out of the high hills of Kashmir, rang round the world and that echo is, by no means, finished yet. The gentleman mentioned gave up all associations with the movement when he accepted a Ministry in the Punjab.

Chapter VI

Beginning of Azad Kashmir Movement

I stayed in Murree and made it my base, if one may borrow an army expression, where some sympathisers loaned a number of rooms in a hotel. In that hotel much was said during the dark hours of night, and nothing was done or said during the long hours of the day. The Punjab Police, Intelligence Department, though quite vigilant, probably did not know much about the whole thing. For the work which I had undertaken to do, Murree was a very convenient and congenial place. One could have all the information from Srinagar every day and also one could easily contact Muzaffarabad, Poonch and Mirpur. From Murree one could easily establish contacts with people in Poonch along the Jhelum River during the night. During the day Dogra Army soldiers regularly patrolled all the possible routes of communication.

Not quite single handed, I took upon myself to resort to arms in defence of our lives, honour and property, and to prepare the people for it. Before taking this most crucial decision, I did not consult my colleagues, because I did not have the opportunity to do so. The decision was not one taken just overnight. I collected some sympathetic army officers of the State before whom I placed the whole situation. These officers, at great risk to themselves, and other advisers, calculated all the pros and cons of the whole matter. A number of con-

ferences were held. Maps were studied and all other possible loop-holes were foreseen. By the advice of these really great friends, we were able to evolve a way by which Mussalmans could be saved, and effective resistance could be offered to Dogra troops and their satellite, the RSSS. Here I must mention that the question of tribal people coming to our assistance was neither considered nor contemplated at this stage of planning. On the other hand, when I got the information that tribesmen were prepared to come to our assistance, it was a pleasant surprise to me.

After making the difficult decision to resort to arms, we got busy with the collection of weapons of any sort. A secret collection of Muzzle Loaders was started, and with these Muzzle Loaders we collected gun-powder and lead from all over the Punjab. A small factory was started in village Basian in the Tehsil of Murree, where lead was converted into bullets, and, during October nights, by very crude and rudimentary arrangements, these things were transported across the Jhelum river. All arms that could be collected in the district of Rawalpindi were collected. It had become easier now, because the story of the Dogra troops' atrocities had spread all over the Punjab, and some of the refugees from Bagh had already crossed the Jhelum river into Pakistan, where they were camping in the Tehsil of Murree. Even the burning of villages in Poonch could easily be seen from the high hills of Murree. About this time a strong protest was lodged by the Government of Pakistan with the Maharaja's Government, about the atrocities committed by the Dogra troops on Poonch Mussalmans.

In Murree I was able to mobilise, most effectively, public opinion in our favour. We were able to raise some funds which we sent to the then Frontier Province, for the purchase of 'drawal' or one shot rifles. This method, though it had a small beginning, made huge progress in due course of time. Very soon it became possible to find ways by which we collected quite a

number of rifles. Before these rifles could be distributed, it was made sure that an organization existed which would utilize this material to the best of our advantage.

In Murree, unique services to our cause were rendered by the Tehsildar, Murree,* at the risk of his job. It was in his house that we were able to collect the 'stuff' and then during the night, in an extremely well-guarded manner, the 'stuff' was despatched on mules to the banks of the Jhelum river. On the banks of this river, on both sides, awaited parties who had prepared 'shinas'—inflated goat skins—for the transportation of arms and ammunition across the river. In this, otherwise most risky and dangerous enterprise, the Tehsildar, Murree, not only risked his job many times, but also risked his life as well. All this 'business' was to be a hush-hush affair. The police were never taken into confidence. Once we were caught red-handed on this side of the Jhelum River. We completely denied any complicity in the matter, though some others were hauled up. The loss of valuable arms was sustained with a heavy heart.

The area of operation was mainly divided into two large sectors, Muzaffarabad to Bhimber, and Bhimber to Jammu. Gilgit was left out, because the Gilgit organization was separate. The Dogra Army Muslim Officers, raising a local rebellion of their own, had established an administration of their own. This was effectively arranged with officers who were posted in Gilgit by the Dogra Government. Separate sectors were given separate quotas of rifles for operation, and placed under different Army leaders. Similarly, different leaders were put in charge of different sectors to provide the necessary political link. Before the whole scheme could operate in an organized and effective manner, we needed an army to fight an army. Mere armed crowds could not possibly achieve much, and this was realized in the very beginning. It seemed, therefore, that the *sine qua non*

*Raja Sultan Maqsood.

of the whole plan was that a people's army be organized. It could only be effectively done in Poonch and probably in Mirpur, though Muzaffarabad was also organized. Mirpur failed to provide the immediate need, because the Dogra troops had not done that much damage in Mirpur as they had done in Poonch, and, moreover, Poonch had no less than 80,000 discharged soldiers from the old Indian Army. The nucleus, and also the bulk of the Azad Army, was consequently raised from Poonch. For this purpose, during the month of September, 1947, I crossed the Jhelum River a number of times during the nights on a 'shina'—with the help of some of our great men, who later so heroically laid down their lives during the fight that ensued. They are—at least most of them—no more amongst us to-day. But each of them played a unique part in the early days of our liberation movement. No matter how much is said in their praise, words surely cannot sum up their great deeds of personal bravery and heroism. We only hope that Almighty God will reward them and their children for what they did.

During the September nights, in the light of torches, under the hanging threats of the Dogra Army Units, we raised companies and then units of the Azad Kashmir Army village by village from Kohala down to Mirpur. Each sector was placed under the charge of different sector commanders. This army had to operate only with the rifles and ammunition, the scarcity of which can hardly be imagined. The rest of the things—rations, clothes and other stuff—were to be provided by the local people themselves. All people worked with so much precision and unity during this crisis, that I could not have even thought possible few weeks earlier. What part women played, how small children carried water, ammunition and rations to the fighting soldiers, are acts without any parallel in the history of recent times. This account may be biased a bit, no doubt, but the things that I myself observed were certainly extraordinary.

As soon as the fighting started, all Muslim Officers

of the Dogra Army joined us with their soldiers, arms and ammunition. This happened to a great advantage on the Muzaffarabad front. Some of the officers came along, took positions along with the rest of us, and played a great part in the organization of the Azad Army. Some of these officers gave their lives in the actual fight with great devotion and patriotism, particularly in Mirpur and generally on other fronts. In all probability history will never know them individually, yet their patriotism, self-sacrifice and devotion to the cause will always find mention, so long as Jammu and Kashmir exists in history.

This people's army was later provided with officers from outside too. In this connection I must mention the services of the officers of the "Indian National Army" from Pakistan. I personally have praise for the way they volunteered to serve a people's cause. Some of them had their failings, as is bound to happen everywhere. Some of them later took part in State politics, and took sides with one leader or the other. If they had not done that, and simply stuck to the organization of the Azad Army, their credit would have been much higher. Unfortunately, they brought in politics and it putrefied the army organization. Some of them, no doubt, played their part with devotion and sincerity. It is not advisable to mention names. In any case, mentioning names only raises controversy, and does not serve any useful purpose.

The fight started on different fronts. People were so oppressed by the Dogra troops, that they could not wait for an organized attack. I cannot blame them. Any people would have acted in the same manner. This, however, cost us ever so much. By starting earlier than we should have, we lost the great advantage of surprise attack on the Dogra dug-outs. Secondly, the Dogras got to know the intentions of the people and learnt about an organized armed revolt. They then informed their Government, who sent more troops to reinforce their earlier and smaller units. Thirdly, our soldiers

attacked without enough reserves of ammunition, and without any hand-grenades. The Dogras had a well-run line of communication connected with their base and this communication was their monopoly. Our soldiers could only work during the nights, and only by using irregular paths and boats on the Jhelum River, which also were burnt by the Dogras later.

As a result of all this, we could not capture positions which we hoped to do in a couple of days' time. The Dogras dug in strongly and used Three-Inch Mortars and also Bren-guns against our ill-equipped troops. As against these, we had only .303 rifles which were 'Darra-made' and one-shot. These factors made our position not only extremely costly but, at times, quite impossible. This happened in Bagh, Rawalakot and Kotli fronts.

Luckily, Tehsil Sudhnutti of Poonch District was at once vacated by the Dogras, and this gave us a solid foothold on the Poonch side, where at Trarkhel we started raising a regular army, and the functioning of a training centre which could regularly feed all battalions of the Azad Army, at least on the Poonch front. A similar training centre was started at Harigel in Bagh, Poonch, for the same purpose.

If we could have captured all the Dogra positions by surprise all over Poonch, we could have completely defeated the Dogra Army within a month all over the State, and taken Srinagar and Jammu both.

The greatest snag in the whole campaign has been the lack of communications, and lack of automatic arms, which are absolutely necessary for an attack. We had to attack everywhere, while Dogras, and later the Indian Army, had to defend everywhere. As soon as the Indian Army entered the fight, the Indian Air Force came into operation as well. It then became impossible for our soldiers on the Poonch, Kotli and Nowshera fronts to operate during day-light. To make a concentrated

attack on the enemy position during the day became, in fact, out of the question. All our attacks were delivered during the nights, when the Indian Army would start a huge barrage of light Machine-Gun fire without in the least caring for their supply of ammunition. They were fighting like a regular army with all arms and ample supply of ammunition, and with their regular line of communication working behind them. Azad Kashmir troops miserably lacked a regular line of communication, and a regular supply of arms and ammunition.

In spite of all this, since October 27, 1947, the 'Azad Army' (name given to the People's Army of liberation) was able to conquer from the Indian Army practically the whole of Poonch, with the exception of the city of Poonch. The whole of Rajauri and Mirpur districts, right down to Akhnoor, were captured by us, while the enemy held Nowshera, peace-time army stronghold throughout. On the Muzaffarabad front we went right up to Srinagar, and then had to retreat to Chikoti, which position we hold ever since. We went right up to Sopore, conquering the whole of Hindwara Tehsil. On the Gilgit front the whole of Gilgit was conquered, and also the whole of Ladakh right down to the positions, thirty miles from Srinagar. The army, which operated in Ladakh under most difficult conditions of snow, without any line of communication, must be given the greatest credit. For regular soldiers this would seem an impossibility, but during the Azad Kashmir Movement miracles have been performed. Whether history will ever give this movement the credit it deserves, is a separate matter. Of course, to expect any reward from any human agency for what the people did would be a great fallacy.

Chapter VII

Tribal People

With the beginning of the Movement of Azad Kashmir, the tribal people of the former Frontier Province and the surrounding territory came into prominence. Throughout British rule in United India, the Pathans in general, and the tribal people in particular, were invariably treated as 'hostiles'. The British Government in India had to keep a huge army to enforce peace, and maintain law and order in this tribal territory along the former Frontier Province. As soon as Pakistan was established, the Government of Pakistan did a very wise thing. They withdrew the Pakistan Army from the areas surrounding the tribal territory. The attitude of the Government of Pakistan completely changed towards these tribes, who are now living as good neighbours. In consequence the attitude of the tribal people towards the Pakistan Government and people of Pakistan has undergone a radical change. They have become great friends of Pakistan, and the Government of Pakistan probably value them as an asset, and quite rightly so.

The tribal people, particularly the Mahsoods and Mehmands, are a great fighting people. The Suleman-khel tribe from Afghanistan, also, are equally good fighters. It is pretty nearly an admitted fact that the Frontier Tribesmen are definitely one of the very best, if not the best, marksmen in the world. There are facts to prove that the men of these tribes have performed miraculous deeds of bravery and heroism. I know some instances where some of the tribesmen were able to

execute extraordinary acts of personal bravery and heroism in the Kashmir struggle. If properly handled, the tribesmen will always be a great asset to Pakistan.

On the partition of India, in East Punjab, unbearable atrocities were committed on the Mussalmans. These atrocities came to be known all over the world. Stories of how Sikhs treated Mussalmans got very wide publicity all over Pakistan. In fact, the manner in which these miserable creatures were killed, their women raped, and their children killed in the presence of parents, is too well known. As soon as the Frontier Pathans and the tribesmen came to know of these stories, they flocked, with whatever arms they had, towards West Punjab, to be allowed to go into East Punjab. The West Punjab Government very rightly prevented their intrusion into East Punjab, though this action of the West Punjab Government never met with the approval either of the tribesmen or the public in general.

Along with the East Punjab atrocity stories, in the months of August, September and October, 1947, the stories of the tragedy, happening in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, began to appear in the West Punjab Press. It published stories of how the Mussalmans in the State of Jammu and Kashmir were faced with a similar fate as they had met in other East Punjab States. A beginning of the general butchery had already been made in the city of Jammu, and in the districts of Udhampur and Kathua. The tribesmen and the Pathans of the Frontier Province, and, particularly, the people in the adjoining district of Abbottabad, got to know of the impending fate of the Mussalmans of Kashmir. Very naturally a huge Lashkar of tribesmen started off on their own from different parts of the tribal territory, and infiltrated into Kashmir, through the district of Muzaffarabad. Muzaffarabad city and district was dominated by Sikhs. All Sikhs in this district and Baramula city were heavily armed. A large number of Sikhs had also entered Muzaffarabad from the Frontier Province with arms. The existence of a

militant force in this district and Baramula city, jeopardised the safety and security of the Mussalmans. Because of the mounting tension that existed between Hindus, Sikhs and Mussalmans in West Punjab, and what had happened in East Punjab, these Sikhs became a real danger to the people in these areas. In fact the Mussalmans in the city of Muzaffarabad were in danger of being completely wiped out.

It was in these circumstances that the people of the Frontier Province, and the tribes, came to the timely rescue of these helpless people. The Muslim part of the Dogra Army joined this Lashkar of tribesmen. We were able to liquidate the entire Dogra Army from Kohala to Srinagar within the short period of a week or so. This Lashkar of the tribesmen plus the Muslim part of the regular Dogra Army, had captured the whole territory right up to Shalting on the outskirts of Srinagar, and had surrounded the aerodrome in Badgam. On the 26th October, 1947, the Indian Army entered the fight, and we had to retreat to Uri, and then Chinari, leaving all this territory. These days were certainly crucial in the history of this campaign of liberation of Kashmir. If we only could have captured Srinagar, which had already been deserted in so cowardly a manner by the Maharaja and his troops, the history of Kashmir would have been different.

Tribesmen played an important role in the movement of Azad Kashmir. They came all the way from different parts, from the settled and unsettled areas of tribal territory, to fight in Kashmir. Sulemankhel tribesmen came all the way from Afghanistan to take part in this Jihad of Kashmir. It has generally been made out by the other party, that the tribesmen were pushed into Kashmir by Pakistan. So far as the Azad Kashmir Government was concerned, we never went into tribal territory, at any stage of the campaign, to persuade the tribesmen to come to Kashmir. It is absolutely true that tribesmen reached Azad Kashmir without any effort

on the part of the Azad Kashmir Government.

With regard to the tribesmen coming into the Azad Kashmir liberation movement, the Government of India held altogether a different view. In their original complaint to the Security Council, the Indian representative to the United Nations in his letter of the 1st January, 1948, submitted in para No. 2 of his complaint that:

“On the 24th October, the Government of India heard of a major raid from the Frontier Province of the Dominion of Pakistan into the valley of Kashmir. Some two thousand or more fully armed and equipped men came by motor transport, crossed over to the territory of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, sacked the town of Muzaffarabad, killing many people, and proceeded along the Jhelum Valley road towards Srinagar, the summer capital of Jammu and Kashmir State. Intermediate towns and villages were sacked and burnt, and many people killed. These raiders were stopped by Kashmir State troops near Uri, a town some fifty miles from Srinagar, for some time, but the invaders got round them and burnt the power house at Mahora, which supplied electricity to the whole of Kashmir.”

Then again in para No. 8 of the complaint the Indian representative alleged that—

“The intervention of the Government of India resulted in the saving of Srinagar. The raiders were driven back from Baramula to Uri, and are held there by Indian troops. Nearly 19,000 raiders face the Dominion forces in this area. Since operations in the Valley of Kashmir started, pressure by the raiders against the Western and South-Western border of Jammu and Kashmir State has been intensified. Exact figures are not available. It is understood, however, that nearly 15,000 raiders are operating

against this part of the State. State troops are besieged in certain areas. Incursions by the raiders into State territory, involving murder, arson, loot and the abduction of women, continue. The booty is collected and carried over to the tribal areas to serve as an inducement to the further recruitment of tribesmen to the ranks of the raiders. In addition to those actively participating in the raid, tribesmen and others, estimated to 100,000, have been collected in different places in the districts of West Punjab bordering Jammu and Kashmir State, and many of them are receiving military training under Pakistan nationals, including officers of the Pakistan Army. They are looked after in Pakistan territory, fed, clothed, armed and otherwise equipped, and transported to the territory of Jammu and Kashmir State with the help, direct and indirect, of Pakistan officials, both military and civil.”

The allegations contained in this complaint were thoroughly refuted by the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, in the debate which subsequently took place in the Security Council. It is certainly true that tribesmen, as they proceeded on to Srinagar, committed certain excesses, but surely the allegations contained in the complaint by India are not correct. The reasons which impelled the tribesmen to come into the Kashmir Liberation movement have been examined. In spite of India's propaganda, that the tribesmen were sent into Kashmir at the instance of the Government of Pakistan, the central fact remains that the people of West Pakistan were deeply stirred by the developments in Kashmir, and there was a universal desire to go to the succour of the oppressed Muslims of Jammu and Kashmir, many of whom had close ties of blood and kinship with the residents of the former N.-W.F.P. and former West Punjab. Consequently, a considerable number of tribesmen, and residents of West Pakistan, including refugees from India, crossed the borders of the State on the 22nd October, 1947, in order to help their brethren in distress.

The Government of Pakistan did its best to stop this incursion, but, with its Army in the process of reorganization and all available troops engaged in rescue operations in East Punjab, or tied down to the North-Western Frontier, it could not stem the tide of tribal advance. Excitement in the tribal area was indeed so great, that it is doubtful whether anything short of a large-scale military operation could check the tribal movement. Pakistan was not in a position to undertake such an operation, nor would it have been countenanced by public opinion.

When tribesmen did come to our aid, their management became a difficult problem. Like all armies, they also marched and fought on their bellies. To manage different camps on a long road, where these tribesmen could be fed, was an extraordinary job. Since we were not conversant with their habits, ways of life or their temperament, in the beginning, our difficulties were real. As soon as we came to know them, matters became easier.

Tribesmen are elements which need constant and careful study in a war. One could not expect them to fight and conquer, and then hold ground. That is where we made terrific mistakes. Tribesmen are a fluid element. They must have regular and dependable forces with them, so that the ground covered may be held by such a force. When the tribal Lashkar retreated from Srinagar, we had no other troops to hold the territory evacuated by them. If we had some regular troops from Poonch or other areas, we could have held ground in the valley by the use of hill positions. In fact this is what happened over the top of Uri, where, though India occupied road positions, we held the hills to make it impossible for Indian troops to link with Poonch, where they remained surrounded for months. This action is a lesson for the future, that the tribes are good for a large-scale attack, where the enemy may be running, or where they may not have dug in.

Tribesmen are good at two things. They are, in truth, masters of these. One is laying of an ambush and the other is dagger fighting when surrounded by the enemy. When tribesmen know that a hundred lorries are carrying ammunition, you can safely leave it to them to lay an ambush in a fashion unknown to regular troops. They simply crawl over the whole ground, camouflage themselves perfectly to spring a unique surprise on the enemy. This happened in the Kashmir fight on a large number of occasions. The other thing in which the tribesmen beat everybody is in dagger fighting. Once tribesmen are surrounded by the enemy, one can be sure that a tribesman will fight with his knife. In the battle for the Pandu hills on Muzaffarabad front, I am told, tribesmen used the dagger with great success.

One cannot use tribesmen in an attack, though Sulemankhel on Nowshera front did marvellously well in an attack also. Tribesmen fight in small groups, using all sorts of weapons, and crawling up to enemy positions. But before they prepare for a thing like this, they have got to be put in that mood. They start by beating their drums not caring if the enemy would know their position. Quite a number of times, because of these things, tribesmen suffered losses. But losses, in any case, could not be very heavy, because a tribal attack never consists of a large group of men.

It is a moot point whether or not we should have withdrawn the tribesmen from Kashmir front. One loss that we have suffered in withdrawing them, is the value of their being there. Tribesmen were in reality a great threat to the enemy. It is not now possible to have them back on the front, because it may involve Pakistan in international complications. On the other hand, it would have been a difficult job to maintain huge Lashkars of tribesmen on the front. Their management is a job which is not altogether free from difficulties. And, in any case, how long would it have been possible for any government to maintain a disorganized Lashkar on

the front sticking to some positions doing nothing? You cannot use tribesmen as a regular army. That in fact is what makes tribesmen different from the regular forces.

The Azad Kashmir people will always owe a debt of gratitude to the tribesmen for generations to come, because they came to their rescue at a very critical time. There may have been excesses committed, but excesses are committed in all wars, even by regular armies. The Indian army of occupation on Kashmir committed excess beyond one's imagination, and beyond description. Tribesmen have great qualities of comradeship and sincerity. They are simple and brotherly. They cannot tolerate insults, and are always prepared to retaliate if insulted.



A Typical Azad Kashmir Mujahid

Chapter VIII

Azad Kashmir Army

A fine small army was produced during the Azad Kashmir movement. I have narrated the circumstances which necessitated the formation of this army. The Dogra Army, in complete co-operation with the RSSS, started playing a dangerous role in Jammu and Kashmir State. Very fortunately, the designs of these forces came to be known to the people in time. These designs were clandestinely backed by the Government of the time. The combination of these circumstances left no other alternative with the people of the State, but to prepare to defend themselves. The age-long tyranny of the Dogra Maharajas had made people bend completely under their oppression, but the designs of a mass annihilation could not be tolerated.

How the movement of Azad Kashmir took its birth has been described elsewhere. As a natural result of the people's will to overthrow a reign of tyranny, which now sanctioned butchery, an Army came to be formed in a crude shape, which, in due course, modified itself into a regular army, to be respected even by the enemy. In the beginning, the leadership of this people's Army was in the hands of local commanders, who were trained soldiers of either the 1914-19 War or the last war of 1939-45. Under them were fully-trained young released soldiers of the old Indian Army. These soldiers had fought in Libya, Malaya and Burma in the Second World War, and in European campaigns in the two

World Wars. They had met other people who had fought for their freedom against Hitler and other forces of fascism. These soldiers were not mere dummies, but soldiers who were conscious of their fight—a fight for freedom. These soldiers were not soldiers of fortune, nor a group of paid men, because they received no pay. The Azad Army was a people's Army in the real sense of the term, which was spontaneously formed as a result of a people's will and revolution to free their land of a Government, which had completely alienated the sympathies of the people, and had used force and third degree methods to suppress them.

There was no plan or method of regular recruitment. What exactly happened was this: The possibility of mass annihilation by the Dogra troops, who were stationed in different centres and villages throughout the State, came to be confronted by the people, who then started organizing themselves into formations which could fight it out with the Dogra troops. Small village bands were organized to begin with. From villages, these organizations grew into sector organizations, and a sector organization was under the authority of a Sector Commander. From Sectors they developed this organization into an Area Command. An Area Command was presided over by the senior-most officer amongst them. From an Area Command, the whole thing enlarged itself into different commands, and started operating on different fronts. The front Commanders held under them a number of battalions, which were never organized into Brigades.

With the beginning of the campaign, there could not possibly be a unified Command. Therefore, where there were Dogra troops stationed, the Azad Army grew into Battalion shape or a Company formation, as the case was, and took up their local fight with Dogra Garrison under the command of a locally chosen leader. But as soon as the areas were cleared, and fronts were established on a regular line, these small formations evolved into bigger

formations, till they developed into front commands. Actual unification of command took place about three months after under General Tariq, who was a capable officer.

The main handicaps that this Army organization suffered, were a deadly lack of weapons and an absence of any line of communication. Therefore, so far as their supplies of rations were concerned, they were all collected locally, and supplied to the troops on the front by the local people themselves. How the local people co-operated with their army, and got themselves into this army machine, surprises one when one looks at it now. The proof of how marvellously people can act in a crisis was given by these people.

How this revolt in the State of Jammu and Kashmir originated, and how the people took up arms against the established government of Maharaja Hari Singh, was very well described by Sheikh Abdullah himself. As reported by the Associated Press of India under the dateline, New Delhi, October 21, 1947, Sheikh Abdullah expressed himself as follows—

“That the present troubles in Poonch, a feudatory of Kashmir, were because of the policy adopted by the State. The people of Poonch who suffered under their local ruler, and again under the Kashmir Durbar, who was the over-lord of the Poonch ruler, had started a people’s movement for the redress of their grievances. It was not communal. ‘The Kashmir State sent their troops, and there was panic in Poonch. But most of the adult population in Poonch were ex-Servicemen in the Indian Army, who had close connection with the people in Jhelum and Rawalpindi. They evacuated their women and children, crossed the Frontier, and returned with arms supplied to them by willing people. The present position was that the Kashmir State Forces were forced to withdraw in certain areas’.”

The same story has been repeated in different

language by Pandit Prem Nath Bazaz, one of the Hindu leaders of Kashmir; in these words—

“In Poonch, where thousands of demobilized Muslim veterans of the Second World War live, an open armed rebellion broke out against the Maharaja and his new administration. The rebellion spread rapidly to the adjoining area of Mirpur, where also war veterans live in large numbers. Instead of realizing what he had done, Maharaja Hari Singh, egged on by Congress leaders and the new Counsellors, despatched the whole of the Dogra Army to quell the disturbances, or, as one Rajput Colonel puts it: ‘to reconquer the area’. The Army perpetrated unheard of atrocities on the people of Poonch; whole villages were burned down and innocent people massacred. Reports reaching Srinagar were not allowed to be published in the press, and no official reports were issued to allay the fears of the public. This happened in September, and the tribesmen did not enter the State before 23rd of October, 1947.”

As the war hardened in Kashmir, and the front stabilized, the Azad Kashmir Army started its own training centres to feed its fighting forces. It had become necessary, because, after all, the Azad Kashmir Area had only a population of ten lacs, and it could not supply trained soldiers to an Army which had swelled to over 50,000. Young boys came forward to enlist themselves in the Azad Army. Some of them were only 15/16 years of age. I saw some of these boys on the front during the Azad Kashmir War. Once I saw a young soldier coming back on foot to his headquarters. This young lad was hardly 15 years of age, and was completely covered with dirt and lice. He was bare-footed, and without any uniform worth the name. He had been fighting on a ridge which was at least seven thousand feet high and covered with snow. This young lad had been on the front with his rifle for days together. I was told later, that he was ordered back to headquarters for a change; he had left the front with tears in his eyes. Similarly, small


boys ran away from their homes and joined different units, trained themselves on the front, and then fought without regular rations or uniform of any sort, and of course, without any kind of pay.

It is difficult to narrate, in any detail, all or even a few instances of personal bravery. But I do propose to mention some of them, which are in my personal knowledge, because of my close contact with the Azad Army. One Subedar, who was an M.C. of the old Indian Army, was leading an attack on a Dogra position in the Mang area, of Tehsil Sudhanoti of Poonch. This was the last of a number of pockets of resistance which was to be liquidated. The Dogras were entrenched in a school building, which was housing a lot of ammunition and Arms belonging to the enemy. This school building was defended by probably two or three soldiers of the enemy. I must incidentally mention here, that a Dogra is a good fighter, and can easily be considered one of the best fighters among the Hindus. The situation had become desperate, because reinforcements to relieve this small garrison had come within sight, and started bombarding the place with a 3" mortar. Our soldiers wanted arms and ammunition very badly. If this school building surrendered to our men they would be equipped and armed. The difficulty was that this building was defended by means of a bren gun, which makes all the difference. At that stage our boys could not possibly even dream of possessing a bren gun. This great soldier crawled all the way, and reached the window of the building where these bren guns seemed to be posted. He wanted to jump on the soldiers who were using the bren guns. As soon as he tried to do so, a burst of shots pierced him through his chest. He was followed by two nephews, who also met the same fate; but a number of others followed and the school building surrendered, a great deal of arms and ammunition was captured.

When the Indian Army started their push towards Kotli towards the end of 1948, the position became very

desperate. The Indian Army started their offensive with tanks. This being hilly area, there was no big tank formation, but the attack was nevertheless led by a number of tanks. We, of course, had no tanks nor anti-tank guns. A large number of boys volunteered to attack the advancing tanks with grenades. They laid an ambush and jumped into the tanks with grenades in their hands. These boys were slashed to ribbons, but the tanks were put out of action. We are told Japanese soldiers performed great deeds of personal bravery but I am sure our soldiers did no less.

On the Bhimber front in the district of Mirpur, a tribesman of the Sulemankhel Tribe performed an equally great deed, when he crawled for about 400 yards, and jumped on three soldiers who had been operating a machine-gun post. On all fronts, Mahsood and Mohmand tribesmen laid ambush to lorries in a way which, by itself, were great feats of personal courage. In the hospitals I saw these young men sometimes completely mutilated, but always smiling. Tribesmen are great soldiers, but only as tribesmen. If we try to train them and teach them the regular tactics of an army, they are no longer the terror that the tribes are. During the month of August, 1947, the first conflict that took place with the Dogra Army was in a place named Khaigala, round about Rawalakot Area of Tehsil Sudhanoti of Poonch. The Dogra Army was sending forces to different areas. Half a battalion's strength was being sent to Bagh to suppress the 'trouble' there. The Bagh people had requested the Rawalakot people to stop, or at least hamper, the progress of this Dogra Battalion. Five hundred people without arms collected to stop this unit. These people had stones and axes in their hands. This crowd was duly warned by the Commander of the unit, who never expected anything from the people except a demonstration, till a volley of stones started, with the result that some Dogra Army soldiers were injured. Then his Dogra unit opened fire on this crowd, killing a large number of people. How these people with their sheer



Azad Kashmir Army Marching Past at Tarakhel

courage and audacity opposed a regular army unit, is an instance without parallel.

The Azad Army later on was commanded by good officers. Though some of these officers had their limitations, even so, some good substantial work was done to organize the Army on a real war basis. In all these efforts for making the Azad Kashmir Army a regular organization, General Tariq played a great part. Indeed, it was General Tariq's presence which kept some of these officers together.

That the Azad Army played a unique historical role cannot be denied. In spirit, in their devotion to a cause, and in their unprecedented sacrifices, the Azad Army will be placed as second to none. After the cease-fire was ordered in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the Azad Army was reorganized in a regular fashion. Units were given training and put into gear. Officers were given to these units, in their training centres, to bring it up to the level of any regular Army. Azad Army forces were reduced from 40—45 Battalions to about 30 Battalions.

The Army of Azad Kashmir is naturally an ally of the Pakistan Army. The Pakistan Army has to play an historical role in Asia, not only in the defence of the land of Pakistan but, also in the defence of those principles, on the basis of which Pakistan has come into existence. In the context of present international affairs the Pakistan Army will, indeed, one day be called upon to perform great deeds. If any such occasion arises, Azad Army men will stand shoulder to shoulder with the Pakistan Army soldiers. We must never forget that the Pakistan Army soldier is the greatest asset of Pakistan. The magnificent role played by the Pakistan Army during the Kashmir campaign in their own way, does not strictly fall within the purview of this small book. Today the Pakistan Army is not an Army of occupation in Azad Kashmir, as the Indian Army definitely is in occupied Kashmir. The Pakistan army is there to defend

their frontiers, and to defend the values on the basis of which Pakistan was formed. These soldiers are there also to defend the lives, property and homes of the Kashmiri Mussalmans.

Under the U.N.C.I.P. Resolution, a cease-fire had been agreed upon in Jammu and Kashmir State. This U.N.C.I.P. Resolution was mainly in three parts—

- (a) The cease-fire agreement;
- (b) The truce agreement; and
- (c) The plebiscite period.

After the cease-fire had been agreed upon, agreement on the truce had to follow, and was to be implemented by both the Governments of India and Pakistan, but this did not prove to be smooth sailing. As soon as the question of demilitarization was taken up, India tried to wriggle out of the undertakings to implement the resolutions of the U.N.C.I.P. by putting in fresh proposals in order to defeat the demilitarization plan. India in her attempt to by-pass the accepted demilitarization terms raised two objections:

- (a) Disposal of Azad Kashmir Forces;
- (b) Question of the administration and defence of the Northern Areas.

When the Government of India raised the question of disposal of Azad Kashmir Forces, the U.N.C.I.P. had taken a clear-cut and unambiguous stand. The Commission in their letter of September 19, 1948, addressed to the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, said—

“Moreover, the Commission agreed that it will be anxious to reduce the truce period to a minimum, and that the resolution does not contemplate the disarmament or disbanding of Azad Kashmir Forces”.

The Commission made the position clear in more or

less the same language to the Government of India. The Commission's Chairman in his letter to the Prime Minister of India dated August 17, 1948 said that—

“Limited Government of Indian forces would remain, and that on the other side only the Azad people would remain in their positions.”

Before the controversy about the disbandment and disarmament of the Azad Kashmir Forces became extremely acute, the Secretary-General of the Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai, stated to the Commission as follows—

“The disarming of Azad Forces is really a matter of chronology. First there must be a cease-fire and, after that a truce, as envisaged in Parts I and II of the Commission's resolution of 13th August, 1948. After that, the condition precedent to arranging for the holding of the plebiscite, is the creation of conditions in which the Kashmir Nationals can return to the area now in the occupation of Azad Kashmir Forces. So far as non-Muslims are concerned, such a movement will not take place until large-scale disarmament of these forces had been carried out.”

The point of contention was whether the Azad Kashmir Forces should be disbanded and dissolved before the plebiscite stage, or whether the U.N.C.I.P. resolution contemplated the disposal and disposition of the Azad Kashmir Forces by the Plebiscite Administrator himself. The Government of India maintained, that before the Indian troops can be withdrawn, Azad Kashmir Forces should be disbanded. The Commission and the Government of Pakistan, on the other hand, held the view that, according to the U.N.C.I.P. resolution, the disposition and disposal of Azad Kashmir Forces only lies with the Plebiscite Administrator before the actual plebiscite takes place. Only on that particular point of time, the question of disbanding or disposal or disposition of the Azad Kashmir Forces can be considered, and not before that.

The Foreign Minister of Pakistan, making his speech during the Security Council's Session of February, 1950, stated—

“The next question to consider is, whether India is right in contending that the Commission's Resolutions required that the Azad Kashmir Forces should be disbanded and disarmed during the truce stage, or whether Pakistan is correct in contending that this has to take place during the plebiscite stage. On that, of course, the best evidence is the language of the Resolutions themselves. In that respect, I would first submit that the Resolution of 13 August, 1947, which deals with the cease-fire and truce, makes no reference to the Azad Forces whatsoever, and that, in itself, is conclusive evidence that the disbanding and disarming of the Azad Kashmir forces, such as was later contemplated, was not to take place under the Resolution, that is to say, not during the truce stage. This was repeatedly explained both to Pakistan and to India.”

Mr. Korbelt, Chairman of the Commission, expressed his views on this matter in the following words:

“That the Commission had taken great pains to assure the military balance on both sides, and the element of balance had been continually at the back of the Commission's mind, while drafting the resolution.”

Mr. Korbelt then asked the Foreign Minister of Pakistan to take note of the fact that—

“Even after the withdrawal of the Pakistan Army, the Azad Forces would still muster 35 battalions of armed people, who were not asked to disarm or to withdraw.”

Some sort of explanation was also given by the Commission to the Government of India. From the summary record of the meeting that took place between the

Prime Minister of India and the Commission on 17 August, 1948, it is evident that the Commission explained to the Prime Minister of India in the following words:

“Moreover, he pointed out that limited Government of India forces would remain, and that, on the other side, only the Azad people would remain in their positions.”

When we go to the resolution of 5 January, 1949, of the Commission, Paragraph 4(a) of the resolution reads as below:

“After implementation of Parts I and II of the Commission’s resolution of 13 August, 1948, and when the Commission is satisfied that peaceful conditions have been restored in the State, the Commission and the Plebiscite Administrator will determine, in consultation with the Government of India, the final disposal of Indian and State armed forces; such disposal to be with due regard to the security of the State and the freedom of the plebiscite.”

The second part of the same Paragraph reads:

“As regards the territory referred to in A-2 of Part II of the resolution of 13 August, final disposal of the armed forces in that territory will be determined by the Commission and the Plebiscite Administrator, in consultation with the local authorities.”

The territories referred in this resolution are the Azad Kashmir territories.

The Foreign Minister of Pakistan making his speech during the Security Council Session of February, 1950, on the Kashmir question, explained:

“It is as clear as anything could be that in the whole scheme of demilitarization, the disbanding and disarmament—or call it the final disposal of the Azad Kashmir Forces, was to be undertaken at the plebiscite

stage, and along with the final disposal of the remaining Indian forces, and of all the armed forces of the State of Kashmir. As late as the 18th February, 1949—after the acceptance of both the resolutions of U.N.C.I.P.—the correct position with regard to the Azad Kashmir forces was known and accepted by the Government of India.”

The Government of India, after they had accepted the U.N.C.I.P. resolution of August 13, 1948, began to change their position. In his letter of 10 March, 1949 to the Commission, Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai, the Secretary-General of Foreign Affairs for the Government of India, states the following—

“Pakistan forces must be withdrawn entirely from Jammu and Kashmir State territory, and the disposal of the so-called Azad Kashmir forces during the period of the truce, must be so arranged as to prepare the way for the ultimate disbanding and disarming of these forces.”

The Commission while answering the letter of Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai on 14 March, 1949, in their paragraph 2 stated as follows—

“In the course of the conversations last August, the Commission explained to the Government of Pakistan, that in its view, a Military balance would exist in the State of Jammu and Kashmir during the truce period, in the sense and to the extent, that the Resolution of the 13 August did not call for the disarming or disbanding of the Azad Kashmir forces, which the Commission understood to number approximately 35 battalions.”

Then again in their letter of 28 April, 1949, the Commission reiterated their position in the following words:

“The Government of India will understand that the Commission cannot deal, at this stage, with the

question of disbanding and disarming the Azad Kashmir Forces, since it does not fall within the purview of the resolution of the 13 August. Nevertheless, the Commission appreciates the significance of the question, and is anxious to consider it without delay.

“While the Commission cannot share the view of the Government of India, that a reduction of its forces beyond the strength mentioned in your letter of 17 April, 1949, must depend upon the actual disbanding and disarming of the Azad Kashmir Forces, it is convinced that an early study of the matter would hasten the preparations for the plebiscite.”

This long controversy shows how the Government of India were extremely touchy on the subject of the Azad Kashmir Forces. They insisted throughout, that the Azad Kashmir Forces should be immediately disbanded so that the truce agreement could be brought about. This was altogether a new stand on the part of the Government of India, and demonstrated, in clear terms, India was really apprehensive of the fighting qualities of the Azad Kashmir Forces, and at the back of their mind, lay the lurking fear that, during the truce period, the cease-fire could be broken and the entire State overrun by the Azad Kashmir Forces. One cannot easily understand this apprehension, when the Government of Pakistan is prepared to give an undertaking to the Security Council, and to the Government of India, that there will be no breach of the cease-fire. If the intentions of the Government of India were genuine, then they should have been able to accept the word of the Government of Pakistan.

Today the issue could be resolved, provided one knew exactly where the Government of India stood. It is not quite clear as to whether the Government of India are making the issue of disbanding and disarming of the Azad Kashmir Forces, as an excuse to avoid the

truce agreement, and ultimately the plebiscite, or whether they genuinely believe, that the Azad Kashmir Forces are a real handicap to the holding of a plebiscite. If this were clear, one could surely think of a definite and different approach to the whole problem.

So far as the Azad Kashmir point of view is concerned, we accepted even the stationing of a large number of Indian troops on the side of occupied Kashmir, and, in his last speech in the final session of the Security Council, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan went so far as to say that Pakistan would be prepared to accept 28 Battalions to be stationed in Indian occupied Kashmir, provided India left the Azad Kashmir forces in tact on the Azad Kashmir side. This, of course, surprised the Government of India.

It will be seen that, behind all this long controversy, is the intention of the Government of India to defeat the holding of the plebiscite.



Working Committee of All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference (1957-58) Author as President

Chapter IX

Azad Jammu & Kashmir Government

As soon as restlessness in the State took the concrete form of an organized revolt against the Maharaja's Government, nobody had any clear concept about the shape the revolt was going to take. It was impossible for the leaders of the Muslim Conference to call their working committee, or to come to a joint decision with regard to this matter. As a matter of fact, since the General Council meeting of July, 1947, it was not possible to get into easy contact with leaders of the Muslim Conference living in different parts of the State. General traffic had become dislocated, and the situation changed every day from bad to worse. Under these circumstances one could not visualize a joint and a concerted action. During the month of August, 1947, only those could meet and decide things who were available in the city of Srinagar. Since the time I had to leave Srinagar, I had been unable to contact any one of my colleagues. The Muslim Conference acting President had delegated all powers to me to make any efforts possible in Pakistan. Whatever I could do has been narrated in the preceding pages.

Since October, 1947, events changed quickly enough in the Southern parts of the State, particularly from Kathua to Muzaffarabad. Fighting had already started from the 6th October onwards at different places. The Dogra troops were putting up a stiff resistance at some places, but had surrendered large areas. When these areas came into the possession of the Azad Army, then it

had to be considered as to how these areas could be administered, and law and order restored. This was all the more necessary, for the war against the Dogra troops had to be prosecuted. Necessary organization had to be built on the ground, the Azad Army had to be organized and built, recruits had to be supplied to it after giving them necessary training. Rations and ammunition had to be carried to the troops to feed them. The line of communication had to be organized behind the troops. The building of roads and the opening of hilly areas had to be undertaken. All these considerations urgently required the formation of a Government which could undertake these functions.

On the 24th October, 1947, for the first time since the year 1846, there came into being a Government parallel to that which was now in Srinagar headed by Sir Hari Singh himself. Since 1931, the political movement had always aimed at a responsible Government under the aegis of Maharaja Hari Singh himself. Whether it was Muslim Conference leadership or National Conference leadership, they never conceived that a parallel independent Government could be set up after an armed rebellion against the Maharaja's Government. Of course, such critical times had never come to pass since 1846. These momentous decisions had to fall on the shoulders of the leadership of the Muslim Conference, which was now working underground. No leaders in jails could be consulted on this. Even if it were possible, it is very problematical to say whether or not any one of the leaders in jail would have approved of such a revolutionary step.

On the 24th October, 1947, this parallel Government was declared to have been established with its capital at Pulandri, a small town on the southern side of Poonch along the Jhelum river. The writer was unanimously voted to be the first President of the liberated areas of Kashmir, named *Azad Jammu and Kashmir*. This was a unanimously endorsed decision of the Working Committee

of the All-Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference. The original Government which this writer formed comprised the following—

1. Sardar Muhammad Ibrahim .. *President*
Khan
2. Syed Ali Ahmed Shah .. *Defence Minister*
3. Ch. Abdullah Khan Bhalli .. *Revenue Minister*
4. Kh. Ghulam Din Wani .. *Home Minister*
5. Syed Nazir Hussain Shah .. *Finance Minister*
6. Mir Waiz Muhammad Yusuf .. *Education Minister*
Shah
7. Khwaja Sanaullah Shamim .. *Civil Supplies Minister*

The basis of this Government was that President was the Head of the State, and also the Head of the Government. He appointed his Ministers as Head of the State and the Ministers worked with him as a Cabinet to be responsible to him. The President kept some portfolios for himself and distributed the remaining portfolios to other Ministers. The Ministers, therefore, could be asked to resign, or they could be dismissed by the President, if any such necessity arose. The political party, All-Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference, through its Working Committee, gave their unstinted support to all this. As a matter of fact there was no one prepared at that moment to assume the onerous and dangerous role of a President about whose government even two people outside the State were not agreed. Nobody contemplated, with any seriousness, the question that the set-up was going to last long enough. No one at that time liked to be brought into it. The reason was that most of the leaders had their families either in Srinagar or in Jammu city. My family was also in Srinagar at that time. I was prepared to run the risk, and I was the approved choice of all my colleagues. The small considerations of one's family would sink into the background if one were to see, with open eyes, the great

events that were taking place around us. There was no time even to think about one's children or wife. This matter had to be left to the will and protection of ALMIGHTY GOD. My wife and child had to sneak out of Srinagar in a desperate condition. My wife was then expectant. From Uri, on Srinagar-Domel Road, to Rawalakot, my home place, she had to walk on foot, a distance of thirty miles. They were followed by Secret Police all the way but they succeeded in dodging them.

When this Government was proclaimed it had the solid backing of the Muslims all over the State, whether in occupied or liberated areas. Some of the non-Muslims also backed it. This Government was supported by a small but strong volunteer Army of 30,000 soldiers, and had enough territory to establish its stronghold on what came to be known as Azad Kashmir territory.

When it came into being it had very little with which it could run. It had no funds whatsoever, no buildings, no staff, nothing worth mentioning. What it had behind it was the strong and solid will of a united people, who wanted to sacrifice their all to get emancipation from Dogra tyranny and repression, and particularly to get rid of the Dogra troops. This unity of purpose and will to fight, carried us a long way. This fight had its international repercussions. The story of the Azad Kashmir Movement since then has spread all round the world.

Mythical names entered into the history of Jammu and Kashmir State. Pulandri, Trarkhel, Chikoti, Chinnari and Chunnj and so many others. These names flashed across the world press. They made history, though lying in far-flung unapproachable corners of the State. Great stories of heroism and sacrifices came to be connected with these names. In these places and all along the 300 to 400 miles long front, a grim drama of life and death was being staged. There are other places which will never be forgotten by the unknown soldiers of unknown places who had come all the way from

Afghanistan and Palestine to take part in the Kashmir Jihad—holy war. There are still other places which entomb the sacred bodies of boys who had run away from their parents and homes to sacrifice their young lives in a cause so dear to the Mussalmans in Pakistan and all over the world!

As soon as the Government of Azad Kashmir was announced, the news went around the world. The revolt against the Maharaja of Kashmir was given wide publicity by all sections of the press, both in England and America. The establishment of a Government parallel to that of Maharaja Hari Singh's in ordinary circumstances would not probably attract so much attention. But because of the extraordinary period of history through which we were passing, the announcement of this Government was indeed very big news. The tension that existed between India and Pakistan was a strong factor contributing towards the publicity this Government got in Pakistan as well as abroad. Though, up to the present day, the Pakistan Government have been unable to see their way to give *de jure* recognition to it, the *de facto* position of this Government has been recognized. The people of Pakistan, however, gave their fullest support to the whole of the liberation movement of Azad Kashmir.

Some of the difficulties which confronted this infant, inexperienced Government have been mentioned above. There were very great difficulties and handicaps which faced the organization of the liberation movement itself, and the establishment of a full-fledged Azad Kashmir Government. In the first place, we had no capital. Pulandri, a very small town at one end of Poonch district, was first adopted as a capital. As Pulandri was the first town to be surrendered by Dogras, and because it was also very easily accessible from the borders of Pakistan by a kacha road and a bridge over the Jhelum river, it was, therefore, considered to be the most appropriate place. During the months of November and December, 1947, we established different Departments of this

Government in the crudest of forms. We established tents around this little town of Pulandri in the thickness of forests, and each tent was a department, and so many departments were under different Ministers. These thick forests were a complete camouflage against an air attack.

One could not easily imagine how a Government could have possibly stood on its legs in such circumstances, when it was totally disconnected with the rest of the civilized world. The capital, however, was transferred later on from Pulandri to Trarkhel because of enemy air attacks.

Secondly, the difficulties that we faced in the establishment of this organization was due to the non-availability of experienced staff. The whole cabinet, including myself, did not have that experience which was needed, not only to run a Government but to establish a new one from the beginning. We had no experienced officers nor secretaries to assist us in the planning of all this. Even ordinary clerks were not available and those who were available, were very much unwilling to work in war areas, which were frequently bombed by enemy planes. No one could give them sufficient protection against the random bombing of the enemy. A small number of officers and clerks volunteered and worked, even under these conditions. Some of these boys were from the city of Jammu, from where they had been hounded out as refugees. They readily accepted the call which I sent them in Sialkot. A lot of credit for working and living in places where regular shelter was not available, where food could not be obtained easily, where no transport back to Pakistan was even to be thought about, goes to these people.

I might narrate that, on one occasion, in this little town of Pulandri the whole of this Government was pretty nearly finished by an enemy plane. We were holding a meeting with public at Pulandri after 5 o'clock.

It was absolutely out of question for an enemy plane to come that way after 5 o'clock in the month of December. All the Ministers and important officials were taking part in this meeting, and no less than 500 people were collected to receive instructions or put in applications. The little town of Pulandri is at the base of a rising hill. Suddenly from over the hill an enemy plane appeared above right our heads. This plane was most likely coming from the Uri front, and was returning to its base in Jammu. We were caught completely unawares, but luckily this plane had no bomb. It started strafing the crowd. Twenty people completely and immediately covered all my body with theirs, with the result that most of them were injured. This is one of the many instances which go to show how much we depended on the unflinching loyalty of our people. I could quote instances of such loyalty without number.

In spite of these great difficulties, we were able to establish, within six months, a well run administration. A police department to maintain law and order; a system of Judiciary working within the Azad Kashmir territory, were brought into being. And also a Magistracy was established which, besides doing case work, helped us in the mobilization of war material. We were able to collect land revenue and customs duties with facility and ease.

The way the common man reacted to the revolutionary changes was a surprising experience. Suddenly, in 1947, the whole machinery of law and order broke down in the State. People were left without any Police arrangements and without any courts. There was no other public organization which could immediately replace Dogra Administration. The common people rose magnificently to meet this crisis. Each village formed a village committee which took upon itself the performance of the following functions:

- (a) Prevention of crimes;
- (b) Decision and adjudication of all disputes;

- (c) Collection of rations locally and its transport to different positions of soldiers;
- (d) Transport of arms and ammunition to the fighting front;
- (e) Enrolment of new recruits and their despatch to the training Centres;
- (f) Looking after the non-Muslims scattered all over the State;
- (g) Looking after the property left by the non-Muslims.

There was no central Panchayat which could co-ordinate the work of different villages, but every village committee nicely co-operated with the neighbouring village committee. The committee's orders in the village were final and were rarely questioned by anyone.

When the Azad Kashmir Government started functioning in January, 1948, these local committees extended their co-operation, and by their co-operation alone, the Azad Kashmir Government established their Courts, Police Stations, and ultimately realised revenues due to the State. I can state without contradiction that, during 1947-48 and 1949, dacoity and murder cases were one in a thousand. Other small crimes were practically non-existent. The credit of what the Azad Kashmir Government has been able to do to establish its position within and abroad, all goes to the people, without whose willing co-operation all this would have been impossible.

All this was made feasible also by the magnificent co-operation and support that we got from the people of Pakistan. They liberally and generously contributed money and good-will, and their sincere efforts, towards the establishment of the Azad Kashmir Government. All over, the citizens of Pakistan formed associations to work for the cause of Azad Kashmir. These associations did solid propaganda in Pakistan and abroad for the

Azad Kashmir movement, and collected money and recruited volunteers for the Azad Army. From Peshawar to Karachi the Azad Kashmir leaders got a great ovation and much applause. The Azad Kashmir movement probably organized the people of Pakistan, just as much as the people of Kashmir.

In their resolution adopted on 13th August, 1948, the United Nations Commission in India and Pakistan dealt with the subject of the Azad Kashmir Government in Part II under Truce Agreement. Under Part II A-3 the resolution says—

“Pending a final solution, the territory evacuated by the Pakistan troops will be administered by the local authorities, under the surveillance of the Commission.”

The Indian Government were always touchy on the subject of the Azad Kashmir Government. In his letter of 20th August, 1948, addressed to M. Josef Korbel, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, the Prime Minister of India, in paragraph (3), sub-para (i) stated as follows—

- ‘That paragraph A-3 of Part II of the resolution (13th August, 1948) should not be interpreted or applied in practice, so as:
- (a) to bring into question the sovereignty of the Jammu and Kashmir Government over the portion of their territory evacuated by the Pakistan troops;
 - (b) to afford any recognition of the so-called ‘Azad Kashmir Government’; or,
 - (c) to enable this territory to be consolidated in any way during the period of truce to the disadvantage of the State’.

The Government of Pakistan always took a different view, and emphasized on the U.N.C.I.P. the importance and political significance of the Azad Kashmir Movement

and the Government of Azad Kashmir. While asking for further elucidation on the resolution of the 13th August, 1948, the Government of Pakistan in their Memorandum observed in Para No. I, as under—

“It has been explained to the Commission, that it is only the Azad Kashmir Government that can authorize the issue of cease-fire orders to their own forces. The Pakistan Government wish to be informed what steps the Commission has taken, or proposes to take, to secure the agreement of the Azad Kashmir Government to its proposals.”

In the same Memorandum in para 8 it was stated—

“In paragraph A-3 the Commission proposed that, pending a final solution, the territory at present under the control of the Azad Kashmir Government will be administered by that Government, under the surveillance of the Commission. The Commission no doubt realises that the population of this territory is almost wholly Muslim, and is in full support of the Azad Kashmir Government.”

It will appear that the Azad Kashmir Government became a real issue of dispute between the Government of India and the U.N.C.I.P. The Pakistan Government, *vis-a-vis* the Commission, insisted that *de facto* recognition must be given to the Azad Kashmir Government, if a *de jure* recognition cannot be accorded to it. As it will appear from the letter of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, the Prime Minister of India, the Indian Government had serious objection to any recognition being given to the Azad Kashmir Government. The Commission, however, wriggled out of this problem by calling the Azad Kashmir Government ‘Local Authorities’, to be placed under nominal surveillance of the U.N.O.

While the 13th August, 1948, resolution of the U.N.C.I.P. was a subject of correspondence between the Foreign Minister of the Government of Pakistan and the

U.N.C.I.P., in his letter of 16th September, 1948, addressed to the Chairman of the U.N.C.I.P., the Foreign Minister of the Government of Pakistan observed as follows—

“They (Government of Pakistan) desired to make it quite clear at the outset, that these views are the views of the Government of Pakistan, and are not, as such, in any sense binding upon the Azad Kashmir Government, nor do they in any manner reflect the views of the Azad Kashmir Government. They note that it is the intention of the Commission to hold discussions with the Azad Kashmir representatives, as individuals, and they do not doubt these representatives will convey to the Commission the views of their Government on the proposals of the Commission. The Government of Pakistan would at all times be prepared to lend their good offices to persuade the Azad Kashmir Government to accept the view of the proposals of the Commission, which the Pakistan Government themselves take, but such acceptance must rest finally with the Azad Kashmir Government themselves. As has already been explained to the Commission, political control over the Azad Kashmir Forces vests in the Azad Kashmir Government, and it is the latter Government alone that has authority to issue a cease-fire order to those forces, and to conclude terms and conditions of a truce which would be binding upon those forces.”

In the same letter it was further emphasized that—
“It must be stressed that the struggle for the liberation of Kashmir was initiated by Azad Kashmir, now represented by the Azad Kashmir Government, and that that Government is a necessary party to any settlement of the Kashmir question. Indeed, this view is implicit in the proposals of the Commission itself, inasmuch as these proposals postulate a course of co-operation between the Commission and the local authorities in several respects.”

The observations of the Foreign Minister of the Government of Pakistan make one thing absolutely clear.

In no uncertain language, the Government of Pakistan had very nearly accepted the *de jure* position of the Azad Kashmir Government. And that only the Azad Kashmir Government could ultimately agree to a cease-fire, and a truce agreement, in Jammu and Kashmir State. Only the Azad Kashmir Government could issue an order of cease-fire, and sign a truce agreement. It is also clear from this letter that it was in the Azad Kashmir Government that the control of whole of Azad Kashmir Army was vested.

So far as the views of the U.N.C.I.P. with regard to the position of the Azad Kashmir were concerned, the Commission, though implicitly accepting the *de facto* position of the Azad Kashmir Government, could not see their way to give it *de jure* recognition. This view was expressed by Mr. Korbelt at a meeting held on 2nd September, 1948, with the representatives of Government of Pakistan in these words—

“By ‘Local Authorities’ we mean the Azad Kashmir people, though we cannot grant recognition to the Azad Kashmir Government.”

With regard to the political authority of the Azad Kashmir Government, Mr. Korbelt expressed his views that—

“Subject to the Commission’s surveillance, the local authorities will have full political and administrative control, and will be responsible for the maintenance of law and order, and security. Neither the Indian Government nor the Maharaja’s Government at Srinagar will be permitted to send any military or civil officials to the evacuated area.”

As to the nature of surveillance, Mr. Korbelt, in his meeting held on the 2nd September, 1948, said that—

“As regards the term ‘surveillance’, we have used it deliberately, in the absence of a better word. It does not mean actual control or supervision. All that we

are anxious for, is to appoint neutral observers to see that the local authorities carry out the truce agreement. If the local authorities do anything against the spirit of the truce proposal, the observers will report the matter to the Commission, which will then endeavour to have it set right. No interference with the local administration is intended.”

In the same meeting, when probably hard pressed by the representative of the Government of Pakistan, Mr. Korbel accommodated the Azad Kashmir view-point in saying—

“We have gone as far as we could to meet the point of view of the Azad Kashmir people. We have tried to deal with the *de facto* situation. But we cannot lose sight of the fact that the State of Jammu and Kashmir still exists as a legal entity. We have to respect its sovereignty.”

Chairman of the Commission, Mr. J. Klahr Huddle, in his letter of the 19th September, 1948, to the Foreign Minister of the Government of Pakistan admitted that—

“In connection with the political aspects of the question raised in points 2 and 3, the existence of the Azad Kashmir Movement has not been ignored by the Commission, consideration thereof appearing in Part II A-3 of its resolution of the 13th August, 1948.”

The United Nations Commission then sent a Sub-Committee under it to study the working of the Azad Kashmir Government, and report back to the Commission. This Committee studied all the problems of Azad Kashmir in detail, after visiting all areas of the territory. This Sub-Committee studied different aspects of social and economic problems of Azad Kashmir as well. The Sub-Committee stayed in the capital of Azad Kashmir, Muzaffarabad, for about a week or so, and had discussion with the writer as the President of Azad Kashmir, and with all the heads of Departments. This Committee

submitted a report to the U.N.C.I.P., but the report was never published. Later on, when I visited Washington in 1950, I learned, from the Chairman of that Committee, that the report submitted to the Commission expressed complete satisfaction over the Azad Kashmir Government affairs.

As regards the legal aspects of the Azad Kashmir Government, it is clear now that a *de facto* recognition to its existence has been given, even by the UNCIP, though in an indirect manner. The Pakistan Government, though not officially, but in all other ways, have given Azad Kashmir Government legal as well as *de facto* recognition over the territory of Azad Kashmir. At one time, in the beginning of the Azad Kashmir Movement, I had requested the Government of Pakistan most seriously, to give full-fledged recognition to the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Government, and accept it as the only legal and constitutional authority on behalf of the people of Jammu and Kashmir. In that case I proposed to them that the Government of Pakistan should accept the instrument of accession from this Government and treat Jammu and Kashmir as a legally and constitutionally acceded State to Pakistan. In that case, I further proposed that the Government of Pakistan should, with every constitutional right and propriety, march their troops into Kashmir and take possession of Srinagar and Jammu both. If this proposal was accepted, then the trouble about Jammu and Kashmir would have been cut short, and, as some observed, there would have been no war in Kashmir. This is definitely proved by the later events of Junagadh and Hyderabad. I wonder if this matter can now be considered *de novo* with some advantage.

This is a question which is not free from difficulty. The real constitutional position of Azad Jammu and Kashmir Government can easily be misunderstood. What I always understood, and I emphasized before the Government of Pakistan, was the position that Pakistan

Government should recognize the Government of Azad Jammu and Kashmir as the only representative Government of Jammu and Kashmir State. This, by no means, should be understood that it implies that the State of Jammu and Kashmir be recognized as an independent entity. At no stage, since 1947, has this been seriously suggested by any President of Azad Jammu and Kashmir Government or by any of representative Authority of Pakistan side of the cease-fire line of Kashmir, that the Jammu and Kashmir State should be declared independent. One very important and crucial point against such a suggestion is this, that geographically and economically, the State cannot be independent of Pakistan. And, consequently, the State, though large enough to be independent State in area, cannot be maintained as an independent State financially. This is sufficient here to mention that the proposition that State be kept independent, both of India and Pakistan, has now been debated in many quarters. This has been considered as an alternative solution for this otherwise a very difficult problem. This question will be dealt with separately in another part of this book.

The Pakistan Government have since 1948 set up a Ministry of Kashmir Affairs which works as a liaison between the Azad Kashmir Government and the Government of Pakistan. Therefore, through this Ministry, the Azad Kashmir Forces affairs *vis-a-vis* the U.N.O. and the Pakistan Government are also conducted.

The All-Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference, from the beginning of the Azad Kashmir Government, acted as the political party instrumental in the formation of this Government. Since no legislative assembly or parliament could be convened, under the present circumstances, therefore, the political party, the Muslim Conference had to take the place of an assembly or a parliament. This position is anomalous. Many serious difficulties have arisen in connection with this position. The following questions still remain as live issues—

- (a) Who should appoint or nominate the head of the State?
- (b) To what extent should the Political Party have administrative and political control over the head of the State and the Government?
- (c) To which body should the Government be made responsible?

These questions are very moot points, and of course, they have been the main basis of difference between the leaders of Azad Kashmir. These fundamental issues have led to the disintegration of the Azad Kashmir Movement to a very large extent.

The constitutional position of Azad Government has since undergone a fundamental change. The position of Azad and Kashmir Muslim Conference has now been relegated to the position of only a Political Party, in Azad Kashmir and Pakistan, by the enactment of the Azad and Kashmir Government. The President of that Government is elected by an Electoral College. This electoral college is again elected on an adult franchise basis by the people living in Azad and Kashmir territory. The system of Basic Democracies was introduced into Azad and Kashmir, some five years or so ago. Under this system certain powers have been delegated to the Union Councils formed in different areas. This, in brief, is after the pattern which has been introduced in Pakistan for the last five or six years. Besides the Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference, there are other bigger and smaller parties functioning in Pakistan as well as in Azad Kashmir. Of course, in Pakistan, these parties are organized by the refugees who are now living in Pakistan. These parties now can take part in the election of the President of Azad Kashmir. But very recently some more changes have been brought into the modus of election of the President of Azad Kashmir. These changes amount to a retrograde step. The election of the Azad Kashmir

President by an electoral college has been abolished. The right that was granted to the refugees in Pakistan to participate in the election of the President of Azad Jammu and Kashmir has also been taken away. This has cut down the rights of those Jammu and Kashmir nationals, who are settled in Pakistan and also the natives of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir territory. I hope a time will come when the whole position will be revised again so that a respectable system of democracy is granted to the people of Azad Kashmir and those people get a chance to elect their own Government on an adult franchise basis. It hardly needs any emphasis that, since 1930, the people of the Jammu and Kashmir have been strenuously fighting for political rights. In these political rights, of course, was included the principal demand for the establishment of a full-fledged democratic Government which should represent rightful aspirations of the people of the State. It will, therefore, be very sad if the Government of Pakistan took away that right from the people of Azad Jammu and Kashmir territory.

Chapter X

Difficulties—Causes of Failure

I have made reference, though not in detail, to the difficulties which we had to face in the beginning of the Movement of Liberation. The first difficulty that we had to face was the non-availability of enough arms. We were able to obtain some rifles, though absolutely insufficient, but the most crucial difficulty was with regard to ammunition. It was impossible to get any ammunition through any official source in Pakistan. It was entirely through personal efforts that we were able to collect some. The difficulty was solved to some extent by the capture of enemy dumps on the retreat of the enemy. At places the enemy was completely annihilated, and in this way the Azad Kashmir forces were able to get hold of big enough dumps of ammunition and arms. The absence of automatic weapons was probably the main cause for the lack of initiative on the part of the Azad Army around Poonch. Besides automatic weapons, we completely lacked the use of 3" Mortars or 3.7 guns, which were also necessary for attack, because the Indian Army were completely equipped with all this.

A great problem that we had to overcome, in the beginning, was miserable lack of communication. I must put on record the great spirit of the people which they displayed, in the building of roads with crudest of implements available. The manner in which the people of Muzaffarabad repaired the roads which were blasted by the enemy action or by rains is worthy of praise. The people, one and all, showed the readiest co-operation.

Similarly, in Poonch and Mirpur, people as a mass stood up to build roads with whatever implements they had, and they opened up some sort of communication line with the advanced position of our troops. We were only able to build kacha mule tracks. The work that the mule boys did during the beginning of this campaign, at least till we were able to build jeep roads, has no easy parallel. The sacrifice of these boys, the great hardship that they voluntarily underwent, and the risks that they ran, are glaring instances to show the remarkable courage of the human material which goes to make the Azad Army and the Pakistan Army. It would be unfair not to mention here the work of those who later, took upon themselves, the construction of these roads through the most difficult terrain in these parts of Kashmir. That all worked in a spirit of Jihad, and that all were prepared to sacrifice their lives without any reluctance, is a hard fact, I am sure, posterity will draw continued inspiration from these deeds of hard work and devotion.

The greatest of all problems that we faced was lack of unity of command. And this lack of unity of command was not due to any absence of planning. It was due to the fact that no wireless, telephone or telegraphic communication could be set up so quickly between different sectors. Between Muzaffarabad and Bagh the only means of communication was a courier. Between Bhimber, in Mirpur district and other fronts, no other communication was possible, except by post or telegraphic message, either from Garhi Habib Ullah, in Abbottabad District, or Kohala, in Murree Tehsil. This indeed was a serious handicap. It takes time and some sort of stability to establish all these things. The situation was still very fluid, the setting up of regular means of communication, therefore, was out of question.

The lack of communication was probably one of the main reasons why some regular troops could not be shifted from Poonch to Baramula, when the tribes started a retreat. This tribal retreat was a shock to us all, and a

relief to the Indian troops.

On the 23rd of October a Lashkar of tribesmen entered the city of Muzaffarabad. The Muslim Dogra troops stationed at Balakot had joined them, therefore, until they reached Muzaffarabad city, there was no opposition offered to them. In Muzaffarabad there was a strongly armed Jatha of Sikhs in the Gurdawara. These Sikhs put up quite a stiff resistance till they were overcome. On the bridges, one over the Kishan Ganga River and other on the Jhelum, the Dogra troops were overcome by a clever surprise attack. I am told that tribesmen crossed the Kishan Ganga Bridge without any shot being fired. It seems that whatever troops there were, either surrendered or ran away to Srinagar. Some Dogra troops were still holding the Kohala Bridge. They were given a fight by the Azad Army soldiers from the Poonch side.

This tribal Lashkar was not a regularly organized Lashkar. On their way to Srinagar, it is quite possible, they did commit some excesses. They fought their way all along the Srinagar road till they reached Shalting, a place in the suburbs of Srinagar city. During this period, till they retreated, they encountered the Indian Army's first contingent at Baramula. We have it on first hand information, that, when the Indian Army unit contacted the tribesmen in Baramula, it was practically annihilated. Their commander was also killed. This raised the morale of the tribesmen and also of the other local forces fighting with them. This first encounter with the tribes so thoroughly demoralized the Indian Army that, even six weeks after this, the Indian Army was very jittery in making an advance along the Kohala road. After the retreat of the tribes from Baramula, the smallest unit of the Indian Army could have advanced along the road, and easily reached Kohala, and then, surely, the Azad Kashmir Liberation Movement would have died a premature death. In fact the Indian Army soldiers were so afraid that each hill appeared to them to be

infested with tribesmen, though they had completely retreated to Abbottabad.

Failure to capture Srinagar was a turning point in the history of this campaign. If we could have captured Srinagar, which was deserted by the Maharaja and his troops, we could have captured Jammu very easily. But this had to be done before a sufficient number of Indian troops landed in Srinagar. Therefore, before the landing started, capture of the Srinagar aerodrome was the most crucial factor. We wasted two days in Baramula. These two days went by in discussions over small and stupid things. This waste of our most valuable time was caused by the factor of uncertainty in the Lashkar of tribes. If they had been under a uniform command, which could be obeyed without much ado, and the tribes had proceeded to capture the airport, instead of wasting forty-eight hours in Baramula, Srinagar would have fallen into our hands like an over-ripe fruit.

The actual retreat, when it did start, was due to the fact that the tribes, as they advanced towards Srinagar, were attacked from behind by a contingent of the Indian Army, which probably came *via* Sopur. The Indian Army were, by that time, using their Air Force, shelling the concentrations of the tribesmen, who found themselves completely helpless against an air attack. Realizing that their line of communication back to their base may be cut off from behind, they lost heart and began to move back on lorries which they had employed as a means of advance. Also, among the tribes appeared an element, which started propaganda that tanks were coming and tribes would be cut off from behind. I am also told that some money was also distributed. In all probability, because of absence of uniform command, they disintegrated into smaller groups and vanished, leaving the territory entirely defenceless. Though they suddenly left the field, they left the Indian Army completely dazed and stupefied. Since then the enemy never advanced any further than Chenari.

All tribesmen reached Abbottabad safe and sound, leaving a completely helpless people to their own defence. At this juncture, General Tariq held back the Indian Army with fifteen men. General Tariq showed, during this crisis, not only remarkable courage but extraordinary presence of mind. He, with the help of these fifteen men, kept back the Indian Army, till, within the seven days that followed, we were able to collect a contingent of 700 soldiers for this front. In those seven days one can hardly describe the supreme efforts that were made. So many of us did not sleep for days and nights together. If we could not collect these 700 men and build up strength on this front, within the shortest possible time, we may have easily lost the whole campaign. This was perhaps the most critical period in the whole of the campaign. After collecting these 700 men we visited the headquarters of General Tariq in Chenari Dak Bungalow. We found his soldiers and himself in extremely good spirits.

It is doubtless that the Liberation Movement produced the figure of General Tariq as its great hero. To the Muslim boys and young men in Pakistan, General Tariq appeared on the scene like a mythical figure in a far away wonderland. His great deeds, particularly during this part of the campaign, are certainly unique.

After the tribal debacle on the Srinagar front, a really dependable army was in the making in Poonch and Mirpur and other fronts. So many pockets were cleared after pitched battles in Poonch and the Kotli tehsil of Mirpur. In the whole district of Poonch, except Poonch city itself, Dogra troops had been liquidated. Similarly in Mirpur, except Nowshera, where the Indian Army held out with such determination, all resistance was broken. After Mirpur, Azad Kashmir troops liberated Rajouri Tehsil of Riasi district, and reached the rear of Shopian, a small town only 35 miles east of Srinagar.

In the meantime, Gilgit forces had crossed Zogilla

Pass, and reached places only thirty miles from Srinagar. This practically surrounded the Indian Army now trapped in the valley of Kashmir. On the Hindwara side also we almost reached Sopur town, which is not far away from Srinagar. Azad forces gained marvelous victories, and, in fact, advanced so quickly, that to hold the territory later became an impossible task.

On the other hand, the Indian Army Generals planned on a different basis. They, to start with, wanted to hold their positions at any cost. Under the same policy, for instance, the Poonch garrison held out in most difficult conditions. All credit must go to these who managed to supply rations, to a civilian population of 30,000, and also to the troops fighting in Poonch, which was not an easy job. Nowshera in Mirpur District was made the base for the Indian Army build-up for operations in Rajouri and Poonch. For nine months in 1948, the Indian Army build-up was consistently reported on all fronts. During November and December, 1948, fighting on all fronts was started. The Azad Army had practically no rations and ammunition build-up on any front. Our difficulties in Ladakh were peculiar. Other fronts also were in a similar position because of lack of communications.

As soon as large-scale operations were started simultaneously from Ladakh down to Mirpur on a 400 miles long front, the Azad Army, because of numerical inferiority of arms, gave way to the Indian Army.

In less than a month's time, huge territories in Azad Kashmir was reoccupied by the Indian Army, and a vast number of refugees fled into Pakistan.

Chapter XI

Security Council—1948

In January, 1948, the Government of India took the Kashmir case to the Security Council. At that time the Indian Army's position in Kashmir was very precarious. The Azad Army was putting very heavy pressure on a number of fronts. A very big area of Jammu and Kashmir had already come under the control of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Government. The Azad Army had scored singular successes on a number of fronts and they were still advancing. This position, probably, had forced India to take the Kashmir case to the Security Council, though the Government of Pakistan had suggested this course to them as early as November 17, 1947. At that time the Government of India had rejected this proposal. When India did refer the case to the Security Council, it came as a surprise to many of us. The Government of India, in their complaint to the Security Council, took the stand, *inter alia*, on the following grounds—

(a) "On 26th October, Ruler of the State, His Highness Maharaja Sir Hari Singh, appealed urgently to the Government of India for military help. He also requested that Jammu and Kashmir State should be allowed to accede to the Indian Dominion. An appeal for help was also simultaneously received by the Government of India from the largest popular organization in Kashmir, the National Conference headed by Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah. The Conference further strongly supported the request for the State's accession to the Indian Dominion. The

Government of India were thus approached, not only officially by the State authorities but also on behalf of the people of Kashmir, both for military aid and for the accession of the State to India.

(b) “The grave threat to the life and property of the innocent people of Kashmir and to the security of the State of Jammu and Kashmir that had developed as a result of invasion of the Valley demanded immediate decision by the Government of India. It was imperative that the defence of Jammu and Kashmir State should be taken over by a Government capable of discharging it. But, in order to avoid any possible suggestion that India had utilized the State’s immediate peril for her own political advantage, the Government of India made it clear, that once the soil of the State had been cleared of the invaders, and normal conditions restored, its people would be free to decide their future by the recognized democratic method of plebiscite or referendum, which, in order to ensure complete impartiality, might be held under international auspices.

(c) “The Government of India felt it their duty to respond to the appeal for armed assistance, because they could not allow a neighbouring and friendly State to be compelled by force to determine either its internal affairs or its external relations, and after the instrument of accession had been signed and accepted by the Dominion of India, it became imperative to take up the defence of the State.

(d) “That the forces which had entered the State to liberate it were sent by the Government of Pakistan and were receiving assistance from it.

(e) “That the facts narrated above indisputably point to the conclusions—

(i) that the invaders are allowed transit across Pakistan;

- (ii) that they are allowed to use Pakistan territory as a base of operations;
 - (iii) that they include Pakistan nationals;
 - (iv) that they draw much of their military equipment, transportation and supplies (including petrol) from Pakistan; and
 - (v) that Pakistan Officers are training, guiding and otherwise actively helping them.
- (f) "That the Government of Pakistan is not willing to stop the assistance in material and men, which the invaders are receiving from Pakistan territory, and from Pakistan nationals, including Pakistan Government personnel, both military and civil. This attitude is not only unneutral, but constitutes active aggression against India, of which the State of Jammu and Kashmir forms an integral part.

In the end the Government of India requested the Security Council to ask the Government of Pakistan—

- (1) to prevent Pakistan Government personnel, military and civil from participating or assisting in the invasion of Jammu and Kashmir State;
- (2) to call upon other Pakistan nationals to desist from taking any part in the fighting in Jammu and Kashmir State;
- (3) to deny to the invaders—
 - (a) access to and use of its territory for operations against Kashmir,
 - (b) military and other supplies,
 - (c) all other kinds of aid that might tend to prolong the present struggle.

The Government of Pakistan, firstly, denied all the allegations of assistance and support to the forces of liberation operating in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Secondly, the Government of Pakistan most vehemently denied the validity of accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India. It was stated in this defence, "that India obtained the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir by fraud and violence, and that large-scale massacres and lootings and atrocities on the Muslims of Jammu and Kashmir State have been perpetrated by the armed forces of the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir, and the Indian Union, and by the non-Muslim subjects of the Maharaja and of the Indian Union". And, thirdly, that the life and security of Muslims of the State of Jammu and Kashmir were really in danger and that a large number of Mussalmans had already been butchered in the province of Jammu, and an equal number of Mussalmans had been driven out of the State and were taking refuge in Pakistan. Fourthly, Pakistan also, quite rightly, pleaded that the people of the State of Jammu and Kashmir are predominantly Mussalmans, therefore, they wanted to join Pakistan rather than India. Because of the atrocities committed by the Dogras in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, and also, because the people of the State wish to obtain emancipation from Dogra tyranny, and wish to accede to the Dominion of Pakistan, "the Muslim population of the State have set up an Azad (free) Kashmir Government, the forces of which are carrying on their fight for liberation. It is possible that these forces have been joined by a number of independent tribesmen from the tribal areas beyond the North-West Frontier Province, and persons from Pakistan including Muslim refugees from East Punjab, who are the nationals of the Indian Dominion".

The Pakistan Government countercharged India with these facts—

- (i) India never whole-heartedly accepted the partition scheme, and has, since June, 1947,

- been making persistent attempts to undo it;
- (ii) that an extensive campaign of 'genocide' has been carried out against the Muslims throughout India, particularly in Indian states;
 - (iii) that the security, freedom, religion, culture and language of Muslims in India was in serious danger;
 - (iv) that a number of States which had acceded to Pakistan had been unlawfully occupied by the Indian forces;
 - (v) that India blocked the implementation of agreement arising out of the partition of India;
 - (vi) India now threatens Pakistan with direct military invasion;
 - (vii) that the object of the various acts of aggression of India against Pakistan, is the destruction of the State of Pakistan.

The Government of Pakistan requested the Security Council to appoint a Commission or Commissions, to enquire into allegations and counter-allegations of the case, and give a finding on them.

After hearing both sides, the members of Security Council had no difficulty in coming to the conclusion that it was not possible for the Security Council to immediately accede to the request of India. They also thought that the accession of the State to India was not a final one. As a matter of fact some of the members thought that, if the life and security of Mussalmans was so endangered, it would have been criminal on the part of Pakistan not to extend any support to a people who were struggling for their very existence, just across the Pakistan

border, who were all Muslims.

India's case was argued by the late Gopala Swami Ayyanger, who was once the Prime Minister of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Besides others, Mr. Ayyanger was assisted by Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, Head of the then Administration in Srinagar. Pakistan's case was pleaded by Ch. Sir Mohammad Zafarullah Khan, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan. Long speeches were made. Tempers were lost. Inappropriate and foolish things were said on the floor of the Council. India lost her case in the first round.

I remember the scenes during the last speech of Sir Gopala Swami Ayyanger in the Security Council, before he ran back to Delhi for further instructions in February, 1948. His speech was to the effect, that his nation and his country had been insulted.

Sh. Abdullah also made a speech in the Security Council. The Government of India thought that a 'representative' of the people of Jammu and Kashmir, Sh. Abdullah, would be in a position to convince the Security Council members of their point of view, but the effect of the speech was quite the reverse. Some of the things that Sh. Abdullah said in his speech were not only unnatural but also quite contrary to the case that India was trying to make out. For example, the Security Council was considering the establishment of a neutral Government in Srinagar of all parties, so that a plebiscite in the State of Jammu and Kashmir could be held under a neutral administration. Sh. Abdullah made a speech in a sentimental fashion. While making his remarks on the question of the neutrality of the proposed administration, Sh. Abdullah dared to say, before an assembly of world statesmen, that if God-Almighty descended upon this earth and assumed charge in Srinagar, even He could not remain neutral. This sweeping statement just helped to prove the case of Pakistan, which was built on the fact that Sh. Abdullah's administration in Srinagar could never

be neutral. No plebiscite under that administration, therefore, could be either impartial or fair. The British delegate pointedly asked Sh. Abdullah, if, in his opinion, God-Almighty could not remain neutral, how on earth could he himself be neutral? Of course, Sh. Abdullah was at a loss for words, and simply grinned. In fact, during this speech he threw away the paper which contained his original speech and spoke extempore, which was a very unguarded action. Giving way to his sentiments, he said things which he should not have said, at least on the Security Council floor. It might have been quite safe to say these things in Amira Kadal Chauk. There was another matter, also, which made Sh. Abdullah rather uncomfortable. He was confronted with the speech he had made in November, 1947, in New Delhi. In this speech he had whole-heartedly supported the revolution in Poonch. He had also endorsed, in unambiguous words, the justification and genuineness of the revolt against the tyranny and suppression by Maharaja Hari Singh's regime in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, and particularly in Poonch.

It is quite true that Sir Gopala Swami Ayyanger and Sh. Abdullah quarrelled with each other, and quite serious difficulties arose between them. Sh. Abdullah blamed Sir Gopala Swami Ayyanger for not being equal to the task, and being no match for Ch. Sir Zafarullah Khan. Sir Gopala Swami Ayyanger condemned Sh. Abdullah for his indiscreet speech, and for his going out of his brief altogether. This was one of the reasons why India's delegation suddenly decided to pack up and run back to Delhi. All this is based on good information that Sh. Abdullah's men used to meet Dr. M. D. Taseer every evening. Dr. M. D. Taseer, incidentally, was my secretary during this tour.

Somehow or other my first impression of the Security Council was not favourable. I thought that the Security Council was not dealing with the case in a court-like manner. But as my experience grew about these matters,

I knew that the position of the Security Council was not that of a court, but that of a board of conciliation. It tried by all means to bring the parties together, and, in this endeavour, it tried to evolve a formula which could be agreed to by both the parties. This entailed a long process of compromise and discussion.

On the 20th January, 1948, a resolution was moved by the President of the Security Council recommending the setting up of a Commission of three, to investigate all outstanding matters of dispute between the two countries. This resolution was adopted and accepted by both India and Pakistan. All aspects of the Kashmir case were examined during the prolonged debates from the 15th January to the 6th February, 1948.

After being satisfied that the only solution of the Jammu and Kashmir State problem lay in holding a Plebiscite to determine whether Jammu and Kashmir State should accede to India or Pakistan, the Security Council concentrated its efforts on laying down conditions, which could ensure impartiality and freedom to the Plebiscite. A resolution was then drafted on behalf of the Security Council based on the following principles—

- (a) all foreign troops must be removed from Kashmir;
- (b) all inhabitants of Kashmir must be rehabilitated to their original homes; and
- (c) a neutral administration be set up in Kashmir to ensure the fairness and freedom of the Plebiscite.

When the Indian delegation found that this resolution was likely to be adopted by the Security Council, it applied for adjournment of the debate, ostensibly to enable the delegation to go back to India for consultation, but in reality to gain time to use diplomatic pressure to

secure acceptance of their views. On March 18, 1948, the Security Council took up the Kashmir case, again.

The Security Council worked out its own solution and on April 21, 1948, adopted a resolution the provisions of which are outlined below—

“(i) The preamble noted ‘with satisfaction that both India and Pakistan desire that the question of the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan should be decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite’. It increased the membership of the Commission, which it was proposed to send out to implement the resolution, from three to five. It instructed the Commission to proceed immediately to the Indian sub-continent and there to place its services at the disposal of the two Governments with a view to bringing about a cessation of fighting and the ‘holding of a plebiscite by the two Governments, acting in co-operation with one another and with the Commission’.

(ii) In order to restore law and order in the State, the Security Council requested the two Governments to take the following measures—

- (a) Pakistan should use its influence with the raiders, and such of its nationals as may be fighting in the State, to withdraw from the State;
- (b) The Government of India ‘should put into operation, in consultation with the Commission, a plan for withdrawing their own forces from Jammu and Kashmir and reducing them progressively to the minimum strength required ‘for the maintenance of internal security in the State, after it has been established that the tribesmen are withdrawing.

- (c) The minimum forces of the Government of India should be posted, in consultation with the Commission, at places from where they may not offer any intimidation, or appearance of intimidation, to the inhabitants of the State. Any reserve of troops considered necessary should be located in their present Base Area.
- (d) The Commission should, as far as possible, use local forces for the maintenance of law and order, and if these are 'found to be inadequate' the Commission should, with the agreement of both India and Pakistan, arrange for use of such forces of either Dominion as it deems effective.

“(iii) The Second part of the Resolution purported to lay down the basic conditions for the holding of a plebiscite in the State. It provided for—

- (a) A coalition Government in the State to which responsible representatives designated by the 'major political groups' should be invited, to share equitably and fully in the conduct of the administration at Ministerial level.
- (b) The appointment of a Plebiscite Administrator by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, with full powers to carry out the plebiscite, including the powers of direction and supervision over the State Army and the Police, and the power to appoint special magistrates.
- (c) The return to the State of all State nationals who have left the State on or after 15th August.
- (d) The removal from the State of all Indian

nationals who had entered the State otherwise than for a lawful purpose.

- (e) At the end of the plebiscite the Commission would certify to the Security Council whether the Plebiscite had or had not been really free and impartial”.

The Government of India rejected this resolution. Neither did Pakistan see its way to accepting this resolution. Notwithstanding their objection to the Security Council resolution, both India and Pakistan co-operated with the United Nations Commission which was founded under this resolution. Pakistan nominated Argentina as its representative on the proposed Commission, India nominated Czechoslovakia. Argentina and Czechoslovakia failed to agree on the third member. The President of the Security Council then nominated Belgium, Columbia and the United States, to complete the composition of the U.N.C.I.P.

Chapter XII

U. N. C. I. P.

During 1948, the Security Council sent out a U.N.C.I.P. which landed in Karachi on 7 July. The Commission left for Delhi on the 10 July, 1948, to confer with the Government of India, and immediately started exploring the possibilities of an immediate cease-fire in Kashmir. The suggestion of a cease-fire was discussed at a formal meeting of the Commission held on July 23 in New Delhi which was attended by the Pakistan representatives. From 10 July to 13 August the Commission held a number of meetings and discussions, both with the Government of India and the Government of Pakistan. Ch. Ghulam Abbas Khan and the writer also had a chance of having discussions with the Commission in Karachi, on the various aspects of the Kashmir problem. The Commission, in the meantime, sent a Military Sub-Commission to study the military situation in the liberated areas of Jammu and Kashmir. This Sub-Commission first flew to Srinagar, and after seeing the Indian side of Kashmir, rejoined the Commission in Karachi. The Sub-Commission then left for the Azad Kashmir area on August 12.

After having further meetings with the representatives of India and Pakistan, the Commission released to the press its resolution of 13th, August and the correspondence connected therewith. A further meeting took place in Rawalpindi on 14th September between Ch. Ghulam Abbas Khan and the writer, on the one hand, and Messrs Huddle and Graeffe on the other. These two gentlemen

of the Commission visited Mangla Head works in Mirpur in Azad Kashmir territory, where they were entertained to a lunch by the Azad Kashmir Government. After this, the Commission left for Srinagar and stayed there until they returned to Geneva.

After these prolonged parleys and discussions, the Commission, on the 13th August, 1948, passed the resolution, which follows, embodying the Cease-Fire and truce agreement—

The Preamble expressed the opinion that prompt cessation of hostilities and the correction of conditions, the continuance of which was likely to endanger international peace and security, were essential for effecting a final settlement of the situation in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. In reply to a query of the Pakistan Government, the Commission explained on the 27th August, that the expression “a final settlement of the situation did not fall short of, nor go beyond, the terms of the Security Council’s Resolution of 21st April, 1948, and was in harmony with it.” The Commission went on to add that it was not committed to a rejection of a peaceful solution, which might be agreed to by the two Governments provided that such a solution reflected the will of the people.

PART I

This part of the Resolution provided that the Governments of India and Pakistan would issue cease-fire orders to all forces operating under the High Commands of India and Pakistan including, for this purpose, the forces of Azad Kashmir and the Tribesmen. It also provided for the appointment of neutral military observers on both sides of the cease-fire line to supervise the observance of the cease-fire order, and called upon the Governments of India and Pakistan to appeal to their respective peoples to assist in creating and maintaining an atmosphere favourable to the promotion of further negotiations.

PART II

This part of the Resolution laid down the following principles as a basis for the formulation of a truce agreement, the details of which were to be worked out in discussion between their representatives and the Commission—

- (i) The Pakistan Government was called upon to agree to withdraw its troops from the State. It was subsequently explained that the withdrawal of the Pakistan troops would be synchronised with the withdrawal of the bulk of the Indian Army from Jammu and Kashmir.
- (ii) The Pakistan Government was asked to use its best endeavours to secure the withdrawal from the State of all its nationals as had gone into the State for the purpose of fighting. The Commission made it clear to the Pakistan Government that the Azad Kashmir Forces would neither be withdrawn nor disbanded, but would continue to remain intact in the areas under the operational control of the Pakistan High Command.
- (iii) The territory evacuated by the Pakistan troops would be administered by the 'local authorities' under the surveillance of the Commission. It was explained that by 'local authorities' was meant the *de facto* Government in this area, namely, The Azad Kashmir Government. As regards the Commission's surveillance, this did not mean actual supervision or control, but was introduced only to ensure that the 'local authorities' did not do anything against the spirit of the truce agreement.

- (iv) When the tribesmen and Pakistan nationals had withdrawn, and the Pakistan Forces had begun their withdrawal, the Government of India were to begin the withdrawal of the bulk of their forces from the State, in stages to be agreed upon with the Commission. The Commission, while recognising the need for the security of the State, assumed that the danger of external attack would disappear with the establishment of a truce, and that the Indian troops to be retained in Jammu and Kashmir would be the minimum required for the maintenance of internal law and order in areas other than those in charge of the Azad Kashmir Government.
- (v) The Government of India would ensure that the Government of Jammu and Kashmir took all measures within their power to make it publicly known that peace, law and order would be safeguarded, and that all human and political rights would be guaranteed in the area under the Maharaja's control.

PART III

This part of the Resolution called upon the Governments of India and Pakistan to reaffirm their wish, that the future status of Jammu and Kashmir would be determined in accordance with the will of the people, and that the two Governments would confer with the Commission to determine fair and equitable conditions, whereby such free expression would be assured. The Commission informed the Pakistan Government on the 19th September, 1948, that in implementing Part III of the Resolution, the Commission would be guided by the terms of the Security Council's Resolution of April 21, 1948, setting forth conditions for a plebiscite, subject to such modifications as the Commission might determine, with the agreement of the Governments of

Pakistan and India.

The Government of India accepted the Commission's Resolution, subject, however, to the following interpretations placed upon it—

- (a) The Commission was to recognise the sovereignty of the Maharaja over the entire area of Jammu and Kashmir.
- (b) Responsibility for the administration of the sparsely populated area of the State in the North (namely, Ladakh), should revert to the Government of Jammu and Kashmir, after Pakistan troops and tribesmen had withdrawn.
- (c) The Government of Pakistan should have no part in the organisation or conduct of the plebiscite, or in any other matter of internal administration in the State.
- (d) The Commission should recognise the necessity of effective insurance of the security of the State against external aggression and internal disorder, and the responsibility of the Government of India in this regard.

The Government of Pakistan was not fully satisfied with all the provisions of the Commission's resolution, yet they accepted it, subject only to one reservation, namely, that the Government of India should accept the conditions laid down in Part 'B' (Articles 6 to 15, both inclusive) of the Security Council's resolution of 21st April, 1948, as explained by the sponsors of the resolution in the Security Council, for a free and impartial plebiscite to decide whether the State of Jammu and Kashmir is to accede to India or Pakistan. The Pakistan Government based their case on the universally recognised principle, that the will of the people should be allowed to prevail. The accession

of the State of Jammu and Kashmir is the main point in dispute between the Governments of Pakistan and India, and, if it is to be decided by peaceful means, the only method is to hold a free and impartial plebiscite, under neutral auspices, to determine the Dominion to which the State should finally accede.

When this Commission landed in the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent, the war in Kashmir was going on. But the parties had come to an unwritten understanding, that no major operations would be undertaken. An unofficial cease-fire seemed to exist. At least we, who were not very high up, were told on our side, that we should not do anything which would militate against the spirit of this unofficial understanding and aggravate the situation.

In the meantime, we were all the time getting information that, in spite of this so-called understanding, the Indian Army was continuing its build-up, particularly in the Nowshera Sector. A manifold increase in the strength of the Indian troops had been undertaken. While the Security Council's Commission was discussing the Kashmir case with regard to a cease-fire agreement, India, it seems, was building up her forces for an all-out offensive in Kashmir. The Indian Army had planned this offensive in Kashmir with the avowed object of forcing a military decision by subjugating completely the whole of Jammu and Kashmir State, and thus presenting the world with a *fait accompli*. But, as the plan unfolded itself, it became clear that its real objective was more far-reaching, and that it was aimed directly at the security of Pakistan. The subjugation of the Azad Kashmir forces in Rajouri Mender Sector, led to the exodus of a very large number of Muslims from Rajouri and Poonch, because the policy of the Indian Army was to liquidate the Muslims from the villages, and to resettle Hindus and Sikhs in their place.

This big offensive towards the end of 1948, came

as a surprise to all concerned. India started a very big push from Nowshera, their Corps Headquarters, branching out into different directions. One push was started towards Kotli and another towards Rajouri. Our build-up and strength, particularly on the Mandhar front were very weak. In the first place, we had no direct line of communication with the Mandhar valley. Secondly, the Azad troops were not very large in number, and were spread out from the top of Shopian, in the Kashmir Valley, down to Azim Garh Fort in Rajouri. Thirdly, these Azad Army soldiers were very poorly equipped. They, at least the majority of them, belonged to Mandhar valley. Last, but not least, the troops on this front lacked an efficient command. We could not spare first class Azad Army troops from Poonch, because these troops were necessary to surround the small city of Poonch, where the Indian army had built up strong enough reserves to break through and overrun the western parts of Poonch, if they so desired.

During the months of November and December, 1948, when the Indian Army built up Corps Headquarters at Nowshera, they also built an elaborate line of communication between Nowshera and Jammu. The Air Force based at Jammu could very easily give them such air support as the Indian Army would require in an advance. In December, 1948, as the Indian Army began their advance from Nowshera towards Rajouri, a similar advance towards Kotli was beaten back by the Azad Kashmir Brigade. This Brigade, though lacking in gun support, automatic arms and air cover, resisted the Indian Army attack with unparalleled heroism. The push towards Rajouri and Mandhar was in a very much larger formation. I am told that at least two brigades started this push with tanks, guns and air support. The spear-head, finding a weak spot, breached through our defences. As they breached through, they made a very quick advance towards Mandi Nala and Mandhar proper. This move practically cut away all the Azad troops all along this front from their base. The Indian Army

started a ruthless butchery of people and burning of houses. When this information reached Azad Army soldiers on the front, they deserted their units, and ran back to save their families from this wanton destruction. A huge migration of population started from the whole of the Mandhar Valley and Rajouri area towards Pakistan. No less than two lakhs of people migrated *en masse* to Pakistan. How these helpless people started on foot, carrying their pitifully small amount of luggage on their heads towards Pakistan, in groups of thousands, constitutes a woeful tale of misery, which will probably be told by historian, when, in due time, he will write the history of this campaign. How little, barefooted children walked down the hilly terrain of these parts, while the Indian Army troops were after their blood, is one of the most pathetic stories! The groups of refugees, helpless as they were, were bombed by the I.A.F. on a number of occasions, whilst on their way. These people were without food and shelter for days together, but they never lost heart, and reached Pakistan after a terrible journey.

Simultaneously with their attack on Mandhar front, in the month of December, the Indian Army made another push on the Ladakh front. They pushed us back from Dras to Kargil, and ultimately to Skardu. How the Azad Army resisted this push on the Ladakh front, is another wonderful story of bravery, heroism and patience. I have no doubt that the Azad Army troops, who fought on the Ladakh front without any line of communication behind them, deserve the greatest praise and credit. It is impossible here to deal, in detail, with difficulties under which the Azad Army troops fought on this front.

The Indian Army, while making these two advances, achieved certain objectives. One objective was link with Poonch, thus releasing the Poonch city garrison. Secondly, to effect a link up with Leh, the headquarters of Ladakh tehsil. This straightened out the line from Jammu to Ladakh for the Indian Army. These two advances within a short period of couple of weeks, caused to us the

loss of huge areas of territory. We also lost in army and public morale. This was the largest major set-back that we suffered since the beginning of the campaign.

As this retreat was taking place in the Mandhar valley, great panic spread through the Poonch district. I hurried from Trarkhel to Hajira and from Hajira to Rawalakot to keep up the morale of the people. I am quite sure that if I had not undertaken this tour, at a time when the morale of the people was at the verge of complete collapse, it is quite obvious there would possibly have started another exodus of at least five lakhs of people from the rest of Poonch. This would have created additional difficulties for us. In the meantime I received an urgent message to reach Karachi. As soon as we reached Karachi the matter of cease-fire was brought into discussion.

Ch. Zafarullah Khan, Foreign Minister of Pakistan, had complained to the Security Council that the Indian offensive was a violation by India of the pledge they had given that they would not do anything that might aggravate the situation. It became clear later that these motives were to gain control over all the strategic areas, just before the cease-fire agreement was reached and to solve two major difficulties, namely, one of supplying Leh and the other of maintaining Poonch. Supplies to these two garrisons were straining the air resources of India to breaking point.

Whatever the merits or demerits of the proposition, if we had to agree to a cease-fire, we should have done it a little earlier. At the time of this agreement, so far as the provinces of Jammu and Kashmir were concerned, we had lost most of the territory in a very brief period. If we had not agreed to the cease-fire, we probably would have lost the rest of Poonch, Mirpur and Muzaffarabad. We could have probably continued the Liberation Movement from Gilgit and Ladakh side. The fact that we have got a foothold on the western part of Kashmir

is certainly of great use to us. If we had lost every inch of territory on this side of Kashmir our bargaining position would have been reduced to nil. I can say with certainty that conditions were so dangerously unfavourable, that it was quite possible that we might have lost the whole of the territory.

On the other hand, by agreeing to a cease-fire, we have, anyhow, not been the gainers. The Indians have been able to consolidate their position, and have built up very strong defences all along the cease-fire line. They will never take upon themselves to launch an offensive, therefore we are left with two alternatives; (a) either the case is settled by peaceful means of negotiation, or (b) we are forced to attack. If the matter is settled through the U.N.O. by peaceful means, well and good. If those means fail, and if we start the attack, we shall be blamed as aggressors, and India will have world opinion on her side. Even after starting an attack, it is not sure whether war can be kept strictly within the four corners of Kashmir State. If that cannot be done and a general war starts between India and Pakistan, one really cannot be sure of the consequences. In that case the consequences will be too terrible to contemplate and both countries might go under. By accepting a cease-fire at the time at which we did, I think, we have lost much of our bargaining power. My only contention is that we should either have managed a ceasefire earlier, or the Pakistan Government should have gone wholeheartedly into the show to counter the last Indian offensive. It was to counter the major Indian offensive of 1948 that Pakistan had to send a small number of troops into Kashmir in May to defend the borders of the Pakistan territory. Everybody is much wiser after the event!

After getting the consent of both India and Pakistan, the U.N.C.I.P. passed two resolutions, one on August 13, 1948, and other on January 5, 1949. The resolutions, taken together, provided for a cease-fire, followed by the demarcation of a cease-fire line. The cease-fire became

effective on January 1, 1949, and the agreement on the demarcation of the cease-fire line was arranged after a number of meetings of high military authorities of both sides on July 27, 1949. The resolutions provided for the demilitarization of the State in two stages: the truce stage and the plebiscite stage. When the cease-fire became effective, armed forces engaged in the Kashmir fighting comprised on the following lines—

On the Indian side there were the regular troops of the Indian Army, the Indian Volunteers, the State Military Forces and the Jammu and Kashmir State Militia. On the Pakistan side there were Azad Kashmir regular forces, the tribesmen, the Pakistan Volunteers, and the regular troops of the Pakistan Army. The resolutions of the U.N.C.I.P. envisaged the disposal of the forces in the following manner—

Pakistan was to use her best endeavours to secure the withdrawal of tribesmen and Pakistani volunteers. The Pakistan Government, in their earnest desire for a peaceful solution, have already carried out the undertaking, although they were under no obligation to do so till a truce agreement had been reached.

In the next stage, it was envisaged that the regular forces of India and Pakistan would withdraw in the following manner—

Pakistan would take the first step in the withdrawal of the regular forces, but, after Pakistan's troops had begun to withdraw, India undertook to begin the withdrawal of its forces in stages to be agreed upon by the Commission. The Commission assured the Pakistan Government that the withdrawal of the Pakistan Army and the withdrawal of the bulk of the Indian Army would be synchronized by the two High Commands.

The resolution of January 5, 1949, empowered the Plebiscite Administrator to determine the final disposal

of the Indian Forces remaining in the State, the State Forces and State Militia, on the one hand, and on the other, the final disposal of the Azad Kashmir Forces.

When the Commission actually started grappling with the matter of demilitarization, India tried to obstruct the Plan, so that ultimately it could defeat the proposal of the Plebiscite. They put forward fresh and fantastic demands; for example, they raised the question of the disbandment of the Azad Kashmir Forces, and the question of administration and defence of the Northern Areas of Gilgit and Ladakh. It may be emphasized here, that the Azad Kashmir Forces are not an outside element. They consist of the nationals of Jammu and Kashmir State, who launched the Liberation Movement at the end of August, 1947. They represent the will of the people of Kashmir to be free. And, in any case, on the question of the Azad Kashmir Forces, the United Nations Commission had taken a clear-cut and unambiguous stand.

The Northern areas, which are mainly mountainous, have a 100% Muslim population. The freedom upsurge in these areas formed part of the Azad Kashmir movement, and in their mountains they had rapidly thrown off the yoke of the Maharaja of Kashmir.

Then a long controversy arose as to the interpretation of the agreed resolutions of August 13, 1948 and January 5, 1949. India put her own interpretation on these resolutions. The U.N.C.I.P., however, did not agree with the Indian interpretation, and it proposed that all points of difference concerning the truce agreement be referred to arbitration by Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, whom both India and Pakistan had accepted as the Plebiscite Administrator. This statesmanlike proposal was supported by the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom. Pakistan accepted the arbitration proposal unconditionally; but India turned it down. The United Nations Commis-


sion had then no alternative but to refer the case back to the Security Council in December, 1949.

In December, 1949, the writer left for New York to attend this session of the Security Council. The Security Council was then presided over by General McNaughton, of Canada. The General was one of the great personalities I have had a chance to meet. He was authorized by the Security Council to mediate between the parties. General McNaughton, with all the thoroughness and exactitude of a military mind, prepared his own plan with regard to the Northern Areas, and also with regard to the subject of demilitarization. Pakistan generously accepted General McNaughton's proposal, but India insisted on amendments, which were tantamount to a rejection of the proposal.

Then a lengthy debate in the Security Council followed. Eventually on March 14, 1950, the Security Council passed a resolution confirming the U.N.C.I.P. resolutions of August 13, 1948, and January 5, 1949. The Security Council, in this resolution, emphasized 'that steps should be taken forthwith for the demilitarization of the State and for the expeditious determination of its future, in accordance with the freely expressed will of the inhabitants.

Then the Security Council called upon the Governments of India and Pakistan, to prepare and execute, within a period of 5 months from the date of the resolution, 'a programme of demilitarization on the basis of the principles of paragraph 2 of General McNaughton's proposal, or of such modifications of those proposals as may be mutually agreed upon. The Security Council also decided to appoint a U. N. representative to replace the U.N.C.I.P., so that the United Nations Representative could assist India and Pakistan in the preparation and execution of a programme of demilitarization. The United Nations representative was also empowered to make any suggestion to India and Pakistan, or to the

Security Council, which, in his opinion, is likely to contribute to the expeditious and enduring solution of the dispute which has arisen between the two Governments in regard to the State of Jammu and Kashmir'. Sir Owen Dixon, a well known Jurist of Australia, was nominated as United Nations Representative on April 12, 1950. He arrived in the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent on May 20, 1950.



Author with the President of the Security Council! General McNaughton

Chapter XIII

Security Council 1949-50

As already mentioned in the last chapter, the U.N.C.I.P. failed in their historic mission. They returned to Geneva, where they took a long time to prepare their report for the Security Council. In this report they admitted the difficulties involved, and suggested the dissolution of the Commission, and the appointment of one man as mediator. The Commission could not have succeeded so easily, because, I personally believe, the Commission had their own difficulties. Secondly, the problem of Kashmir is a very difficult one. On the one hand, it involves the prestige of the Government of India, and, on the other hand, the very existence of Pakistan is at stake. The paramount difficulty was that India every time adopted an unreasonable attitude. Particularly, the Government of India put their own strange interpretation on the language of the resolutions which the Commission itself was not prepared to accept. There could not be any acceptable via media, therefore the Commission had to end up with a report of failure.

The Kashmir case again came up before the Security Council towards the end of 1949. In this connection, for the second time, I visited the Headquarters of the United Nations in Lake Success, to attend the meeting of the Security Council as a representative of the Azad Kashmir Government. During my first visit in 1948, I was very much handicapped by the fact that, abroad, very little was then known about the Azad Kashmir

movement. This time the question of Kashmir was a very familiar subject to the world press and the people. Since 1948, we had been successful in establishing contacts and organizations all over the world, which did a great deal of propaganda in favour of our movement. For example, all over England we had by now our organization known as the Azad Kashmir League. It had branches in London, Birmingham, Leeds, New Castle, Manchester, and even in Scotland. Similar organizations were working in Egypt and other Muslim countries, for instance, Turkey. These branches, from all over the world, contributed towards the Azad Kashmir Movement in money, material and good-will.

During the second visit to the Security Council, I took advantage of the occasion and spent some time in America, England, Cyprus, Turkey and Egypt. During my visit I made excellent contacts abroad, and was able to do concerted publicity in favour of Azad Kashmir and Pakistan. The Kashmir problem had jeopardised Indo-Pakistan peace and, consequently, it had affected world peace. It was for this reason that people were deeply interested in this problem. Since both India and Pakistan had done fairly wide publicity with regard to the question of Kashmir, vis-a-vis Indo-Pakistan relations, public interest abroad had also been excited. There was hardly any first class newspaper anywhere in the world, probably with the exception of Russia, which had not, in one way or another, commented on the problem of Kashmir. For the same reasons, wherever I went, I found every newsman very keenly interested in whatever I had to say. My press conferences were always given fairly good publicity and space in foreign newspapers.

On my way to the Security Council, after Cairo the next scheduled stop was London. At the London Airport I was warmly received by the people of Azad Kashmir and Pakistan, who were residing in different parts of England. As I have already mentioned, these people had formed themselves into a well-knit organiza-

tion. I have no doubt that these people, who belonged to Azad Kashmir and elsewhere were working wholeheartedly for the liberation movement of Azad Kashmir in England. It was because of the efforts of this Azad Kashmir League, that we were able to organise a very big meeting in Holborn Hall in London. This meeting was indeed a very great success. It was presided over by Mr. Hector Hughes, a member of the British Parliament. It was also attended by people of different nationalities, including some Africans. While speaking in English, I was able to impress upon the public the magnitude of the problem that Kashmir involved, and how that problem was affecting the peace and security of the world. Secondly, I was able to tell them, I believe in an effective manner, just how Pakistan stood, with regard to the issue of the accession of Jammu and Kashmir State. Thirdly, I was able to tell them, with all conviction, that economically Pakistan and Kashmir were part and parcel of each other, and their economies were completely interdependent and complementary.

While summing up this lecture, and the discussion that took place afterwards, Mr. Hughes was able to say that if the facts brought out in the lecture, were true, and were put in a similar manner before the Security Council, there was no reason to doubt that Pakistan was bound to win her case against India.

I must say that, luckily, the atmosphere then in England was very favourable. The reason was that Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, Prime Minister of India, on his way back from the United States, had addressed a Press Conference in London. In that Press Conference he had let himself go, after being completely overpowered by anger and passion. He had given expression to something which was not only undignified but was also in bad taste. The words he used against Pakistan, and the people of Pakistan, were definitely unjustified, and no sane person was prepared to accept an opinion that was expressed by Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru. He had

certainly uttered things which did not befit him or his high office.

During my stay in London, and during my tour all over England, I made good contacts with the British Press. I met the Foreign Editor of *The London Times*, Professor Rushbrook Williams, an extremely fine man. He knew so much about the Kashmir problem, that it was indeed a great pleasure to discuss things with him. He could see the reasonableness of Pakistan with regard to Kashmir. I also met Editors and Sub-Editors of other London newspapers, which, off and on, write on the subject of South-East Asia. I am very glad to say that these British Journalists appreciated the point of view of Azad Kashmir and Pakistan. In fact some of them, whose names I need not mention, expressed, quite candidly, that they were thoroughly convinced that, since the beginning of the Kashmir Movement, Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru had been shifting ground on the Kashmir issue. They were equally convinced of the fact that, looking at the problem from the economic, geographical and population points of view, there was no doubt that the State of Jammu and Kashmir should automatically accede to Pakistan. In addition to all this, what convinced every sane person in England, and everywhere else, was the fact that the stand the Government of India had taken with regard to Junagadh and Hyderabad, was so radically different from the stand the Government of India had taken with regard to Kashmir. To be candid the Government of India's stand bluntly amounted to a policy of 'heads I win, tails you lose'. The problem that baffled them was how India's face could be saved in the Kashmir dispute. In Kashmir, judged from any point of view, only India's prestige is involved, but so far as Pakistan is concerned, I consider it is a question of life and death. The British Pressmen, though appreciative of our point of view, pointed out unanimously that they could not do much in the matter. They thought that the position of the United Kingdom, vis-a-vis India and Pakistan, was one of neutrality. England wanted good

relations with both India and Pakistan.

I have no intention of going into the matter as to what stand United Kingdom should have taken in this matter, as a senior member of the British Commonwealth of Nations. What my opinion was on this matter, I had occasion to express in a later meeting in London, where I addressed world newsmen on my way back from the Security Council. I said, "What use would it be to be member of a club where, if two members quarrel, the Chairman is unable to compose their differences or do anything in the matter!" That was such a pointed question that, though it interested everybody, nobody was able to answer it. The position for England, however, as one is able to appreciate, was difficult. During my stay in England I visited Birmingham, Nottingham, Newcastle and Leeds. In all these places I addressed meetings which were attended by the British public. The provincial Press gave the Azad Kashmir Movement much better publicity than the London Press. The London press perhaps got their cue from the Foreign Office. Also perhaps the Indian Embassy had not contacted the provincial press. When I addressed a very big meeting in Birmingham, some of the people who belonged to Azad Kashmir areas, burst into tears, when I explained to them how miserably the Mussalmans in Kashmir had suffered. The people of Azad Kashmir living in England made their contributions to the Movement of Azad Kashmir in their small and humble way. Their efforts have been magnificent. In this regard I might particularly mention the name of late Syed Fazal Shah who was the President of the Azad Kashmir League in England.

During my stay in London I was invited by the British Broadcasting Corporation to broadcast from their studios on the Kashmir issue, though I was politely asked by one of their editors that the subject may be made the least controversial. When I had actually made this broadcast I learnt that the Indian High Commission in London registered a regular protest with the British

Broadcasting Corporation. Wherever I went, whether in America, England, Turkey or Egypt, the Indian Embassies were sensitive and touchy about me. Whatever I undertook to do, they did their best to counteract.

When I reached New York, the Kashmir case was not yet before the Security Council. We had, in between the meetings of the Security Council, time to visit different places.

In America it is impossible to arrange a fixture for a lecture at short notice. In fact, for big meetings, one has to arrange through special publicity agencies. I had fixtures in Boston, Philadelphia University, Washington and New York. In Boston I addressed the students at two different places. The discussions at these places were interesting. Some of the students knew quite a lot about the Kashmir problem. In Philadelphia University, I addressed a class of persons who had been writing on Kashmir affairs in different journals in America. I had long discussions with them over the Kashmir issue.

Then I visited Washington for about a week. I appeared on television and in a radio programme. Mr. Mubarak Ali Shah of Arizona State, a well known Muslim Leaguer, arranged a very big dinner in Washington, which was attended by at least fifteen Congressmen, which, I was told, is a difficult thing to manage in Washington. I was able to speak on Kashmir at this dinner, and every one of the Congressmen spoke on Kashmir as well. What really was a discovery to them, was the fact that Kashmir was on the borders of Communist Russia and Communist China. Only then was their interest aroused. This is true in a smaller or longer way, with regard to every American. After the Second World War destiny has placed the leadership of the democratic world on the American people. America, it is quite true, has economically aided some of the small countries of Europe. The Americans today are not a nation trying to exclude themselves from

world affairs. On the contrary, America has got the effective leadership of all the countries, which are grouped together against the Russian bloc.

In Washington we had a number of fixtures at different places. There are societies and clubs which are interested in the affairs of the South-East Asia. Membership of these clubs is usually very small. The members take a sufficient amount of interest on Asiatic subjects. For example, when we took up the Kashmir question, quite a number of people already knew a lot about this dispute between India and Pakistan. They were in the nature of specialists, who themselves make detailed and special studies on South Asiatic subjects. In all these meetings were present the officials of the Indian as well as Pakistan Embassies, who amongst themselves had heated discussions.

It goes without saying that the Indians in America do very wide publicity in favour of their country. Because of strained Indo-Pakistan relations, they have been doing dangerous propaganda against Pakistan. An average American does not know much about Pakistan. Nor is there any effective machinery on the Pakistan side to either counteract that propaganda or do positive publicity for Pakistan. It is not an easy job either, because, in the first place, it costs a lot of money, which small countries can hardly afford; and, secondly, it needs specialized knowledge and experienced men to undertake scientific publicity abroad. We at this moment lack both. Vis-a-vis India we are handicapped in another manner. India is a well known country all over the world. In America India is known because of Mr. Gandhi and his pacifist philosophy. I remember in 1948, when Mahatma Gandhi was murdered in New Delhi, huge publicity was given to this incident. Therefore, it is not an easy task to put Pakistan on the map of the world. In spite of this, two factors have come in handy to achieve this result to a degree which would have not been possible ordinarily. In the first place, Pakistan

has played a good role in the United Nations Organization, and, secondly, because of Kashmir. I personally believe that much more is possible in the field of publicity in all countries of Europe, as far as Pakistan is concerned.

The Security Council met and requested General McNaughton, the President of the Security Council, as mentioned in the last chapter, to get into touch with the parties, and to see if he could bring about a settlement. General McNaughton carried out his task, and made two reports: an interim report and a final report. These reports incorporated the fundamental principles which have been agreed upon between the parties, namely, that the accession issue of the state should be determined through a free and impartial Plebiscite. General McNaughton had explained that he proceeded on the basis that the agreement already arrived at, must be preserved, and that differences that have since arisen with regard to the agreement, should be resolved. Leaving aside the technicalities, he took the problem of demilitarization as a whole, and made certain changes with regard to the scheme that was visualized by the Commission.

After General McNaughton's mediation efforts failed, and the matter had come before the Security Council, the Pakistan representative, Ch. Zafarullah Khan, addressed the Security Council in the following words—

“As I said in the opening part of my submission to the Council, on all the criteria that the Government of India has to date suggested with regard to accession, Kashmir ought to accede to Pakistan, if the choice had to be made by Kashmir itself. The interest of the majority of the inhabitants of Kashmir indisputably points in that direction.”

During the same speech, the nearly exasperated Foreign Minister of Pakistan expressed himself as follows—

“But it has been agreed that the whole matter shall



Author with the Indian Representative Sir B. N. Rao

be settled on the basis of a free and impartial plebiscite. Well, then let the free and impartial plebiscite take place.

“The question to-day is not of any fresh conditions, or any new conditions. The whole question is to implement the resolutions to which the two parties have agreed”.

On behalf of the Government of Pakistan, it was emphasized that, in order to eliminate all possible sources of pressure, the following measures were necessary—

- (i) Withdrawal of all outside troops ;
- (ii) Neutralization of the Civil Administration;
- (iii) Provision of the fullest and widest powers for the Plebiscite Administrator; and
- (iv) Ensuring complete freedom for legitimate political activity.

Before this chapter is closed, one might mention, along with the failings of the Commission, the achievements which the Commission was able to bring about. One was the implementation of the cease-fire, and the other was that the Commission was able to secure, of course, with the agreement of the parties, the appointment of the Plebiscite Administrator, who fulfilled, in every respect, the qualities that were laid down as being essential in this case, in the person of Admiral Chester W. Nimitz.

The Commission recommended the appointment of a United Nations Representative and then the Commission was dissolved.

Chapter XIV

Sir Owen Dixon and Dr. Frank P. Graham

Sir Owen Dixon, a judge of the High Court of Australia, was chosen as the United Nations Representative on April 12, 1950. He arrived in the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent on May 27. On a number of occasions Sir Owen Dixon met the representatives of India and Pakistan, and some of the Azad Kashmir leaders. He travelled extensively in Jammu and Kashmir State, with a view to obtaining first-hand knowledge of local conditions. After going into a large number of meetings and discussions, the United Nations Representative invited the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan to a joint meeting in New Delhi. This Conference took place from 20th to 24th July. The Conference, like some other conferences, ended without any result. The Pakistan Government was agreeable to Sir Owen Dixon's proposal that the Pakistan army and the Indian army should be withdrawn outside the borders of the State, and that State forces and the Militia and Azad Kashmir forces should be disbanded. The Pakistan Government was also prepared to agree to initiate a programme of withdrawal, and that India could then follow suit. The Government of India could not, however, see their way to accepting a clear demilitarization of the State. Then Sir Owen Dixon was prepared to allow a number of concessions to the Government of India, and the concessions were, no doubt, beyond the terms of the agreed settlement, but he totally failed to bring India round. It had become

pretty clear by now, that India was not, in any case, prepared to carry out the demilitarization which they had undertaken to do. This attitude was adopted simply to defeat a free and impartial plebiscite. In this regard, Sir Owen Dixon reported—

“That India’s agreement to demilitarization in any such form would never be obtained, or to provisions governing the period of plebiscite in any such character, as would, in my opinion, permit of the plebiscite being conducted in conditions sufficiently guarding against intimidation, and other forms of influence and abuse, by which the freedom and fairness of the plebiscite might be imperilled”.

After the Prime Ministers’ Conferences, it had become quite clear, that no agreement could be achieved with regard to the problem of demilitarization. Sir Owen Dixon should have left for the Security Council and reported his failure, but he stayed on in the sub-continent to explore ways of resolving the Kashmir dispute, other than through an overall plebiscite. He considered a number of alternatives. One of them was a clean partition of the State, or in the alternative, a partition combined with plebiscite within a limited area. The proposal of a clear cut partition of the State was dropped by Sir Owen Dixon, when he found that, under any circumstances, India was not willing to let go the Valley of Kashmir. Pakistan stood by the international agreement, that the issue of accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir should be decided by an overall plebiscite.

The other alternative that Sir Owen Dixon explored was, that a plebiscite should be held only in the Valley of Kashmir, and some other adjacent territories, and the rest of the State should be partitioned between India and Pakistan. No indication, however, was given as to the basis on which this partition would take place. Sir Owen Dixon himself stated that the following specific measures were necessary, for the holding of a free and

impartial plebiscite, if it ever came—

- (i) That the plebiscite area should be placed under the temporary control of an administrative body consisting of United Nations Officials;
- (ii) The administrative body should have the power to exclude troops of every description. If, however, it required some troops, it could request both India and Pakistan to provide them; and
- (iii) India and Pakistan should have equality in any right granted to lay their views before the people and in other respects.

The Government of Pakistan took their stand unequivocally on the position that, under the agreed resolutions of U.N.C.I.P., and the Security Council, the question of the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir should be decided by means of a free and impartial plebiscite, and was, therefore, reluctant to consider any alternative proposal or plan. Nevertheless, in compliance with the wishes of the United Nations Representative, the Pakistan Government were ready to attend a conference to discuss the plan evolved by Sir Owen Dixon, provided the Government of India would accept the specific measures, for ensuring the freedom and impartiality of the plebiscite proposed by Sir Owen Dixon.

The Government of India which alone benefited from the alternative plan emphatically rejected all the safeguards proposed by Sir Owen Dixon. The report of the United Nations Representative states that Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru was prepared to agree to a plebiscite even in a limited area, only on the following conditions—

- (i) That the armed forces of India were allowed

to remain in control in the Valley;

- (ii) That then Sh. Abdullah's administration should remain intact; and
- (iii) That Pakistan should have no access to the plebiscite area.

It had been made clear to Sir Owen Dixon, as it was to every one else, that India had no intention of allowing a free expression of the will of the people, in any part of the State under its control. Sir Owen Dixon left the sub-continent of Indo-Pakistan in disappointment.

The Dixon report, when ultimately submitted to the Security Council, disappointed every one, and because of certain portions with regard to the legality or otherwise of accession, it shocked some of us. The Minister for Kashmir Affairs, speaking in the Pakistan Parliament on Kashmir Affairs, observed in the following manner:—

“Now coming to the Dixon report, I share the surprise expressed by Honourable Members who have spoken before me, at the conclusions and recommendations made in that report. In effect this is what Sir Owen Dixon has said. One, that he was unable to carry out the directive given to him by the Security Council to bring about the demilitarization of the State. Why? Because India did not agree to any of his suggestions. Two, that he put forward alternative suggestions in order to secure India's agreement to a peaceful solution of the Kashmir dispute, but even those suggestions did not meet with India's approval. Three, that because of India's intransigence, the Security Council should wash its hands of the whole affair, and leave it to the parties to settle the dispute between themselves.”

Mr. M. A. Gurmani, the Minister for Kashmir

Affairs, further told Parliament that—

“He has made one more suggestion to the Security Council, namely, that the Council should press the parties to reduce the military strength, holding the cease-fire line to the normal protection of a peacetime frontier. In other words, the part of the State occupied by India should be made safe for her, and the two-thirds of the State population should continue to suffer under Sheikh Abdullah’s regime, which exercises arbitrary powers of arrest. It reminds one of a saying, there are guilts which become innocent acts and even glorious deeds, through their splendour, number and excess. Are we to understand that action by the Security Council is only called for in cases in which the interests of its permanent members are involved? In making these suggestions perhaps Sir Owen Dixon did not realize all the implications arising therefrom. He did not realize that, by throwing in the sponge, he was creating a dangerous void, inasmuch as he was appointed as substitute for the United Nations Commission on Pakistan and India, which had wider terms of reference than merely the settlement of the Kashmir dispute.”

When Sir Owen Dixon submitted his report to the Security Council, the Council adopted a resolution on March 30, 1952. In this resolution the Security Council recorded its emphatic disapproval, of the convening of a “Constituent Assembly” for the purpose of determining the future shape and affiliation of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Recommendations had been made on October 27, 1950, by the General Council of the All-Jammu and Kashmir National Conference, for convening a “Constituent Assembly”, to finally decide the accession issue. While confirming the principles embodied in the Security Council’s resolutions of April 21, 1948; June 3, 1948, and March 14, 1950 and also the resolutions of August 13, 1948 and June 5, 1949 of U.N.C.I.P. the Security Council emphatically declared in the following

words—

“That the final disposition of the State of Jammu and Kashmir will be made in accordance with the will of the people, expressed in the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite, conducted under the auspices of the United Nations”.

Out of Sir Owen Dixon’s report, the main point of differences that prevented an agreement were—

- (a) The procedure for, and the extent of, demilitarization of the State preparatory to the holding of a plebiscite;
- (b) The degrees of control over the exercise of the functions of Government in the State, necessary to ensure a free and fair plebiscite.

On the same day the Security Council accepted the resignation of Sir Owen Dixon, and appointed a new United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan with the following brief—

“(a) (Security Council) instructs the United Nations Representative to proceed to the sub-continent, and, after consultation with the Governments of India and Pakistan, to effect the demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, on the basis of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan resolutions of August 13, 1948, and January 5, 1949.

“(b) Calls upon the parties to co-operate with the United Nations Representative to the fullest degree, in effecting the demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir.

“(c) Instructs the United Nations Representative to report to the Security Council, within three months

from the date of his arrival in the sub-continent”.

In this resolution it was also suggested to the parties, to accept arbitration on all points of difference.

The Security Council then proceeded to appoint one Frank P. Graham to be the United Nations' Representative in the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent. This United Nations Representative was asked to, specifically and particularly, concentrate on the problem of demilitarization.

Dr. Graham took the place of Sir Owen Dixon, and was charged by the Security Council with the carrying out of the programme of demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, that is to say, to bring into effect the truce part of the U.N.C.I.P's resolution of 13th August. The great difficulty in the implementation of the demilitarization programme is, that it has got to be implemented through, and by, the mutual agreement of both India and Pakistan. It is not the scope nor the purpose of this book, to go into the details of all the efforts, which Dr. Frank P. Graham had so patiently made in this direction. It has been firmly accepted by the United Nations that the issue of demilitarization has held up all progress. Dr. Graham had presented three reports to the Security Council, without any real progress achieved, as far as the real problem itself is concerned. The Security Council has since passed resolutions asking both the Governments of India and Pakistan, to agree to the demilitarization of the State, so that the plebiscite stage could be brought nearer implementation. These resolutions have been rejected by India.

The last efforts made by the United Nations Representative, in Geneva, have also failed. After the failure of the Geneva talks, the United Nations Representative submitted his last report to the Security Council. In this report Dr. Frank P. Graham has gone a long way to put a premium on Indian intransigence. The docu-

ment (report) is a masterpiece of equivocation and evasion, and very much reflects the shilly-shallying policy which the United Nations have been following, since it became seized of the problem.

On December 23, 1952, the Security Council requested the Governments of India and Pakistan to start immediate negotiations under Dr. Graham's auspices, in order to reach agreement on the specific number of forces to remain on either side at the cease-fire line, at the end of the demilitarization period. It also envisaged the proposal, that on the Indian side of Kashmir should remain troops between 12,000 to 18,000 strong and on the Azad Kashmir side the number be reduced to 3,000 to 6,000. Since this resolution was rejected by India, the Geneva negotiations started on the basis of the U.N.C.I.P. resolutions. The Pakistan Government insisted that, should negotiations on this basis fail, and should it become necessary to revert to a consideration of 12 proposals of Dr. Frank P. Graham, then the basis of discussion should be the figure of forces permitted by the Security Council resolution of December 23, 1952. The latest Geneva negotiations were, therefore, started with a view to reaching a truce agreement, on the basis of the principles embodied in Part II of the U.N.C.I.P. resolution of 13th August, 1948. Part I of this resolution, namely the cease-fire, has already been implemented. Part II of this resolution deals with the problem of the demilitarization of Kashmir. The withdrawal of Pakistan troops in this part is contingent upon the withdrawal of the bulk of the Indian forces. It would, therefore, appear logical, that the parties should carry out their respective obligations, in order to enable themselves to move towards the next stage. After some progress in the Geneva talks, Dr. Frank P. Graham told the Pakistan delegation, that the figure of troops India had proposed for withdrawal in terms of Part II of the August 13 resolution, was not such as Dr. Graham could ask Pakistan to accept.

This phase of the negotiations having ended in failure, on account of India's obduracy, the two parties began to consider Dr. Graham's 12 proposals. Dr. Frank P. Graham's new formula precluded any chance of settlement, because the trend of earlier negotiations with India had made it clear that she had her own reservations, and that parts of this formula were in contravention of the Security Council's resolution of December 23, 1952.

Dr. Graham's latest formula envisaged, towards the end of the period of the demilitarization, an armed force of 6,000 on the Azad Kashmir side and an armed force of 21,000 on the Indian side of the cease-fire line. There seems no justification, since the passing of the Security Council's resolution of December 23, 1952, for the raising of the figure of troops on Indian side to 21,000. Under this plan, it will appear that the forces on the Indian side of the cease-fire line are to be three-and-a-half times larger than the Azad Kashmir forces. This position not only seriously jeopardises the security of Azad Kashmir but also militates against paragraph 8 of the formula, which embodied the principle, that "demilitarization shall be carried out in such a way as to involve no threat to the cease-fire agreement", at any stage during or after the demilitarization. Dr. Graham's proposal, which allows India to keep a very large force on its side, gives them freedom to take aggressive action. This renders Azad Kashmir defenceless. As has been pointed out by the Government of Pakistan, this constitutes a "process of continuous yielding of ground in face of Indian intransigence". If Pakistan agreed to such a proposal, it would amount to an endorsement and abetment of the Indian attitude.

The net result is that the Kashmir deadlock continues. As other world events take more prominence, the Kashmir problem is slowly shifting into the background. In Pakistan itself important problems like Canal Water and food shortage are engaging the serious attention of the Government, and the public alike. The

people of Pakistan, in their minds, have now started giving Kashmir second rate importance, which is an extremely dangerous tendency.

In the context of global strategy, the Anglo-American bloc wish to create a Middle-East Defence Organisation, and Pakistan might play a part in this new move. This quite rightly frightens India, because, according to India, any such military alliance next door to her, might jeopardize her integrity and independence. Pakistan might be forced simply by circumstances, which, in turn, arise out of the problems of Kashmir, Canal Water, Food Shortage and Defence, to join a possible Middle-East plan. If Indo-Pakistan leadership could rise high enough, it would be greatly in their interest to settle all the Indo-Pakistan problems, including Kashmir, by sitting around the table. That, incidentally, could relieve the Security Council of her burdens, under which it is being strained to the breaking point. By an all out American Arms Aid to India, things have radically changed. Pakistan, very naturally, is more and more inclined to China, in particular, and Russia. Since India is favouring Malayasia, Pakistan is having Indonesia as her ally. Things are similarly changing swiftly all round the world. Internally, India is facing a grave food crisis, which is solidly contributing towards a political chaos and anarchy in a very near future. This anarchy may be hastened by a language controversy in South India, developing into a colossal movement there. This movement may, ultimately, start disintegration in India. Who knows, after all, Indian history is replete with such events!

Chapter XV

People of the Kashmir Valley

The sacrifices and tribulations which the people of the Valley of Kashmir had to undergo in the Liberation Movement, from its very beginning, are by no means less memorable. The 'Valley of Kashmir' comprises the two most thickly populated districts of Jammu and Kashmir State. From the very outset, the Valley has been the focus of political activity in the State, because of the fact that Srinagar, the capital of the State, is situated in the Valley, which is, by far, the most fertile part of the country. In fact it is the Valley which has given the whole State its name.

Enlistment in the Dogra Army was, for reasons unknown, denied to the Muslims, as well as the microscopic minority of the non-Muslim Kashmiri Pandits who live in the Valley. It is well known that no Mussalman could keep any arms even for the purposes of self-defence. Before independence dawned upon India, the non-Muslims in the Valley had, with the connivance of the Dogra Government, organized themselves in the form of the RSSS and other military associations, as was done in Jammu Province and elsewhere in India. The Muslims, on the other hand, in the absence of a strong and well-built organization, were unprepared, and were merely watching the development with a deep lurking in their minds.

A convention, as mentioned before, of the Muslim Conference workers met in Srinagar just before the

independence of India, and demanded the accession of Jammu and Kashmir State to Pakistan. Active support to the Movement for Kashmir's Accession to the Dominion of Pakistan by the Muslims of the Valley of Kashmir, was to be taken for granted, but what is really an eye-opener for the Government of India, and the outside world, is the attitude of the broad-minded non-Muslim leaders like Pandit Prem Nath Bazaz. Voice was raised in favour of holding a free and impartial Plebiscite on the issue of accession, by newspapers holding independent views on contemporary political problems. The daily 'Hamdard' and the 'Kashmir Times' both edited by non-Muslims, and the entire Muslim Press, demanded a Plebiscite in the State. Mr. Bazaz, the veteran social democrat, decided to go to Karachi and New Delhi, as the head of a deputation willing to wait on the Premiers of the Pakistan and Indian Governments, and make them agree to holding a Plebiscite regarding Kashmir's accession to either of the two Dominions. He was arrested before he could go with the deputation. His arrest and steadfastness in advocating a Plebiscite in Kashmir, are an unanswerable challenge to the intransigence of the Government of India, which has spent crores of rupees, and caused the loss of lakhs of human lives, to prove its wrong case right, by throwing dust into the eyes of all concerned.

Among other newspapers, the 'Kashmir Times', owned by Mr. Mitha and edited by G. K. Reddy, also supported the demand of holding a Plebiscite, with the result that both of them were externed, and their press confiscated. Warrants of arrest were issued against the Editor of 'Millat', Secretary, Kashmir Editors Conference, and the Editor, 'Islah', Srinagar. All pro-Pakistan journalists were persecuted, so much so that they had to find their way to Pakistan, in the quest of freer atmosphere to express their ideas. They had to close down their papers in the Valley, and the few who remained there were treated inhumanly. All independent newspapers were gagged and to-day there is no newspaper

in India-held Kashmir, which can opine independently upon the problem of Kashmir.

Before India sent her Army to occupy Kashmir, feverish and intense political activity was going on in Srinagar, and the other parts of the Valley of Kashmir. It included public meetings, processions and demonstrations. A deputation led by Maulana Mohammad Yusuf Shah met the Prime Minister Raja Janak Singh, and the Deputy Prime Minister R. L. Batra, and impressed upon them, for the last time, that giving power to the National Conference, and thereby paving the way for Kashmir's accession to India, would mean nothing short of courting disaster in Kashmir. But as usual this warning fell flat. Though the Kashmir Government had not, by that time, openly made any declaration in favour of India, its day to day policies and actions indicated beyond a shadow of doubt, as to which way the wind was blowing. The Ruler and his Government were taking directions from the State Department of the Government of India ever since Mahatma Gandhi, who visited Kashmir in August 1947, for the first and last time, as already pointed out, held a long talk with the Raja. This consequent conversion of the Maharaja, and the change in the Government policy, was marked by the expulsion of Rai Bahadur Pandit Ramchandra Kak from the Prime Ministership of Jammu and Kashmir State. Mr. Kak was supposed to be the main obstacle in the path of a Congress-Hari Singh alliance. With the new set-up, a reign of terror and ruthless repression was unleashed against the people of the Valley, who, one and all, stood for the accession of Kashmir to Pakistan. Civil Liberties were denied to them; they could not even hold public meetings; while the State authorities openly helped the National Conference, which was to be used as a pawn in justifying Kashmir's accession to India in the near future. This was going on in the capital of the Jammu and Kashmir, when the insurrection made its appearance in Poonch and other places. This was when the fugitive Nationalist leaders, like Bakhshi Ghulam Mohammad and

Ghulam Mohammad Sadiq, returned to their homes in Kashmir, after their 'exile' for one and a half year, and were received in the city by the Dogra Military against which they were supposed to have risen in revolt, when they launched what was called the 'Quit Kashmir Movement'.

The reunion of the Dogra Government and the National Conference, that was gradually and silently taking place in spite of the much publicised 'standstill agreements', and 'independence' of Kashmir, could not remain a secret for long. The Valley people clearly and keenly were conscious of all this. They did what was humanly possible to explode this alliance, and to make impossible the advent of a Hindu Raj in their country, but, in the end, the inevitable took place.

The entry of Maulana Mohammad Yusuf Shah, Mirwaiz, along with the acting President of the Muslim Conference, who was sent to Pakistan to contact Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, was banned in the State of Jammu and Kashmir one month before the accession actually took place, for obvious reasons.

When the tribesmen entered the State, to save it from such a tragedy, the Muslims of Kashmir received them cordially, and political activity reached its climax.

The Indian Army was called in by the fugitive Maharaja, and Sheikh Abdullah was invited to stem the tide of revolutionary forces. Unarmed hosts of pro-Pakistan Muslims organized Muslim National Guards, which later had to be crushed by the well-equipped National Militia of the India-supported Government in the Valley.

The disorganized, untrained and unarmed Muslims of Kashmir were no match for the 'mighty' Indian Army, the Dogra Army, the National Militia and the RSS units. Hence armed insurrection in the Valley was out

of the question, for the time being at least. But public indignation and resentment could only be silenced by resorting to the brutal and fascist methods of the lathi-charge, firings on peaceful gatherings and processions, continued promulgation of curfew order, and making mass arrests. Firing on a peaceful mob was once resorted to even in the Juma Mosque in Srinagar—resulting in several casualties. But all this had a transitory effect. The instinct of liberty and the inner urge to live freely in the hundreds of thousands of human souls is there and the flame of freedom continues to burn.

In the present struggle the people of the Kashmir Valley underwent the most inhuman torture in Kashmir Jails. They had been in jails in the time of the Dogras prior to the Indian occupation of Kashmir also, but the cruelties meted out to them in the last fifteen years are unprecedented in their character. Detention without trial was, and still is, the order of the day. In the name of justice and Law and Order, thousands of Muslims, and even pro-Pakistan non-Muslims, including political workers and leaders, lawyers, journalists, students and leading businessmen, were arrested in all parts of the Valley of Kashmir. Most of them have now been released and externed from the State.

The National Militia are in no way different from the Storm Troopers of Adolf Hitler. It is a terror to the people of the Valley, as it comprises 'goonda' elements which were a source of trouble for the political life of the State, even before the 'accession' of Kashmir to India. The Militia came into being as an auxiliary force, to serve with the Indian Army, and to reach quarters which would be inaccessible to the latter due to many reasons. This Army of terrorists can arrest any number of people without warrants, and search any number of houses without any charges, it enjoys more powers than the police. Most respectable citizens (not to speak of Muslim political leaders), like Rai Bahadur Ram Chandra Kak, were handcuffed with ropes made of straw and made

to double-march in the streets of Srinagar. The faces of many were blackened, and they were taken out in processions. Before the detenus were sent to prison they were subjected to humiliation yet unknown to the civilized world. Most of them were flogged and beaten black and blue. In the prisons, Srinagar Central Jail, for instance, they were almost to starve. One prisoner, Ghulam Hasan Bande, I am told, actually starved to death in Srinagar Jail. Even 'first class' prisoners were not provided with paper and ink or newspapers. No allowance was given to any prisoner's family. All the jails resembled the concentration camps of Hitler's Germany, where hundreds and thousands were thrust together for years.

In addition to physical torture, political prisoners were made victims of mental torments too. On the sad demise of Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the prisoners were told the news in a decisive manner, with the provoking and sarcastic foreboding that Pakistan would cease to exist now. Only those who have been in prison during the 1948-49 regime in Kashmir, can imagine what this remark must have meant to the hundreds of helpless prisoners at that time.

Whenever house searches were conducted to trace and arrest some underground leaders, scores, rather hundreds, of innocent people were victimized for nothing. Young girls, women and males of certain households in Zoonimar Illaqa, were made to stand in a frozen stream for hours together one night, when the National Militia were told that the late Mr. Abdus Salam Dallal, General Secretary of the City Muslim Conference, Srinagar, was in hiding there. About a dozen people were flogged for a full fortnight continuously at Achabal, by one J. N. Kakroo, when Abdus Salam Yatu, President of the Kisan Mazdoor Conference, was said to be absconding with those poor souls. Every village hooligan had become the village chief overnight, and this was termed 'revolution'. Whenever a unit of the National Militia

goes to any locality, the public become panicky, as the 'National Razakars' exploit the poor people and exact large sums from them.

The Nationalist leaders were not confident of their success in the initial stages of the Indian occupation of Kashmir. Their only game at that time was to make as much money as possible. They did not even hesitate to obtain from moneyed people exorbitant sums in the name of 'National Fund'. This was particularly done by the leaders in Anantnag District. God alone knows what became of this fund afterwards. Punitive taxes were imposed on many without any grounds, and no stone was left unturned to loot and bully the unfortunate people of Kashmir.

In the areas where the Indian Army operated, the havoc wrought and the massacres committed, were not difficult to visualize. Indian soldiers once killed even some soldiers of the National Militia, because they happened to be Muslims. Houses were burnt and property looted in Baramula and its vicinity. Rape and abduction are a common feature of life in these areas, even to this day. The honour of no Muslim woman is safe in Kashmir now-a-days at the hands of Sikhs and other Indian soldiers, who are found in swarms in the Valley's towns and villages.

An RSSS detachment committed dreadful atrocities once in Verinag Sector. This heinous scheme was planned by D. P. Dhar, then Secretary to the 'Prime Minister'. Numberless cases of kidnapping and murder and vandalism took place. The Government dared not to take action against those responsible for this arson.

Though comparatively less blood has been spilt in the Valley of Kashmir what the people of the Valley had to undergo is unforgettable. Their sufferings lay in mental and physical torture, and material loss in the complete paralysis of the tourist trade and commerce. Due to the

unnatural accession with India, Kashmir is at this time in a state of famine and it has been so for the last fifteen years. In the days when the war was going on, spacious tracts of cultivable land were devastated, because the villagers, male and female both, could not attend to their fields properly, due to the fear of the omnipresent Indian soldiers. Cultivation of maize was declared unlawful, because the Government of the day, which is uncertain of its own future, feared that tribesmen could remain in ambush in the maize fields. All this resulted in a state-wide famine. Prices of foodgrains have risen to a height unprecedented in the history of the land. That is why people are still migrating to Pakistan in search of livelihood and food even now, when there is no war and active hostilities have ceased.

Price of almost all commodities of daily use have risen enormously, because the usual channels of trade and communication have ceased to function, and new and artificial ones have failed to serve the purpose. Kashmir arts and crafts have lost their market in the world. The Export of dry and fresh fruits, and other commodities, like timber, has for all practical purposes ceased. The great number of people depending upon these trades for their livelihood have been pauperised, and forced by circumstances to migrate in thousands to Pakistan. It is noteworthy that a great number of students, political workers, businessmen and others, have been forced by Indian oppressors in the Valley and their henchmen, to traverse the snow-clad mountains and seek refuge in Pakistan and Azad Jammu and Kashmir.

Trade having thus received a death-blow, desperate attempts have been made by Srinagar Government to revive it. But this was not possible for obvious reasons. Kashmir tradesmen could not go to the Indian cities, where thousands of them had been butchered mercilessly in the days of the barbaric Hindu-Muslim riots. Even the poor Kashmiri labourers could not get there for fear of losing their heads. Then there is the difficulty of

transport and communication, which is an incurable thing as long as the State is with India. The only trade done now in Kashmir is under the control of the kith and kin of Nationalist leaders like Bakhshi Ghulam Mohammad, who have centralised everything in their own hands. Those who used to do trade formerly, are now a penurised lot.

Pauperisation of the trading community and the slump in trade had its repercussions upon all other fields of Kashmir's economy. The uncertain state of political affairs, and the drastic reduction in the State revenues, resulted in more and more deterioration. The clique of rulers and exploiters, without any qualms of conscience, kept on wasting the little revenues that were obtained on unconstructive and futile departments. The puppet Government of merry-makers never cared to ameliorate the lot of the unfortunate masses, whose guardians and custodians they profess to be. There is no exaggeration in stating that the condition of the man in the street, was much better fifteen years ago, than it is now, when there is 'Swaraj' and 'New Kashmir'.

The food situation, in particular, is deteriorating day by day. The people of the Valley are bearing all these iniquities as part of the struggle which are the natural consequences of the unnatural accession to India.

The educational institutes run by the Anjuman-i-Nusratul Islam and the like, are suffering at present for want of financial help, which they used to get even during the Dogra Raj from the Government. Educationally the Muslims of Kashmir were already backward, but the facilities they were enjoying before were denied to them in the 'New Kashmir' of India's making. All this stands in the way of the all-round progress and prosperity of the people of Kashmir.

The evils of corruption and cruelty, which were special characteristics and outstanding features of the Dogra Raj, were multiplied in the New Kashmir regime. The administration is rotten to the core, and needs

complete overhauling. The only law prevailing is the law of the jungle, and there is no use crying against it. The people have lost all they had achieved during the last twenty years' struggle, in the shape of reforms. Now there is a dictatorship established, which is not prepared to tolerate the slightest possible criticism of its policies. A microscopic minority, not amounting to lakhs, but a few thousands, are the only people satisfied with the present state of affairs; this because they got posts and positions and economic gains, which they could not even dream of getting otherwise. All these things have been clearly brought out in the letters of correspondents published in the 'Statesman' of Delhi.

The tale of the Valley of Kashmir is a tale of woe, of tears and blood. Whenever any important development in the political situation of Kashmir takes place, the Kashmir Valley people react to it, and they have to pay very dearly for this reaction. When members of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan came to Srinagar and Baramula, the students at both these places did marvellous work. In spite of the fact that Srinagar Government put security guards round the members of the Commission, so that none could approach, students, nevertheless, were able to present addresses to the Commission, and were also able to demonstrate at a number of places in favour of Pakistan.

In spite of the ruthless suppression of the forces of freedom and democracy by the Government of India, and the puppet Srinagar Government, the flame of freedom is still burning. Whenever occasion arises, and the assistance of the people of the Valley is needed to stimulate the titanic struggle of liberation, we should be confident of their active support. The trial which a number of them had to undergo in connection with the heroic 'Bomb cases', and the steadfastness with which they suffered the results, show as to what extent the people of the Valley are prepared to go shoulder to shoulder with their compatriots on this side of the Cease-

Fire line, for the liberation of their homeland. In short, the marvellous deeds done, sufferings faced, and steadfastness and dauntlessness shown by the people of the Valley during the last so many years, in spite of their manifold handicaps and shortcomings, will be a source of inspiration to posterity for many years to come.

In August, 1953, Sheikh Abdullah was dismissed as Prime Minister of Kashmir in a dramatic fashion. While Sheikh Abdullah slept in his hotel room in Gulmarg, a coup d'état took place in Srinagar. The great leader, who was so sweetly owned by Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru, for so many years, was put in prison without much ceremony.

Sheikh Abdullah had differed with Pandit Nehru on the pertinent question of accession of the State to India. Experience had proved to Sheikh Abdullah that it was not an easy job to go along with Hindus and a Hindu Government, although this Hindu Government was then presided over by a confirmed liberal like Nehru himself. In consequence of his holding these views, Sheikh Abdullah suffered incarceration for ten years. In these sufferings, he bore insult and humiliation with courage and steadfastness. He stood by his convictions, though he had sacrificed everything for these convictions. No temptation came in the way of Sheikh Abdullah in his stand on the question of the inalienable right of the people of Kashmir vis-a-vis the question of plebiscite. No sufferings nor humiliation could make his mind change. His family bore insults and privation. They all stood firm and faced the might of a Government of India for twelve years or so. They are still doing it.

Sheikh Abdullah's leadership is established. His place in history is assured for all times to come. The people of Kashmir, quite rightly, pin great hopes on him. His other colleagues deserve just as much praise and credit. Leaders of this calibre are the surest guarantee to a people's struggle for freedom and its success in the end.

Chapter XVI

Kashmir's Ties with Pakistan


Much has been said and written since the beginning of the Kashmir issue, on the social, religious, cultural, historical, geographical and economic relationship of Kashmir with Pakistan. Before the troubles in Korea and Viet Nam, Kashmir was the burning topic in world politics, and the most important item on the United Nations agenda. For the Commonwealth of Nations, Kashmir is still the most outstanding problem which is pending solution. Untiring efforts have been made by the United Nations to bring about a peaceful and democratic solution of this problem, but, as was disclosed by the U. N. Representative in his last announcement, no results worth the name have been achieved so far with regard to the demilitarization problem nor was there any hope of the case being settled till recently. Demilitarization of the State, of course, is the main hitch at this moment. There are, however, at the time of writing, efforts afoot, through which the Prime Ministers of India and President of Pakistan may meet, and discuss all the outstanding problems and disputes between India and Pakistan. We only hope and wish that such an effort will succeed, but past experience points to the contrary. India and Pakistan cannot live like good neighbours, until and unless the Kashmir issue is thrashed out to the entire satisfaction of both sides. If this problem is not settled amicably, it might result eventually in a war between the two countries, which of course, will put international peace into jeopardy. In the Kashmir issue itself lies the

future of four million human beings. If a solution is not brought about, and the situation is allowed to deteriorate, there is every danger of some precipitate action being taken, probably out of sheer exasperation. It seems necessary, therefore, to assess and appreciate the problem of Kashmir scientifically, in the light of irresistible facts and unchallengeable logic.

Numerous arguments have been advanced to prove that Kashmir is a natural part of Pakistan, while there is nothing to justify her accession to India. The latter has taken advantage of the fact of the accession of a ruler, who had lost sway over his domain, and he signed the Instrument of Accession. The Indian Army has no moral or human sanction behind its continued presence in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. It is not without reason that, day by day, world opinion is deprecating India's Kashmir policy, and extending its support to the people of Kashmir, who desire to attain their right of self-determination.

The first and foremost link between Kashmir and Pakistan is one of geography. Even a layman in geography can very well understand that nature has designed Kashmir to be a natural part of Pakistan, and not of any other country. The Hindu-Kush ranges in the North, the hilly tracts of land in the North-West, common between the adjoining districts of the West Pakistan on one side, and Jammu and Kashmir State on the other, prove, beyond a shadow of doubt, that, geographically, Kashmir and Pakistan are one. No natural barriers separate Kashmir from Pakistan, as is the case with respect to India. It is only a man-made and artificial line which separates Pakistan from Kashmir. Climatic, agricultural and other physical conditions in these two areas are so alike that, without previous knowledge, one cannot differentiate between the two.

The three rivers, Ravi, Chenab, Jhelum which come down from the ancient snow-clad mountains of Kashmir,



Prime Minister of Pakistan Making a Speech on a Historical Occasion at Tarakhel

enter Pakistan to become tributaries of the River Indus. These rivers are the natural sources of water supply for Pakistan, and the rivers Ravi, Jhelum and Indus do not go to India at all. Incidentally, the Government of India, it is alleged, are preparing schemes to tamper with the natural flow of these waters. If the Government of India succeeds to any degree, the possibility of completely ruining West Pakistan agriculture, and her irrigation system, is always there.

Chaudhry Sir Muhammad Zafrullah Khan, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, making his speech in the Security Council in 1950, spoke on this aspect of Jammu and Kashmir State's link with Pakistan, as follows—

‘A look at the map, distributed to members of the Council, will show that the boundary between the State of Jammu and Kashmir and the Dominion of India, bisects the mountainous range practically throughout its whole length. I should explain that near Pathankot, which is a railway terminus close to the boundary on the Indian side, there is a gap of about 20 to 30 miles which is a plain. Then the mountains begin and the whole of the common boundary from that point between India and Kashmir is mountainous. Most of the mountains are high and inaccessible. India's only road link with the State passes through that gap of about 20 to 30 miles width. The importance of that factor is, that India has nothing to fear from the side of Kashmir, inasmuch as there is scarcely any possibility of direct communication between Kashmir and India.’

With regard to Pakistan, the case is entirely different, said Zafrullah Khan—

‘On looking at the boundary between Kashmir and Pakistan, it will be seen that the greater part of the boundary runs along the plains, and cuts across three

of the main rivers that flow through Pakistan’.

Emphasizing the communications aspect of Kashmir with Pakistan, Zafrullah Khan said—

‘Next comes the question of communications which, of course, is one of the corollaries of the geographical situation. Before partition, all three roads that led into Kashmir passed through Pakistan. Since partition, and after the Indian forces were moved into the State of Jammu and Kashmir, Pathankot has been linked by road with Srinagar, but this road goes over the 9,000 foot high Banihal Pass, and it is snowed up for 4 to 5 months in the year. The State has a very short railway line running from Jammu in the direction of Sialkot, in Pakistan. All three main rivers of Kashmir flow into Pakistan. Thus the geographical position and communications both indicate the natural integration of the State of Jammu and Kashmir with Pakistan, and not with India.’

The borders of Kashmir and Pakistan are common for several hundred miles. While India and Kashmir are linked by a comparatively smaller part of mountainous land near Pathankot, which itself, but for the notorious Radcliff Award, should have been in Pakistan. Much labour and money has been wasted by the Government of India, to construct and build an unnatural link between India and Kashmir, in order to maintain her forcible occupation of the ‘Valley of Kashmir’. It is a well established fact that that link is always open to damage and destruction by torrents in the rainy season.

It was made clear by the last Viceroy of undivided India that geographical contiguity was to be the most important factor to be taken into consideration by the Ruler of a Native State, when he wanted to choose between Pakistan and India. But the leaders of India did not care at all for these considerations.

From times immemorial, Kashmir has had economic ties with the parts of pre-partition India, which now constitute Pakistan. The only two metalled roads, *i.e.*, the Banihal Cart Road and the Jhelum Valley Road, which have linked Kashmir with the outside world throughout the ages, enter Pakistan and no other country. The Kathua-Pathankot road which had been constructed to connect Kashmir with India since 1947, is only open during six months in the year, because of the Banihal Pass. This, therefore, makes a very poor substitute for the two historical and natural means of transportation and communication with the outside world, so far as the Kashmir Valley is concerned. These two roads and also the railway link between Jammu and Sialkot, have been the life lines of Kashmir's trade and commerce in the past. Since India's forcible occupation of the valley of Kashmir, the functioning of these communications has been completely destroyed, with the result that Kashmir's trade has received a serious set-back, rather a death blow, during the last fifteen years.

Kashmir has been exporting unfinished silk, fruits (dry and fresh), wool, foodstuffs, articles of embroidery, carpets and other things through these roads before 1947, and her inhabitants have been importing things of their daily use along the same route.

The fruit trade in Kashmir, for instance, has practically ceased, because the export of perishable commodities and fruits or vegetables, *via* the Kathua-Pathankot road, is next to impossible. These commodities rot before they can reach their destination by that road. Even if it were possible to send these goods to India, India has no potential market for their consumption. A considerable section of Kashmiris earn their living by horticulture, and there is every possibility of this trade developing to a great extent, if Kashmir were to accede to Pakistan. Difficulties of transport and communication, in case India continues to hold the unfortunate land of Kashmir, are sure to kill completely

this trade, and cripple all other industry.

Not to speak of these details, the mere fact that a 50% decrease has taken place in the revenues of Jammu and Kashmir State during the last 14 to 15 years of the Indian occupation, is enough proof that Kashmir's future is wedded to Pakistan, and not to India. Timber which is water-borne, worth so many million rupees was being exported from Kashmir to Pakistan through her rivers and now that Kashmir is torn into two parts by strife, this trade has also more or less come to a standstill. The trading community inside the State has been pauperised by the suspension of trade that has been a natural consequence of unnatural 'accession' and the denial of the usual means of communication and markets for Kashmir products.

Sir Muhammad Zafrullah Khan speaking in the Security Council during 1950, analysed the position in these words—

“Let us now consider the economic factors. The one single article which is outstanding with regard to Kashmir resources and trade is timber. The timber is cut in the mountains. It is dragged down to the rivers and streams and rafted down into Pakistan. The two markets for Kashmir timber have always been Wazirabad, which you will see is next to Sialkot on the map, and Jhelum which is on the Jhelum River, where the river intersects the road and the railway between Wazirabad and Rawalpindi, so that the whole of the timber produce of the State passed through, and was marketed and sold in Pakistan. There was no other means; there is no other means of conveying that timber out of Kashmir. The Security Council can judge of the volume of this trade, from the fact that 20 to 25 per cent of the total revenue of the Kashmir Government, was derived from the sale of this timber.”

Speaking with regard to other items, Sir Muhammad Zafrullah Khan emphasized similarly the question of trade of Kashmir in fresh fruits and vegetables. He pointed out that the nearest markets for these fruits are at Rawalpindi and Sialkot in Pakistan.

What really connects the economy of Pakistan with Kashmir is the flow of rivers from Kashmir into Pakistan. Because of the natural flow of these rivers into West Pakistan, a system of irrigation has been brought into being, which contributes almost 90% to the welfare and well-being of the inhabitants of West Pakistan. Sir Muhammad Zafrullah Khan in his speech in the Security Council during 1950 commented on this aspect as follows—

“There is another, and an almost overwhelming economic factor that must be taken into account. The three rivers—beginning at the top of the map—the Indus, the Jhelum and the Chenab, which flow from Kashmir into Pakistan, control, to a very large extent, the agricultural economy of Pakistan itself. As much as 19 million acres of land are irrigated in West Pakistan from the waters of these rivers. If Kashmir were to accede to India, this supply is liable to be cut off altogether. This is not an idle apprehension on the part of Pakistan. This situation has arisen already in the case of the rivers Ravi, Beas and Sutlej which have their sources in India, but flow on to West Pakistan and irrigate a considerable part of its cultivable area. On the 1st April, 1948, India took up the position that, being the upper riparian State in respect of these rivers, it was the owner of every drop of water in them and was entitled, if it so chose, to cut off the entire supply which flows down into Pakistan. On the basis of that claim, India actually cut off the supply on 1st April, 1948, and the supply was not restored until six weeks later, when, at the point of the pistol, India had obtained an agreement from Pakistan, that Pakistan would not

only go on paying its proportionate expenses in respect of the running of these systems, and the interest charges on the capital involved, but also seniorage, *i.e.*, the price of water supplied.”

While emphasizing the same aspect of the economic link between the State of Jammu and Kashmir and Pakistan, Sir Muhammad Zafrullah Khan again proceeded to say—

“Assume, for one moment, that Kashmir were to accede to India. The same would apply to the other three rivers, and not only the water of the three rivers which flow from India into Pakistan, but that of the three rivers which flow from Kashmir into Pakistan would be denied to Pakistan. Nineteen million acres of cultivated land would be turned into a wilderness and millions of people would be faced with starvation and extinction. That is an economic factor the like of which cannot be produced in a comparable case anywhere else.”

Desperate attempts at reviving Kashmiri art and trade made by Srinagar Government have failed miserably, because of the lack of the means of transport and communication. Before India was divided, Kashmiri traders could be found in every big city of India, but as soon as Independence dawned upon the sub-continent, barbarism and savagery were let loose in some parts of that country, as is well known. Kashmiris' shops were looted and plundered, even in New Delhi under the very nose of the 'champions' of Kashmir's freedom. Many traders were killed, with the result that it was made practically impossible for any Kashmiri Mussalman to move about with freedom and security in any part of India. In such an atmosphere, trade and commerce was impossible. No doubt with the advent of the Liaquat-Nehru Minorities Pact, communal fervour did subside to a certain extent, but the prejudices are there, and to this day it has not been possible for Kashmiri

Muslim tradesmen to resume their vocations, as they used to do in olden times. 'Chamber of Commerce' and 'Emergency Trade Bloc' have also not served any useful purpose as far as is known. Before the present unfortunate state of affairs, our trade was flourishing even in the West, but it is now on the decrease.

During the initial stages of India's occupation of Kashmir, Kashmiris had to undergo unprecedented scarcity of articles of food, so much so, that in those unforgettable days a seer of rock salt (Pakistani salt) was sold for 16 rupees. Even now after fifteen years of Indian rule in occupied Kashmir, there has been no visible improvement in the conditions of the people. Consequently, many people have migrated to Pakistan in search of the means of livelihood. Prior to India's independence also, thousands of Kashmiri labourers have been coming to the plains of Pakistan to earn their daily bread. If Kashmir needs prosperity and progress in the economic sphere, she must resume her economic dealings with Pakistan, and that is possible only when her unnatural bondage with India is severed.

One might mention, with all emphasis, that a large number of Kashmir's agriculture labour remains practically idle during the winter months. In these winter months this surplus labour used to migrate to the Punjab plains, and earn their livelihood in different cities of Pakistan. Since the Kashmir Valley has been occupied by India, it has been impossible for Kashmiri labourers to come down to the plains of West Pakistan. Since the conditions in India about Mussalmans are also not certain, and because of communal tension in that country, free movement of Kashmiri Mussalmans in India or the Indian cities has not been possible. This has forced Kashmiri rural labour to stick to their homes. In consequence, they have economically suffered. As far as the opinion of the neutral observers has been ascertained, it confirms this view.

Last, but not least, come the social and religious ties

of the people of Kashmir and Pakistan. The inhabitants of Kashmir and Western Pakistan belong to the same race. It may, however, be made clear, that race is not necessarily a determining factor of mutual relationship between Muslims and Muslims. Islam is more than a sufficient link between the people of Kashmir and Pakistan. Islam is a way of life and not a collection of rituals, customs and conventions. It teaches equality and brotherhood to its followers. It follows that people having one and the same way of life are a single nation. More than three-fourths of the population of the Jammu and Kashmir State comprise Muslims, and the religion of the inhabitants of Pakistan is Islam.

Mr. Philips Price, a Member of the British Parliament, while writing in the *Manchester Guardian* of November 11, 1948, expressed himself in unequivocal language :

“Passing up the Jhelum River along the boundary between Pakistan and the Kashmir State, one observes, at once, that the population is exactly the same on both sides of the political line. The language is the same and so is the dress, and Islam is the common faith. I ascended the narrow valley of Jhelum by a road built by British Engineers when the Pax-Britannica prevailed in this land. It was the main road once to Srinagar.”

Writing in the *Times of London* of December 3, 1948, the Special Correspondent of that newspaper commented:

“On the other hand, in the western districts of Poonch, Muzaffarabad and Bagh, tens of thousands of peasants, uprooted by the fighting, are homeless and are trekking across the hills in bitterly cold weather, seeking sanctuary with their co-religionists in Pakistan. The recent push by the Indian Army where some 10,000 Hindu and Sikh refugees are being protected by a small Indian garrison from possible massacre, has meant that more thousands of Poonchis have left

their homes in Mandhar and the adjacent areas, and joined the pathetic stream of evacuees, some of whom have been on the roads for more than a year.”

Vivisection of the Indian sub-continent took place on the basis of religion, and, keeping this thing in view, they would only be self-interested persons, who would try to justify and endorse India's policy with regard to Kashmir. Justice demands that Kashmir should go to Pakistan, with which the future of her people is linked.

It is also clear that, for purpose of Kashmir's defence, it is Pakistan which can be depended upon and not India. During the Liberation Movement, India's many times larger army could not succeed in waging war against the semi-armed Azad Kashmir Army in 1947-48. How can India be expected to defend Kashmir in future from any outside aggression? This proposition had been clearly proved when China had trouble with India. Examining the same proposition from the point of view of Pakistan, namely, Defence, it is quite clear to anyone who would care to examine the strategy of Kashmir vis-a-vis Pakistan, that, if the enemy forces exist on the soil of Kashmir from one end to the other, the defence of Pakistan becomes almost impossible. Kashmir, from the defensive point of view, completely surrounds, from one end to another, nearly the whole of West Pakistan. If Pakistan's frontiers, to a length of five hundred miles, are exposed to a hostile army, along with other frontiers that Pakistan has to defend against India in the East and West Wings of Pakistan, this country will require a huge army. The maintenance of a large Army cannot be sanctioned, in any case, by the economy of the country. Therefore, to think in terms of Pakistan without Kashmir as an independent country, is a complete fallacy. If Pakistan is to remain independent and her territorial integrity is to be maintained, Kashmir must become a part of it. If for some reason the accession of the Jammu and Kashmir State cannot be achieved, Pakistan's independence is a doubtful proposition.

Sir Muhammad Zafrullah Khan speaking in 1950 in the Security Council said with regard to the strategic factors:

“What about the strategic factors affecting the situation? India’s security is not affected to the extent of one ounce, by the accession of Kashmir to Pakistan. On the other hand, look at the question from the point of view of Pakistan. Take the main railway line, running from Lahore through Wazirabad to Rawalpindi, and on to Peshawar. It has a road running parallel to it throughout. These are the two main strategic road and railway systems of West Pakistan. The whole of the defence of that area is based upon the fact, that this line would not be threatened from the flank. If Kashmir acceded to India, the whole of that flank would be threatened and broken.”

Emphasizing the same aspect of the problem the Foreign Minister further pointed out—

“Pakistan might as well throw in its hand as far as making any preparations for defence is concerned. India would obtain direct access to the tribal areas, and, through the tribal areas, on the Afghanistan. Pakistan’s position would become absolutely untenable. The defence of the Pakistan frontier against any threat to it from the north-west has to be built up along the River Indus and, beyond the River Indus, between that river and the international boundary known in that area as the Durand Line. If we were threatened all the time on our flanks by India, what attention could we pay to the building up and the maintenance of our defence arrangements along the North-West Frontier? It would lay a burden on Pakistan which Pakistan could not possibly undertake to bear.”

So, no matter from whatever aspect one looks at the problem of Kashmir’s Accession, one and only one conclusion is inevitable—Kashmir must come to Pakistan some day or, at least, Kashmir assume a position, when Pakistan’s security cannot be challenged.

Chapter XVII

Accession Issue of the States

With the advent of independence both for India and Pakistan, there were as many as five hundred odd states which had to accede either to the Dominion of Pakistan or to India. The last Viceroy of pre-Partition India, in his last address to the Princes, had positively emphasized that the Princes had to accede to one of the two dominions. He had further urged upon them that the accession must take place, if possible, before August 15, 1947. This meeting of the Princes took place in the month of July, 1947. They were not altogether unanimous nor were they decisive. The out-moded old system of the rule of Maharajas was scattered all over the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent and the Princes had not the slightest idea as how to act, when the events proceeded so quickly. Probably, most of the Princes thought that the British would never part with power in India, and, therefore, their sun would continue to shine and they would continue suppressing their own people. The Princes had always depended on the support of the British in India. Quite often the British forces were used against the people in the States, and the *gaddies* of the Maharajas were made safe for them at the point of the bayonet.

But independence dawned much earlier than these people expected. They were caught unawares. Therefore they had no considered opinion on the matter far less to have come to any decision. Some of the Maharajas, however, were far-sighted enough, and had

also enough experience, to make up their minds on the accession issue. It was obvious to them that, in a sub-continent like ours, when the British had already left, and the Princes had neither good-will in the Congress circles nor in the Muslim League, their future, unless they unconditionally surrendered according to the advice of the last Viceroy, would be extremely doubtful. There were some Princes, nevertheless, who still believed that the British could help them, or that they could maintain their own separate independent entity. For instance, States like Travancore and Cochin tried their level best to maintain their independent existence, but they were completely broken by the Indian States Ministry headed by the late Mr. Patel. But the question of Hyderabad (Dn.), Kashmir and Junagadh was not so easy. These States became the subject of dispute between the Governments of India and Pakistan.

So far as the Indian National Congress was concerned, they had a definite policy on the States of India. They had a separate Congress Organization known as the States Congress, which was once presided over by Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru himself. The Indian Congress positively abhorred the rule of the Maharajas and the Nawabs, and the tyranny which was imposed on the people of the States. The Congress point of view, on the advent of Indian independence, was that the Princes must go. If any one of the Princes came in the way of this policy, he was broken and smashed to bits and pieces. The last expression of this policy of Government of India was on Hyderabad, where by means of 'police action' they broke the resistance of the State and occupied it through their armed forces.

Since the question of the States had to be determined one way or the other, definite lines had to be suggested to their rulers. Certain principles were to be determined with regard to the accession issue. The States, with this end in view, had to be guided by the British Authority in India on the lapse of paramountcy.

On this issue of accession of the States, the last Viceroy of old India had emphasized the following considerations which should weigh with the Princes—

1. 'Geographical compulsions which cannot be evaded'; and
2. Communal majorities of the Ruler's subjects.

I propose to quote from *Mission with Mountbatten* by Alan Campbell-Johnson. He says on page 192—

“It has been freely recognized that the act of accession is the prerogative of the Princes. But India's readiness to recognise such acts was governed by the time limit of the 15th August, which was, of course, the basis of Mountbatten's urgent appeal to the Princes on 25th July. Moreover, arising from that speech two other powerful factors have always been inherent in the choice of accession—first, in Mountbatten's own words, certain 'geographical compulsions' which cannot be evaded and, secondly, the communal majorities of the Ruler's subjects.”

As soon as the British Government announced their plan of June 3, 1947, for the future of the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent, paramountcy over the States was to cease on the appointed day, namely, the 15th August 1947, and the States were to be left free to decide to which Dominion they should accede. At the same time, the Crown Representative advised the Rulers of the States to take into consideration economic factors, geographical contiguity, the wishes of their people and other factors, in arriving at a decision vis-a-vis accession.

The Indian Independence Act provided that the suzerainty of the British Crown over the Indian princely States wouldl apse after the transfer of power to India and Pakistan.

After the lapse of paramountcy, the Crown Representative gave his candid advice to the Princes based on the definite principles mentioned above.

It will appear that at that time the Indian leaders were of the opinion that the accession of a State to Pakistan or to India should depend upon the will of the people rather than that of the ruler. On March 8, 1948, the late Mr. Gopaldaswamy Ayanger, the Indian Representative, explained to the Security Council the Indian position as regards accession of States in these words—

“No doubt the Ruler, as the head of State, has to take action in respect of accession. When he and his people are in agreement as to the Dominion to which they should accede, he applies for accession to that Dominion. However, when he has taken one view and his people take another view, the wishes of the people have to be ascertained. When so ascertained, the Ruler has to take action in accordance with the verdict of the people. This is our position.”

Similarly, in the White Paper on Hyderabad issued by the Government of India on August 10, 1948 the position was stated in the following words—

“The Government of India are firmly of the view that, whatever sovereign rights reverted to the States on the lapse of paramountcy, they vest in the people and conditions must be created in every State for a free and unfettered exercise of these rights.”

As has already been pointed out, the accession issue with regard to other States was amicably settled. Trouble arose with regard to the States of Hyderabad, Junagadh and Kashmir. Hyderabad had a Muslim Ruler but a majority of non-Muslim population. Junagadh, which was contiguous to Pakistan by sea, had also a Muslim Ruler but a majority of non-Muslim population. Kashmir had a Hindu Ruler but an overwhelming majority of

population is Muslim. Hyderabad decided to remain independent for the time being. Junagadh acceded to Pakistan on September 15, 1947 and the Maharaja of Kashmir made an offer of accession to India, which the latter accepted on October 27, 1947, subject to certain conditions.

About Hyderabad, the stand of the Government of India was that the State should first accede to India and then a plebiscite could be held to ascertain the wishes of the people; very much like Hitler's proposal for a referendum in Austria after the occupation of that country by German troops. In August 1948, the Government of India made a statement of their policy with regard to Hyderabad that—

“The Nizam's Government wish to hold a plebiscite under the conditions in which a small militant group controls the destinies of the people and the Razakars are left free to terrorize the people into submission. A plebiscite without an interim Government representative of and satisfactory to the majority population in Hyderabad will only be a fraud on the people.”

This, exactly, is the stand taken by the Government of Pakistan on the accession of Kashmir. To India what was good enough in Hyderabad was not good enough in Kashmir !

It will appear that the Nizam of Hyderabad desired to enter into special treaty relations with the Government of India, so that a fair measure of independence could be maintained for his State. This position was not acceptable to the Government of India, and they asked the Nizam to submit and accede to India without any conditions. The Nizam then offered to hold a plebiscite under the aegis of the United Nations, so that the wishes of the people may be ascertained on the issue of accession to India. This position, also, was not acceptable to the Government of India. The choice offered to the Nizam

of Hyderabad was a plebiscite, after he had already acceded to India. When no amicable arrangement could be arrived at between the Government of India and the Government of the Nizam, the Government of India invaded the territory of the Nizam of Hyderabad by means of a 'Police action', and took possession of the State, and a number of atrocities were committed on the Muslim population of the State.

With regard to Junagadh, it entered into a standstill agreement with Pakistan on 15th of August, 1947, and acceded to Pakistan on 15th of September, 1947. The Government of India strongly objected to any such agreement between Junagadh and Pakistan. The Government of India strenuously maintained that accession to Pakistan, was in violation of the principles on which the partition of the sub-continent had been agreed to and effected. They argued that partition of Indo-Pakistan sub-continent had taken place on the basis that, where there were Muslims in the majority that should form Pakistan, and where there were Hindus in majority it should form India. On this basis, they said, the accession of Junagadh State to Pakistan was not justified and the Government of India thought that accession of Junagadh State to Pakistan was a direct encroachment on Indian sovereignty and territory.

The Foreign Minister of Pakistan, while making his speech in the Security Council in the year 1950, in connection with the accession of the Jammu and Kashmir State, said—

“Cannot Pakistan with equal justice retort with regard to Kashmir in the very words employed by the Government of India in respect of Junagadh, that the so-called accession of Kashmir to India is in utter violation of the principles on which the partition of the country was agreed upon and effected, that it is an encroachment on Pakistan's sovereignty and territory and that it represents an attempt to disturb

the integrity of Pakistan?"

It was also pointed out in the same speech by Sir Muhammad Zafrullah Khan, on the logic produced by India, that the majority of the population in Junagadh was Hindu and the State of Junagadh was contiguous to India, the Ruler, though a Muslim, had no right to decide the accession issue against the will of the Junagadh people, Kashmir ought to accede to Pakistan unconditionally. It was pointed out that the Kashmir Ruler was a Hindu, but there was an overwhelming majority of Muslim population in the State. The State of Jammu and Kashmir was geographically contiguous to Pakistan. Then, on what logic and under what considerations could India accept the accession of Kashmir? Speaking further, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan pointed out—

“They proposed that the question of accession should be settled either by negotiations, that is, admitting India’s claim to the accession of Junagadh, or by a plebiscite organized under the joint control of the State of Junagadh and the Government of India.

“If this was a fair offer, why cannot Pakistan with equal justice, contend that the ascertainment of the wishes of the people of Kashmir should be by means of a plebiscite held under the joint control of the State of Kashmir and the Government of Pakistan?”

Subsequently a farcical plebiscite was held in Junagadh, while India was already in military occupation of the State. Pakistan’s complaint with regard to the State of Junagadh is still pending before the Security Council. So far as the Security Council itself is concerned, it has practically shelved the cases of Junagadh and Hyderabad. Kashmir still remains a live issue on its agenda.

With regard to the issue of the accession of Kashmir itself, much has been discussed and said in the chapter

under the heading 'Kashmir's Ties with Pakistan.' After the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir showed his inclination to accede to India, an independence movement had already been started by Jammu and Kashmir State people against such an accession. Talking about this movement Sheikh Abdullah commented as follows—

“The Kashmir State sent their troops and there was panic in Poonch. But most of the adult population of Poonch were ex-servicemen in the Indian Army who had close connections with the people in Jhelum and Rawalpindi. They evacuated their women and children, closed the frontier and returned, with arms supplied to them by willing people. The present position was that the Kashmir State forces were forced to withdraw in certain areas.”

When the tribesmen had to withdraw back to Abbottabad, this made the condition in the Jammu and Kashmir State absolutely precarious, and the people of the State were in complete panic and terror. Immediately after this a general massacre of the Mussalmans started in the State, particularly in Jammu. I was told by Quaid-Azam himself that, when he felt that the Kashmir Mussalman was in grave danger, he, as a Governor-General, decided to send Pakistan troops into the State. What exactly happened after this has been narrated by Alan Campbell-Johnson in his book *Mission with Mountbatten* on page 223 as follows—

“The military and political implications of today's move are grave, and Mountbatten is, of course, under no illusion about that. Although his role can only now, in the last resort, be advisory. I get the firm impression that his presence may already have helped to save his Government, overburdened and distracted with the problems of the Punjab and Junagadh, from the most dangerous pitfalls. It was a sudden emergency, calling at once for restraint and quick decision. Mountbatten's extraordinary vitality and candidness

were well adapted to the demands of the hour.

“I gather from him that it was last Friday night (24th October), at a buffet dinner in honour of the Siamese Foreign Minister, that Nehru first spoke of bad news and reported that tribesmen were being taken in military transport up the Rawalpindi road. State forces, it seems, were absent, and altogether a most critical situation was developing. Mountbatten attended the Defence Committee on Saturday 25th, at which General Lockhart read out a telegram from the Headquarters of the Pakistan Army stating that some five thousand tribesmen had attacked and captured Muzaffarabad and Domel and that considerable tribal reinforcements could be expected. Reports showed that they were already little more than thirty-five miles from Srinagar.”

He further goes on to say—

“The Defence Committee considered the most immediate necessity was to rush in arms and ammunition already requested by the Kashmir Government, which could enable the local populace in Srinagar to put up some defence against the raiders. The problem of troop reinforcements was considered, and Mountbatten urged that it would be dangerous to send in any troops unless Kashmir had first offered to accede. Moreover, accession should only be temporary, prior to a plebiscite. No final decision was taken on these vital questions on the 25th, but it was agreed that V. P. Menon should fly to Srinagar at once to find out the true position there.”

V. P. Menon, the Secretary of States for the Government of India, flew to Srinagar and found the conditions extremely ‘disturbing.’ He rushed the Maharaja through the instrument of accession, and flew back to Delhi, leaving the Maharaja at Jammu.

Alan Campbell-Johnson throws further light with regard to the Kashmir issue vis-a-vis the old Viceroy of India. He says thus—

“While urging the Maharaja to make up his mind about accession before the transfer of power, he had all along, from his visit in June onwards, exerted his whole influence to prevent him from acceding to one Dominion or the other without first taking steps to ascertain the will of his people by referendum, plebiscite election or even, if these methods were impracticable, by representative public meetings. When during the past forty-eight hours it became clear that the Government were determined, against the military advice both of their own Chiefs of Staff and of himself, to send in troops in response to a request from Kashmir for aid, he returned to the charge about accession.”

Campbell-Johnson again, in the same book, relates the story that, when Mr. Stephens, the Editor of *The Statesman*, Delhi, wrote a leading article “which, in its anxiety over the decline in Indo-Pakistan” relations, had denounced the injection of Indian troops into Kashmir, the Viceroy sent for the Editor and admonished him, in this manner—

“You cannot build a nation on tricks. Jinnah at Abbottabad had been expecting to ride in triumph into Kashmir. He had been frustrated. First there was Junagadh, then yesterday’s fantastic hold-up of the Hyderabad delegation India’s move on Kashmir was an event of different order. Her readiness to accept a plebiscite had been declared from the outset. A large-scale massacre, including a couple of hundred British residents in Srinagar, by tribesmen would have been inevitable if no military move had been made. The Maharaja’s accession gave complete legality to the action so far taken”.

Then with regard to how Pakistan was prevented

from sending her troops into Kashmir is narrated by the same author in his book *Mission with Mountbatten*, which is, of course, interesting. He narrates—

“In the middle of to-day’s Defence Committee, Auchinleck rang up Mountbatten from Lahore to say that he had succeeded in persuading Jinnah to cancel orders given the previous night for Pakistan troops to be moved into Kashmir. The order had reached General Gracey, the acting Pakistan Commander-in-Chief in the temporary absence of General Messervy through the Military Secretary of the Governor of the West Punjab, with whom Jinnah was staying. Gracey replied that he was not prepared to issue any such instruction without the approval of the Supreme Commander. At Gracey’s urgent request, Auchinleck flew to Lahore this morning and explained to Jinnah that in so far as Kashmir had acceded to India, the Government of India had a perfect right to send in troops in response to the Maharaja’s request.

“Before Auchinleck left him he had not only called off the order, but also invited Mountbatten and Nehru to come to Lahore. Vernon, however, arriving late for dinner after some harassing hours on the telephone, announced, ‘it is the end’. The whole plan had broken down as Nehru could not get to Lahore because of illness.”

I am quite positive in my mind today that, if on the urgent call that I had submitted to Quaid-i-Azam, the then Governor-General of Pakistan, on behalf of the people of Kashmir, the Pakistan troops had moved into Kashmir, *i.e.*, into Jammu and Srinagar, the accession of Jammu and Kashmir would have been accomplished for Pakistan. I am just as sure that there would have been no war between India and Pakistan and I have good reason for saying so, though I cannot go into these details. The alteration of this fateful decision changed the course of history and the accession of Jammu and Kashmir State is now a

matter for the future. On Kashmir, Mahatma Gandhi (relates Campbell-Johnson), struck an almost Churchillian note. His line was : "The result was in the hands of God; men could but do or die. He would not shed a tear if the little Union force was wiped out like the Spartans bravely defending Thermopylae, nor would he mind Sheikh Abdullah and his Moslem, Hindu and Sikh comrades dying at their posts in the defence of Kashmir. That would be a glorious example to the rest of India".

Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, Prime Minister of India, in his telegram of 8th November, 1947, to the Prime Minister of Pakistan said—

"It is essential in order to restore good relations between the two Dominions that there should be the acceptance of the principle that where the ruler of a State does not belong to a community to which the majority of the subjects belong and where the State has not acceded to that Dominion whose majority community is the same as that of the State, the question whether the State has finally acceded to one or other Dominion be ascertained by a reference to the will of the people."

Then again the Government of India took their stand on the same principle. The statement of the Indian Representative, Mr. Gopalasawami Ayyangar, may be re-quoted with emphasis. On 8th March, 1948, he said—

"However, when he (Prince) takes one view and his people take another view, the wishes of the people have to be ascertained. When so ascertained, the Ruler has to take action in accordance with the verdict of the people. That is our position."

It crystallises into this position—

(a) Certain states had to accede straightaway to

India, and certain others had, without any controversy, to accede to Pakistan;

- (b) There were other States which wished to remain independent, and wished to have relations with both India and Pakistan;
- (c) There were still other States whose Rulers were at variance with the people. Namely, the people wished to accede to one Dominion, and the Ruler wished to accede to the other.

In the last alternative above, it was expected by all concerned, *i.e.*, the British Government, the Indian Government and the Pakistan Government, that in such States, the principle that the will of the people should be ascertained should prevail.

While in the case of Hyderabad and Junagadh the Indian Government accepted this principle, in the case of Kashmir they only accepted this principle on paper, and, against all persuasions, they have so far refused to implement the provisions of the plebiscite agreement.

Chapter XVIII

Possible Solutions

When the Governor-General of India accepted the accession of Jammu and Kashmir State in October 1947, its accession was made explicitly subject to a future plebiscite. In the Indian Independence Act there was no such provision that any State could effect a conditional accession to one of the two dominions. Accession had to be total and irrevocable. In the case of Kashmir State it was not certain as to which dominion, according to the Governor-General of India, the people wanted to accede, therefore, an arbitrary procedure was resorted to and adopted by India in this particular case.

Again when the matter went to the Security Council, about the accession of Jammu and Kashmir State, the Government of India accepted the principle of plebiscite in the State in the clearest of terms. The Pakistan Government always insisted that it should be the will of the people, and not the act of Maharaja, that should decide the issue of accession of the State. The principle of plebiscite has been accepted by all the parties to the dispute. The United Nations also, in all their resolutions referring to the issue of accession, always laid it down in the clearest terms, that it was the democratic process of plebiscite that should finally decide the issue of accession of Jammu and Kashmir State to either India or Pakistan. That has been the position up to date.

Though all concerned have accepted a full and impartial plebiscite as the only method of deciding the

accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, and the efforts of the United Nations have so far been directed to that end, the attitude of the Government of India has been the main hitch towards the final achievement of this objective. Though the United Nations appointed an Administrator to conduct the plebiscite in the State, his induction into office has not so far been possible. The main reason for this delay has been the question of demilitarization of the State, and other ancillary matters. Up to this day it is the demilitarization problem that holds up all progress in the matter. It can be said emphatically, without any fear of contradiction that, with regard to the demilitarization of the State, Pakistan and Azad Kashmir authorities have always been very reasonable, and they have been prepared to accommodate the Government of India to any extent possible.

If a plebiscite could ever be held in the Jammu and Kashmir State I have never been doubtful, nor am I doubtful today as to its results. It is quite clear that the State is inhabited by 80 per cent of Muslim population. This Muslim population might owe allegiance to a number of political parties. One of them was All-Jammu and Kashmir National Conference. The case of nationalist leaders was that a very large number of Jammu and Kashmir State people believe in the ideology of the National Conference, which in turn owes its allegiance to the Indian National Congress. Nationalist leaders do not believe in the two-nation theory, on the basis of which Pakistan was founded, and India was partitioned. On the basis of this theory, the nationalist leaders believed that the majority of the people of the State wish to accede to India, and, in fact, according to them, they have already acceded to India. The Pakistan and Azad Kashmir case is, that an overwhelming majority of the people of Jammu and Kashmir State are in favour of Pakistan and that includes some of non-Muslims as well. But, taking a very conservative view of the matter, it would be very safe to presume that a very large majority maybe, 95 per cent of the Muslims, will vote for Pakistan. It is quite

true that there may be some people who are with National Conference, but that does not necessarily mean that they automatically would vote for India. The matter stands this way, that there are National Conference leaders who would like to vote for a nationalist leader as Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir State, but, on the accession issue, they would not like to vote for India. This matter, however, can always be confirmed by neutral observers. Nationalist leaders' claim that their party followers, because of their being members of the National Conference, would *ipso facto* vote for India, is not an acceptable proposition. This position has greatly changed now, because Sheikh Abdullah and his party-men have dissociated themselves from the National Conference. They have now formed a new party.

If a plebiscite had been held in 1948-49 or even in 1950, the plebiscite results would have been an 80 per cent vote of the people of the State in favour of Pakistan. But since these days things have changed a bit. Their henchmen, and the Government of India, have consolidated themselves in the State. They have established things according to their own ideas. This might make some difference, but, I am still positive, it will never make a decisive difference. I believe the result of an overall plebiscite, if a free and fair plebiscite were held under a free and impartial United Nations agency, would be a big majority in favour of Pakistan. This position is true to-day, as much as it was ever before. The fact of the matter is that India has manifestly and materially lost her prestige in the State. This has become more emphasised after the demise of Pandit Nehru.

There are people who talk of a zonal plebiscite. For this purpose the State could be divided into the following zones—

- (a) Trans-Chenab area *i.e.*, Kathua, Jammu and Udhampur Districts and a part of Riasi.

- (b) Rest of Jammu Area, that means Mirpur, parts of Riasi District and parts of Poonch.
- (c) Azad Kashmir territory, that includes parts of Mirpur District, parts of Poonch District, parts of Muzaffarabad District and Gilgit and parts of Ladakh, and
- (d) Valley of Kashmir.

If, for some reason, we abandon our accepted principle of an overall plebiscite, and think of an alternative plan in the form of a zonal plebiscite, this would pre-suppose a partition of the State. It would mean that the State must be divided into different zones, and the results of these zones, separately, should decide what parts should go to India, and what parts should go to Pakistan. If, for instance, the trans-Chenab area, which is a Hindu majority area and is also contiguous to India, returns a result in favour of India, then, it is argued, it should go to India. I will show how the results of a zonal plebiscite would go, but, before I do so, I wish to go into the question of partition of the State, which a zonal plebiscite pre-supposes.

The Government of India is opposed to partition of the State. The Government of Pakistan are also opposed to the partition of the State. All political parties of the State are opposed to partition except a few. There has not been any suggestion by the United Nations that the State should be partitioned. There has, however, been a suggestion put forward, on a diplomatic level, to the effect that the State be partitioned in such a manner, that India should get all such contiguous areas as are dominated by the Hindu population. A partition can only be agreed to if the parties agree. In fact, that is true about any solution of the problem. The Government of India ultimately might have to agree to such a solution, but it will be very difficult for the Government of Pakistan to agree, because if the area across the Chenab goes to India,

Pakistan's defence and economic problems remain, in fact, unsolved. Since Pakistan is committed to the principle of an overall plebiscite, it will be very difficult for her to get away from this stand. This may, to some degree, be true about India also. As regards the political parties of the State, they have not so far seen their way to even consider an alternative plan. But if the matter is put to them, as a last resort, in the name of international peace, it will have to be looked at from a broader angle. After Canal Waters Agreement between India and Pakistan, this aspect of the problem has become much easier. This question can now be considered as a feasible and acceptable solution.

The results of such a zonal plebiscite, one can safely predict, will be as follows—

- (a) In the trans-Chenab zone of Udhampur, Jammu and Kathua, an overwhelming majority of votes will go for India.
- (b) In the rest of Jammu and all other zones an overwhelming vote will go for Pakistan.

The result of this zonal plebiscite would be that, in the three districts of Kathua, Jammu and Udhampur, which are contiguous to India, the votes will go for India.

The third possible solution of the problem, which has recently been discussed in certain quarters, is the independence of the State. One cannot easily conceive of Jammu and Kashmir remaining a full sovereign independent State. There are some psychological and sentimental reasons for such a proposition. If one were to examine the whole problem dispassionately, one is confronted with the following central facts—

- (a) Is the State of Jammu and Kashmir, as an independent country, a financial and fiscal possibility?

- (b) Can the finances of the State be such as to allow the maintenance of some sort of an army to guard her frontiers?
- (c) Are there not very serious possibilities of the State becoming an arena of international intrigue, because so many international territories meet on the borders of the State?
- (d) Can the Jammu and Kashmir State be, economically and from the trade and food points of view, absolutely independent?
- (e) Can an independent State of Jammu and Kashmir be of any use to Pakistan or India?
- (f) Can Pakistan or India countenance and benefit from such an independent State to the extent to which it should?

These are some of the fundamental questions which must be answered. So far as the area and the population are concerned, one can very well visualize an independent Jammu and Kashmir as a Switzerland of Asia. The State could welcome visitors from all over the world and provide an international holiday resort, where people could come and forget their worries, and spend some money. That is one way of looking at it. Another manner of looking at is the more difficult way. Unless some solid economic and financial aid came from somewhere, an independent Jammu and Kashmir State is not easily feasible. If, for example, the trade relations break down with India and Pakistan for any reason, then what will happen to the trade of the State? If her trade fails, can the State financially still exist, and maintain her independence, without surrendering her sovereignty to one of the larger countries? This, in my opinion, is not possible. The State will have to compromise her sovereignty, at every point, when she has to bargain for

trade or financial aid. Then the big question is, can the State be independent, and maintain an army which could guarantee the defence of the State? The answer is a positive *NO*. The State finances are such, that it cannot be possible for the State to maintain any army at all. It will be foolish to imagine that the State can maintain an army, which will, if occasion arises, fight it out with any of the powers across her frontiers. If this proposition is correct, then the State has to live only on the good-will, and certain guarantees, which her neighbours must give her. An autonomous status can be conceded to Jammu and Kashmir State by Pakistan essentially and also by India. Such a status is conceivable, when Pakistan first, and then India can give a joint international guarantee that both will respect the integrity and independence of Jammu and Kashmir State. If such a position materialises, then the State of Jammu and Kashmir will have to enter into a special treaty agreement with Pakistan with regard to her defence, foreign affairs, communications, trade etc. This is absolutely essential. Without these, State cannot possibly have any other arrangement.

There is still another thing which could be considered. That the State should remain in a semi-independent condition, and this position may be guaranteed by Pakistan first, and then by India, and also by an international body like the United Nations. A central government for the State of Jammu and Kashmir may then be established by a coalition of all the political elements of the State and such a Government should be left to continue for a period of ten years to develop the State. In this period, a state-wide educational programme should be taken up by this Government, and the people should be thoroughly educated. Both Pakistan and India should extend financial aid to the State. The people of the State in this period should be given the maximum amount of political freedom. After this period it should be left to the Government of the people in the State to hold a plebiscite under auspices of either the International Court of Justice or any other international

body, to decide whether it should accede to India or to Pakistan, which should, in the end, certify its fairness and impartiality. Both India and Pakistan should bind themselves beforehand to accept such a verdict. It may therefore be considered as such by the Governments of Pakistan and India. I must, in the end, emphasize, that is the country of Pakistan which will be a very big loser it, if the State is lost to her, and it is her independence and integrity that will be positively jeopardized. Any solution, other than an overall plebiscite, must first satisfy the country and the people of Pakistan, and then it must be acceptable to the people of Jammu and Kashmir State, and must be essentially a democratic solution.

Chapter XIX

Future Prospects

Nobody can claim to be a prophet, nor is it advisable to hazard guesses which may mislead the public. Since the Kashmir problem involves issues which have far-reaching implications in the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent, and, in fact, elsewhere, so many factors have a bearing on the solution of this problem. The world situation, which at the moment is full of grim possibilities, shall as much affect the Kashmir issue as any other problem. The possibility of a third World-War is already in sight in Vietnam, Indo-China and round Formosa. The international horizon looks pretty grim. It should surprise no one if, one day, we find ourselves involuntarily involved in a world conflict. So many events and changes in world politics affect our problems and lives to-day, that to forecast definitely any solution of any problem, will not only be inadvisable but also fallacious.

The stage which we have just reached in Kashmir, with the failure of the Security Council, is far from satisfactory. India, I feel, has not, even one fraction, changed from her original attitude. As a matter of fact the opposition parties in India, like the Jan Sang and the Mahasabha, have adopted a stiffer attitude on Kashmir in particular, and on Pakistan in general. These parties are openly flouting every move of reconciliation between India and Pakistan. The Mahasabha and the Jan Sang leaders have declared that the partition of India was not acceptable to them, and their political parties wished to integrate the State of Pakistan with the

rest of India. Added to this, there is some agitation going on in Jammu province, particularly in the districts of Kathua, Jammu and Udhampur. The Parishad agitation, in brief, has the following programme in front of them—

- (a) Application, *in toto*, of the Indian Constitution to Jammu and Kashmir State;
- (b) Establishment of a responsible Government in the State with the Maharaja as the Constitutional Head;
- (c) Payment of compensation to the landlords, in the light of the procedure adopted in this connection by the Indian Constitution;
- (d) Banning of cow-slaughter in the State.

The Hindu population in Jammu area seeks complete merger with India. Indian Government are taking steps, through 'constitutional' means, to effect that merger. National Conference is now being integrated with the Indian National Congress.

In the same manner, the Nationalist Government of Srinagar has not been able to satisfy any section of the people of the Valley of Kashmir. The Hindu populace of Jammu feel that Nationalist Government is just as much an alien Government as the one under the British aegis. In any case, the present Nationalist Government's failure to do any substantial work for the people of the state has completely disillusioned all sections of the population. To-day the Nationalist Government is there, not on its own, but it is there because of the support that it is getting from the Government of India. The same is true of the Government on the Azad Kashmir side. Politically the state has suffered as a whole, but economic aspects of the progress cannot and must not be easily ignored.

The movement in parts of Jammu has opened up possibilities of certain parts of Jammu going over to India, because these parts contain a very big majority of Hindus. From these parts Muslims have practically been turned out. This, it seems, was a pre-planned arrangement, through which Muslims from these parts were either to be massacred or driven into Pakistan, so that these parts become in reality Hindu dominated areas, and, since these are adjacent to India, therefore they might automatically fall in line with India. The Hindu leadership has entrenched itself very strongly against the administration of Srinagar Government, though it is an absolute puppet in the hands of the Government of India. The repeated declarations of Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru, and men in authority in Srinagar, that Kashmir has entered into a cent per cent accession with India, have failed to satisfy the Hindu elements in Jammu area. These Hindu elements have been supported by the reactionary Hindu organizations in India, a mention of which has already been made. An agitation at one time unnerved Pandit Nehru himself, to the extent that he had to admit that, after all, he felt the people of Jammu and Kashmir State may not be with India. If that formed the basis of his policy, which it should have as early as 1947-48, if certain facts were realistically faced by Pandit Nehru, the solution of the Kashmir problem may have been much nearer than it seems to certain people. If the pace of events continues in the present direction for some time, and the Government of India changed their attitude towards the whole problem, and accept, with a sincere heart, the basis on which Pakistan and India were partitioned, then it would seem that the whole matter can be settled by sitting round the table, without much ado, or with ut resorting to an international conflict by means of arms.

Reverting to the Hindu agitation, which has a very close bearing on the solution of this problem, one might remark that a plebiscite offer, in order to decide the future of Jammu and Kashmir State, may not be accept-

able to the Hindus in Jammu province. The President of the Praja Parishad, Pandit Prem Nath Dogra, in his statement published in *The Times of India*, Delhi (October 6, 1952), said—

“An overall plebiscite in the State was suicidal and that it should be limited only to the Kashmir Valley”.

It will be seen that some other reactionary parties of Hindus in India, lent substantial amount of moral support to this idea, that Jammu, in any case, should automatically integrate with India without the plebiscite.

The late Doctor S. P. Mookerjee, President of Jan Sangh, in his statement published in *The Statesman*, Delhi, August 15, 1952, said—

“The people of Jammu are not prepared to be tagged to Kashmir Valley unless the principle of full integration with India is accepted. To curb this natural desire by force or coercion will be fatal and a separation will then become inevitable. It will be a mistake to brush aside the depth of such feeling by asserting that they are the outcome of the activities of a handful of reactionary and communal agitators.”

This will make it clear that the Hindu movement is directly against an overall plebiscite in the State. Secondly, that certain parts of Jammu should integrate with India in any case. It will also appear from the statements of these reactionary Hindu leaders, that they would rather have the state divided in the following manner—

- (a) Azad Kashmir going to Pakistan;
- (b) Praja Hindu movement area going to India straightaway without a plebiscite; and
- (c) A plebiscite in the Valley.

To these suggestions the Mussalmans, whether they are Nationalists or otherwise, are thoroughly opposed. On behalf of this section of people, it has been proved, and quite rightly, that Jammu province is a Muslim majority province. Therefore, the demand of certain Hindus, that Jammu province should integrate with India without ascertaining the will of the people, is a fallacy, and this questions the integrity and solidarity of the State. Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru had, of course, agreed that the indivisibility of the State will be maintained. But who knows, after Pandit Nehru, a weak Government at Delhi may give way to the demand of Hindu reactionary groups.

Speaking on this matter Maulvi Saeed Masudi, the General Secretary of the All-Jammu and Kashmir National Conference, said in a speech in the Indian Parliament on August 7, 1952 as follows—

“The cry and slogan that Jammu and Ladakh were predominantly non-Muslim areas was fraught with grave danger. It was fantastic to suggest that the districts of Kashmir, being predominantly Muslim, should be kept apart from the districts of Jammu and Ladakh which were predominantly non-Muslim.”

Of course, the impression created by Hindu reactionaries, that Jammu Province is a Hindu dominated province, is an enormous fallacy. That on this so-called basis, the province of Jammu should automatically integrate with India, is a bigger fallacy still. That for this purpose the Jammu Hindus have elicited support from the Hindu reactionary parties in India is without any doubt. Pandit Nehru himself in the Indian Parliament on December 13, 1952 stated—

“The leaders of the Praja Parishad have been in constant touch with the leaders of some organizations in India, more specially in Punjab and in Delhi. A deputation of Praja Parishad workers had toured

and is still touring Punjab and PEPSU endeavouring to enrol volunteers and setting up branches for this purpose at Amritsar, Jullundur, Ludhiana and the Praja Parishad agitation in Jammu. We have received information that the Praja Parishad collected some money in Punjab (I) and in Delhi. Also that rations and some arms and ammunition have been stocked by it."

Large-scale American arms aid to India has changed the position substantially. India's attitude towards Pakistan has become stiff. Any concession to Pakistan on any front by India seems unlikely. In Kashmir, India has in right earnest started its integration without caring for what Pakistan does in the matter.

These factors, if considered in a cool manner, might affect the decisions of the Government of India on all matters of Indo-Pakistan relations. If India and Pakistan develop cordial relations and all disputes are amicably settled, neither of the two countries need necessarily join any one of the blocs.

It will be seen that the possibility of the Security Council producing any solution of Jammu and Kashmir is getting remoter and remoter. It has already been discussed elsewhere, that the method of approach to these problems by the Security Council, is no that of a Court which can straightaway give a decision and decree on hearing both the parties. The main difficulty is that the Security Council is in the role of a negotiator, and it has only to bring the parties together, and put in best efforts to make them agree to a solution. And, for achieving that solution, the Security Council only produces certain formulae to the respective Governments for their acceptance or rejection. This process of bringing out formulae and sending them to the Governments for their acceptance or rejection has already been carried on *ad nauseum*. Therefore, the effort of solving the Kashmir tangle through the Security Council does not seem to

hold any prospects of success. I believe, and, it seems that the Security Council also believe, that much cannot now be achieved by further effort.

The possibility of a war between the States of India and Pakistan does not seem to be acceptable to any one at the moment.

In any case it will be a big disaster for the whole of Asia, if there is an open conflict between India and Pakistan. Such a possibility will destroy the economic and political structure of both the countries. They may, in such an eventuality, lose their freedom. No wise man, in either of the countries, will advise his Government to come into an open conflict.

The question of Kashmir will have to be resolved. My view is that, instead of bringing India and Pakistan into conflict with each other, it is more desirable that the people of Kashmir should themselves struggle for their freedom, as it was done by the people of Algeria and by so many other people, particularly in Africa and Asia. The struggle of the people for their freedom will be more commendable and all the more worth having for the people themselves. No freedom is worth anything and, indeed, it is no freedom at all, unless it is freedom obtained at the cost of the very life blood of the people themselves. What I can think and what I believe to be the shape that this struggle should take, will be, in brief, narrated in the following lines.

It has now been established that during the last 15 years or so, Government of India tried their best to rehabilitate the people of Kashmir economically and politically. This was done by consistent efforts by Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru. And, in fact, by delaying the plebiscite in Kashmir, his primary and principal object was to so rehabilitate the people there, economically and politically, that a demand for a plebiscite may die its natural death. But, to his entire disappointment to the

last day of his life, Pandit Nehru was himself convinced that he had failed in his mission in Kashmir. India, in occupied Kashmir, has been facing political unrest and economical chaos. As a consequence of political unrest India had to put in prison hundreds of people. And that included Sheikh Abdullah, the great leader of the people of Kashmir, for as long as a period of a decade. Since the release of Sheikh Abdullah from his prison, he is still continuing his great fight against a foreign rule. Sheikh Abdullah has the backing, in his struggle of freedom, of all the people in Kashmir.

My plan for a future struggle in Kashmir would be as follows:—

- (a) Pakistan Government should completely absolve itself of all the responsibility of maintaining the cease-fire line in Kashmir. The reason is that, in 1949, the United Nations gave solemn guarantees to the people and the Government of Pakistan for holding a plebiscite in Kashmir, when a cease-fire agreement was reached between all concerned. It is now absolutely clear that the United Nations have failed to implement their promises. This, no doubt, has been due primarily to the attitude of the Government of India. But, nevertheless, Pakistan Government should now, legitimately, tell the parties to that agreement, that all have failed to implement their solemn promise of a plebiscite in Jammu and Kashmir. Therefore, Pakistan by herself, is not, morally or otherwise, in a position to guarantee the maintenance of the cease-fire agreement. If other agreements, which were supposed to follow the cease-fire agreement, have not been brought into being, it is useless to compel the people of Kashmir to be bound by the implication of cease-fire agreement,

which, to them, is worth nothing much. The people of Kashmir are still suffering a foreign domination and they are deprived of their freedom and liberty.

- (b) After Pakistan Government have absolved themselves of their responsibility in the State, the people of Kashmir should be left to themselves to organize a movement of liberation on an all-State level. They should organize themselves systematically, making Azad Kashmir as a solid base for such a struggle. This struggle should be left to be pursued by the people of Kashmir and their leaders.
- (c) Before such a struggle is launched, the Azad Kashmir Government should inform all the democratic countries in the world, of the existing state of affairs in Kashmir. This Government, which should be an all-parties Government, should also undertake to get the assistance, moral, political and financial, from all democratic countries of the world. After this organisation is complete in all respects, the people should launch a struggle for freedom.

What is happening in India today, one cannot fail to notice. India is a large semi-continent. It is inhabited by peoples of all colours and creeds, believing in different ideologies and living in different regions and having different cultures. It is not possible, particularly, for a weak Government to keep these elements together in a united one political nation. In India a disintegration process has already set in, and it will continue. India may further be divided into different states. This process of disintegration proves, if there was any doubt left about it, that India cannot stand as one country. This one India theory has again exploded. If this is realised

by the leaders of India and they adjust themselves accordingly, this will be good for India herself and for all those countries who are neighbours to India. If, some day, this view of re-examination of all the political and social problems of India takes place, this will be a healthy development. They will have to concede in this context, that Kashmir has a separate place in this sub-continent and cannot, by force, be made an integral part of India, by any standard.

Those who want to make it so only wish to perpetuate an unnatural relationship, which can only end in tragedy for India and Pakistan and Kashmir.

Chapter XX

Muslim Countries and Kashmir

On my way back from the Security Council, in 1950, I had enough time to visit Turkey, Cyprus and Egypt. Of all the Muslim countries, including Pakistan, Turkey, to my mind, is the most advanced from every point of view. One can see that the country has undergone a social, economic and political revolution. One is apt to form inaccurate impressions of the whole country while visiting only Istanbul and Ankara. The impressions may still be fallacious, if one has been there only for a brief period. Even so, one can quite easily see that the people of Turkey have, in a number of fields, made extraordinary progress during the last twenty years or so. Turkey's economy is not self-sufficient; she, therefore, has profitable trade agreements with other countries. Strategically she is so placed, that her position is far from enviable. Because of her, at present, not having good relations with Soviet Russia, she has a hanging threat of Russian aggression over her head. She controls the Dardanelles. She is a small country and cannot afford to maintain a big Navy. She has a very big Army, out of all proportions to her economy. But, without the Army, it is not possible for her to guard her frontiers. Most of her finances are, therefore, spent on her Defence. Every son of the soil is a soldier. He must be a soldier.

Turkey has made experiments with dictatorship, and has quite successfully passed through that phase, though Turkey's counterparts in Europe have not been able to do so. She is now experimenting with a party-

system of Government. I have no doubt that, with further advance of education, she will become one of the foremost countries in Asia in all respects, and probably she may lead all Asian countries in establishing a democratic system of Government. Since above lines were written, Turkey's democracy had some rude shocks. Japan is bound to leave all Asian countries miles behind in all aspects of life.

Turkey has a very good press. When I visited that country in February, 1950, most of the press belonged to the opposition. ULUS was the only influential Government paper.

Turkey is vitally interested in Pakistan affairs. During my stay in that country, the Turkish press and people gave me a real welcome. I will not easily forget the hospitality and politeness of the people. My impressions about the Turks are really the result of my contact with the people in Ankara and Istanbul.

During my stay in Turkey, I lectured at a number of places and addressed a number of conferences. A lawyer from Ankara used to attend these lectures with his little son. His son was hardly eight years old. When I left Ankara this child gave me a letter for the children of Pakistan and Azad Kashmir. There was nothing extraordinary. But, while leaving me at the station, this young child burst into tears. This was an incident which could have occurred only in Pakistan or Kashmir. This goes to show how close the Turkish people are to us.

Turkey has managed her foreign policy wonderfully well, since the Turkish Republic came into being. She is placed in a difficult position because she holds a key position between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. In the context of the world blocs of today, to keep neutrality for Turkey is not an easy game. In the last War she was able to do so. Whether she can do it again

in the next World War is a very big question. In any case, it will not be possible for Turkey to remain exclusively outside the sphere of the Balkan Blocs.

We have very often been told, quite probably by interested people, that Turkey has gone un-Islamic. It is quite true that Turkey has undergone a social and political upheaval, but essentially the people of Turkey are just as much Muslims as people anywhere in Pakistan. Nothing is farther from the truth than the assertion that Turkey is in any way going un-Islamic. I am told in the educational system compulsory religious education has been introduced by the Government in Primary Schools. The Government runs a religious department where all religious matters are studied and given attention at the expense of the Government.

In the early days of the Turkish Revolution, there indeed was a reaction of indifference towards religion, because of political reasons. Ataturk did not like his country to be attached to other countries, which, though Muslim in name, were in fact, pawns in the hands of the foreign powers. For Turkey, Kamal Ataturk wanted an independent national existence, and a foreign policy not tied to that of any other foreign country. In such an attitude he was quite justified from every point of view.

Turkey today, though just as Islamic as any other Islamic country, has got rid of a lot of old stupid customs and out-of-date usages, which always hamper the smooth progress of a people. In education, in social advancement and in political progress, Turks are in the front rank. Turkey had a foreign policy of complete independence till recently. She has no particular liking for becoming a member of a Muslim Bloc, nor, as a matter of fact, any bloc in any other country. The reasons for such an attitude are historical, and are quite easily understood. But recently she has been compelled to cast away this policy.

While my stay in Turkey was brief, in three weeks' time I got enough publicity. I was able to hold a number of conferences and individual meetings with the newsmen of Turkey, and with the newspaper editors. During these formal and informal talks, I was able to convince the newspapermen, and through them the press and the people of Turkey, of the nature of Kashmir's Liberation Movement. I was also able to tell them how the Kashmir people had been practically overpowered by India by sheer force of Arms. Of course, this matter was easier for me to do, because the Turks themselves are a people who heroically fought for their own liberty. They have to become stronger still to maintain their own integrity and independence.

The Turkish papers also commented on the issue of Kashmir, even before my visit to that country, in a very liberal manner. They always supported any cause of Pakistan, though the Indian Embassy in Turkey always tried their level best to put a different picture in front of the Turkish people. I must say, to the credit of the Turkish press and people, that they are sufficiently educated to explore and examine all matters, before they form their judgement or views. This is exactly what we lack in this country. We go by gossip and baseless rumour. The people in Turkey are judicious enough to sift what is gossip and what is truth.

Before I left Turkey I made it a point to visit most of the historical places that existed in Ankara and Istanbul. In Istanbul particularly, I visited the old palaces of the kings of Turkey—the kings of the Turkish Empire. These palaces and all the old relics they contained, remind one of a bygone age, when Muslims ruled almost the whole of Asia. One feels really proud of them when one sees them. In one palace I saw old things which were, I was told, brought from China, and their age was anywhere near thousands of years. It was a pleasure to see them. Ankara, I visualized, represents how Ataturk had organized an otherwise illiterate and back-

ward people in a crisis. The Turks have the capability of developing into a first-rate nation.

After leaving Turkey, I visited Cyprus. Cyprus is a small island in the Mediterranean, a very important place from the strategic point of view. The majority of the population of this island is Greek. The rest are Turks. The loyalties of the Turks are for Turkey and those of the Greeks, quite naturally, for Greece. The Turks wish to be linked with Turkey, while the Greeks seek union with Greece. This is the most vital question for the people of this island, which was, till recently, governed by the British. The Turks of this island have wide and deep sympathies for every Muslim cause.

When I landed in this island, only for a day, I found the public very enlightened on the Kashmir question. The local Turkish papers gave large headlines to my visit. A number of people came to receive me at the airport. I was their guest for a night. That night I attended a concert which was purely Turkish, and quite interesting for me, though I could not understand the words used. In the morning when I was leaving for the airport, after naming a baby in my honour, people crowded in the streets. One old man, as my car stopped, came to me and asked if I was the one whose picture had been published in the papers. He showed me the picture in the local papers which he hugged. To my saying, 'yes' from the old man's eyes flowed down two tears through the stubs of his over-grown beard. These small things leave such an indelible impression on one's mind and one really feels the greatness of the common man. This little island of Cyprus, has been after attaining her independence, a victim of a civil war. This war is still going on.

My next stop was in Egypt. I stayed in Cairo for a number of days. Cairo is the centre of all Middle East and Arab countries. It is also a holiday resort for European people. Perhaps it is one of the most cosmopolitan cities of the world. East and West meet here.

In the hotels like 'Semiramis,' one finds the European traveller, and also the foreign diplomat. Along with this crowd one finds the Egyptian Pasha, immaculately dressed with a red fez on his head. The Egyptian people in Cairo speak French fluently. They also speak English, but not as well as they can speak French.

Egypt leads the Arab countries, though not quite effectively, through the Arab League. The Arab League in the beginning was an effective organ to plead the cause of Arab countries and all the Mussalmans. Today it has grown weaker. One only wishes that the Arab League were a completely free agency, and not, in any manner, influenced by any foreign power. With the coming into power of the Wafd Government in Egypt in 1948, it was expected that the Arab League would become a strong and independent organization. The results have been quite the contrary. The new revolution which has taken place in Egypt is expected to change the whole situation. But one has got to carefully watch what happens in Egypt, for it is certainly a danger spot in global strategy. She has always been wooed by Western powers because of her position. A suggestion in the form of Middle East Defence has already been put to Egypt for their consideration.

Egyptians and the Egyptian Government had sympathies with the Muslim cause of Kashmir. The Press undoubtedly accepted the case of Pakistan as the real truth about Kashmir. As long as the Wafd Government was in power, it always had a leaning towards Pandit Nehru, because of a personal friendship that existed between Pandit Nehru and Mustafa Nihal Pasha, the Wafd Leader. The Press, and, in some respects the Government, nevertheless, supported the Pakistan case in Kashmir, though in this support they were always very deficient. The policy of the present Government vis-a-vis Pakistan and the Kashmir problem, has not yet crystallized into something definite. From gleaning from the present uncertain affairs, Egyptians will always

understand the Kashmir problem very well, because the Sudan problem is similar to the Kashmir problem.

It is very necessary that there should be stability in Egypt in order to create stability in the Middle East. If Egypt is strong then the Muslim countries, whether jointly or even separately, also get strength. Since Egypt is a country of the Arabs, therefore the people of Pakistan have very deep sympathies and connections with the people of Egypt. In any case, Egypt is a country with thousands of years of history behind it. Peoples all over the world love to talk about Egypt. We hope that Egypt, after all its economical and political turmoils, will emerge a strong and independent nation. In the context of present international politics, it is hardly possible for anyone of the Arab countries to lead a completely independent existence.

As I have already mentioned, to Egypt, Kashmir is another Sudan. Kashmir's case regarding accession to Pakistan, is exactly what Sudan is to Egypt. It was, therefore, very easy for me to put before the Egyptian Pressmen the Kashmir case. There are a number of Cairo Pressmen who have already been to India, Pakistan and Azad Kashmir. All of them have, naturally, sympathies for Pakistan. As far as the Kashmir case was concerned, it needed no logic to argue with the Egyptians. All of them had sympathies for us. They also appreciate the moral side of the case, though one has to admit that India is also trying her best to concentrate over her popularity in Egypt.

The majority of people in Egypt have genuine sympathies for Pakistan. There are others, and that includes the ex-Shah Faruq of Egypt since deceased who think that Pakistan is a rival country. This is quite natural. But I am sure, by our consistently sympathetic attitude towards Egypt, and all other Muslim countries, such impressions will disappear in time. It will be only in due course that all Muslim countries will be able to form

into one united bloc, not necessarily a parallel political bloc, but an organization based on regional ties and religious sympathies. Only then will 40 crores of Muslims, pulling in one direction as a united whole, be able to affect political and economic issues of the world. That seems to be the only way by which all the Muslims and Muslim countries of the world would be able to, not only maintain their independence but also would be able to fight for the other small nations of Asia.

India wishes to exert a great influence over Egypt in order to win her favour. I do not think India will succeed in this. India does not like the Arab League, because India disowns any bloc based on religious or any other racial basis. Egypt would like to be a leader of all Arab countries, which is a natural aspiration. Because of Kashmir, Indo-Pakistan relations have been strained. A consistent propaganda has been carried on by India in Egypt against Pakistan. In spite of her admiration for Hindu leaders, in their fight for freedom against the British, Egypt has always been on the side of Pakistan. One thing, however, has been exploited by the enemies of Pakistan. This has been the propaganda that Pakistan has been a deliberate creation of the British. Since Egyptians, because of the Sudan and the Suez Canal policy of the British, have not much liking for the British, the above line of propaganda has done substantial damage to Pakistan's cause. The way the Pakistan delegation took up the cause of Palestine has, to some extent, retrieved our position in all the Arab countries. Pakistan indeed played a very conspicuous role in the fight for Palestine, in the United Nations Organization. Pakistan later on earned for herself a lot of good-will, by espousing the cause of the many small Muslim countries of North Africa in the United Nations.

I wish to say something, in passing, about Islam in Middle Eastern countries. I might candidly admit that I have no experience of wide travelling in these regions, to make a profound remark. My impressions, it is quite

likely, may be wrong or based on scanty information and inadequate experience. My feeling is that Islam is not a very strong point with the Muslim countries today. Internal and external policies of the Middle Eastern countries, have, to this day, been influenced by other countries. So long as foreign influences exist in the form of economic imperialism, Islam's revival does not seem to be a very near possibility. Politically all the Asian countries have adopted, in one way or the other, the Western political systems. Obviously, because of Western domination of the Eastern countries for the last two to three hundred years, even today, looking at the present economic condition of these countries, it becomes clear, that unless these countries revive economically, they are bound to succumb to foreign influences. Strategically, countries like Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, and also Pakistan, are so placed, that in a global war it would be a miracle for them to keep neutral. But that does not, necessarily, mean a policy of surrendering a country's sovereignty to a foreign power. One surely should have honourable alliances and trade, and other relations, without which no modern country can exist.

Formation of an Arab League by itself is not a strong proof of Islamic revival. Islam as a living religious, political and social guide does not exist anywhere today. The Western type of democracy, in all its essentials, does not exist anywhere either. We are today living under a mongrel sort of system, which is Western in character, and is imposed on people not at all suited to such a system. Unless we again examine the fundamentals of Islam, and bring about any changes that may be required in the non-essentials, and apply those Islamic values to solve our problems, we shall be faced with a crisis resulting in a psychological chaos, ultimately ending in confusion. That will be a sad day for Muslims and Islam. If we all agree on this, then no time should be wasted.

In order to avoid economic bankruptcy of all the

Middle Eastern countries, which undoubtedly will result in political upheavals of an unprecedented nature, economic planning may be undertaken. The special conditions of these countries may be studied, first, in their details, and, when a body of economic specialists may evolve a plan, it should be implemented by mutual co-operation of the countries of these regions. Necessary co-operation of the U. N. O. may be obtained for economic emancipation, without necessarily surrendering political sovereignty to any particular bloc.

The Kashmir cause has been recognised by almost all the Muslim countries, except perhaps Afghanistan. All countries, for instance, Iran, Iraq, Syria and others, have expressed their deep sympathies for Pakistan's cause in Kashmir. Iran in particular, through her Press, has, in clearest terms, supported Pakistan in her struggle in Kashmir.

The writer of this little book has had the occasion of visiting very large number of countries, in 1964, as a member of the Kashmir Goodwill Mission. The writer visited West Africa and East Africa. He also visited Turkey, Egypt and Sudan. After these countries, the writer has had another occasion to visit very large areas in South-East Asia. This included countries like Malasia, Indonesia, Japan and Philippines.

The countries, in Africa, have obtained their freedom at the expense of great sacrifices. They are emerging as independent nations, claiming full share in the comity of nations of the world. This emerging of independent states in Africa, is a great source of inspiration to those countries who are struggling for freedom throughout the world, particularly in the colonies. The writer was impressed the way in which this Goodwill Mission was received by the Governments and the people of these countries in Africa. This is also true for the countries in South-East Asia. There is, however, hope that these countries will support, morally and

otherwise, a struggle that may be launched in Kashmir by its people. The writer is also convinced that the countries like China and Russia, who have always supported the struggle for freedoms of the subjugated people in the world, will morally support such a struggle. These Communist countries must also be approached in this connection and informed of the existing state of affairs in this region. I am not disappointed with regard to Western democratic countries. Even they will be convinced of a struggle for freedom in Kashmir, though they may not be able to give any substantial assistance. Nevertheless, I am thoroughly convinced that they will not oppose any movement for freedom.

What is basic is the fact that all concerned in India and Pakistan, recognise the people of Kashmir an entity. They are a people who have always struggled for freedom and have suffered tremendously in their struggle for freedom. All their efforts, to be free, must be supported as such. Nobody should have the idea that Kashmir can be had and owned as a piece of property. Those who have such ideas, they must revise them. In any case, it will be unfair for anybody to think that Kashmir can be used as a piece of property. This, the people of that land, will no longer tolerate, though they may have tolerated this in the past.

